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Abstract 
Public research and development (R&D) subsidy is one of  the most important 
policy instruments to tackle R&D-related market failure of  firms. Studies based on 
neoclassical economics have substantially discussed the effects of  R&D subsidy on firm-
level R&D input and output. Recently, academic studies have focused increasingly on the 
effect of  R&D subsidy on the behavioral additionality of  firm-level R&D processes to 
further describe and analyze the contents of  the complicated “black box” between R&D 
subsidy and firms’ R&D activities. 
Combining the knowledge-based view with an organizational learning perspective, 
this dissertation explores and analyzes empirically the interactions between R&D subsidy, 
organizational learning behaviors, and firm-level R&D outputs in the context of  China, 
from an evolutionary and systemic perspective. A set of  panel data were applied to the 
empirical analysis, covering 7,928 manufacturing firms in Jiangsu Province observed 
from 2010 to 2014. The main econometric methods are comprised of  propensity score 
matching, instrumental variables, Tobit regression model, Logit regression model, and 
Cox regression model based on the specific research questions for each chapter. 
According to the empirical results, this dissertation reveals the following findings. 
First, the R&D subsidy promotes the firms’ investment in R&D collaborations with 
universities, and it also promotes firms’ citations of  knowledge from universities in their 
invention patent applications. At the same time, firm-level higher educational R&D 
human resources, conceptualized as higher absorptive capacities, and are found to 
moderate R&D subsidy positively to promote the firms’ citations of  knowledge from 
universities in invention patents. Surprisingly, antagonistic effects exist between the 
science parks and R&D subsidy due to the overlapping of  public support in China. 
Second, no impact of  the R&D subsidy is detected in the novel knowledge exploration 
of  firms in all stages, yet public funds significantly inhibit firms in the decline stage from 
adopting novel knowledge in innovation. Third, firms' learning behaviors in novel 
knowledge adoption of  core technological focus change at the firm level can be 
significantly facilitated by participating in R&D subsidy programs. However, this effect 
differs between local and central R&D subsidy programs. More specifically, this 
facilitating effect on firm-level core technological focus change is significant in local 
R&D subsidy programs, while no similar effect can be found in central R&D subsidy 
programs. 
ii 
This is arguably the first study that explores and discusses the effect of  public R&D 
subsidy on firms’ learning behaviors of  novel knowledge exploration based on the 
knowledge-based view and organizational learning perspective in the context of  China, 
in which the Chinese government has placed more emphasis on enhancing firm-level 
R&D capabilities by learning. Empirical evidence is also provided for validating relevant 
theoretical hypotheses. This dissertation extends understanding beyond previous studies, 
which focused mainly on the effect of  R&D subsidy on firm-level R&D input and output 
within the logic of  neoclassical economics. By extending the application of  
organizational learning theory, this dissertation strengthens the theoretical depth in the 
research field of  public R&D subsidy. At the same time, it is the first study to differentiate 
various effects of  R&D subsidy from central and local governments on firms’ R&D 
behaviors. This provides a new perspective for related studies and expands the strategy 
research related to the government-industry dynamics. This dissertation also explores the 
interactions between public R&D subsidy, firms’ learning behavior, and R&D output in 
the context of  China from a more comprehensive perspective, and further contributes 
to the aforementioned process of  understanding what is happening inside the “black box” 
between public R&D subsidy and firm-level R&D activities. In addition, the dissertation 
adopts Cox regression to explore the effect of  R&D subsidy on firms’ learning behaviors 
of  new knowledge exploitation, which is a methodological innovation in respect of  
current related studies. 
Furthermore, the policy and management implications based on this study are 
provided. For example, the focus of  R&D subsidy policy is required to change from a 
result-based focus to process-orientation in China, and the Chinese government should 
carefully consider the timing of  R&D subsidy allocation. At the same time, the 
government should also help shape the external learning environment of  firms. More 
importantly, the central government needs to decentralize the authority of  allocating 
R&D subsidy investment to local governments to enable the technological upgrading of  
local firms. For managers, this study provides implications on strategic decisions on when 
and how to participate proactively in governmental projects in relation to the exploration 
of  new knowledge for the enhancement of  their own innovative capabilities and 
technological upgrading. 
 
KEYWORDS: R&D subsidy; behavioral additionality; R&D output; organizational 
learning perspective; novel knowledge exploration; China
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Resumé (Summary in Danish) 
Offentlige tilskud til virksomheders forsknings- og udviklingsudgifter (F&U) er et 
af  de væsentligste politikinstrumenter i forhold til at adressere F&U-relaterede 
markedsfejl. Studier baseret på neoklassisk Økonomi har udfoldede diskussioner af  
effekterne af  F&U tilskud på virksomheders F&U input og output. I den seneste tid har 
akademiske studier i stigende grad fokuseret på de adfærdsmæssige effekter af  F&U 
tilskud for derigennem at afdække den komplicerede “black box” i sammenhængen 
mellem F&U tilskud og virksomheders F&U aktiviteter. 
Ved at kombinere et vidensperspektiv med et organisatorisk læringsperspektiv 
udforsker og analyserer denne afhandling empirisk sammenhængene mellem F&U tilskud, 
adfærd i forbindelse med organisatorisk læring, og virksomhedernes F&U aktiviteter. Det 
sker i en empirisk kontekst som er Kina. Der anlægges et evolutionært og systemisk 
perspektiv. Et panel datasæt anvendes i den empiriske analyse. Det dækker 7,928 
fremstillingsvirksomheder i Jiangsu Provinsen og dækker perioden 2010 til 2014. De 
primære økonometriske metoder er propensity score matching, instrumentielle variable, 
Tobit regressionsmodel, Logit regressionsmodel, og Cox regressionsmodel.  
De empirisk analyser i denne afhandling giver de følgende resultater: For det første 
viser det sig, at F&U tilskud fremmer virksomheders investeringer i F&U samarbejder 
med universiteter og det fremmer virksomheders citeringer af  viden fra universiteter, når 
de ansøger om patenter. På samme tid influerer det på resultaterne om virksomhederne 
har højt uddannet arbejdskraft, idet dette udgør en ressource i forhold til at indoptage 
viden fra universiteter, og dermed påvirker tendensen til at citere universitetsbaseret viden 
positivt. Det er overraskende, at der er modsatrettede effekter af  forskerparker og F&U 
tilskud, men det kan skyldes overlappende subsidier i den kinesiske kontekst. For det 
andet viser det sig, at der er ikke effekter af  F&U tilskud i fald virksomhederne er i en 
explorativ, udforskende fase. Dog er det sådan at F&U tilskud gør virksomheder i 
tilbagegang bedre i stand til at indoptage ny viden for innovation. For det tredie giver 
deltagelse i F&U programmer en positiv effekt på virksomheders evner til at optage ny 
viden, særligt i forbindelse med tilpasning af  deres kerneteknologier. Imidlertid er denne 
effekt forskellig i henholdsvis lokale og centrale F&U tilskudsprogrammer, idet den er 
klart positiv i lokale programmer, men denne effekt genfindes ikke i centralt organiserede 
programmer.  
iv 
Dette er sandsynligvis det første studie som udforsker effekterne af  kinesiske, 
offentlige F&U tilskud på virksomhedernes læringsadfærd med hensyn til anvendelse af  
ny viden og som samtidigt anvender et vidensbaseret og organisatorisk læringsperspektiv. 
Den kinesiske regering har haft mere focus på at styrke virksomheders F&U kapacitet 
gennem læring. Der gives i afhandlingen desuden empirisk belæg for relevante teoretiske 
hypoteser. Afhandlingen udvider den eksisterende forståelse af  emnet, eftersom tidligere 
studier primært har fokuseret på effekterne af  F&U tilskud på virksomhedernes F&U 
input og output set i lyset af  et neoklassisk økonmisk rationale. Ved at anvende 
organisatorisk læringsteorier styrker afhandlingen den teoretiske dybde i studier af  F&U 
tilskud. Samtidigt er det det første studie som skelner mellem forskellige adfærdseffekter 
af  F&U tilskud fra henholdsvis lokale og centrale offentlige aktører. Dette giver et nyt 
perspektiv for relaterede studier og udvider dagsordenen for studier af  dynamikkerne i 
offentlig-privat samspil. Afhandlingen udforsker også sammenhængene mellem 
offentlige F&U tilskud, virksomheders læringsadfærd, og F&U output i en kinesisk 
kontekts med anvendelse af  et mere holistisk perspektiv, og dermed udfoldes indholdet 
i den “black-box”, som er mellem offentlig F&U tilskud og virksomheders F&U 
aktiviteter. Yderligere anvender afhandlingen Cox regressioner til at udforske effekter af  
F&U tilskud på virksomheders læringsadfærd med hensyn til at udnytte ny viden. Dette 
er en metodemæssig nyskabelse af  relevans for lignende studier. 
Endelig giver afhandlingen såvel politik- som ledelsesmæssige implikatoner. For 
eksempel bør fokus i F&U tilskudspolitik ændres fra resultatbaseret til procesbaseret 
politik i Kina, og den kinesiske regering bør overveje nøje hvordan timingen af  F&U 
tilskud skal ske. Desuden bør regeringen hjælpe med at skabe et læringsmiljø for 
virksomhederne. Endnu mere vigtigt bør den centrale regering decentralisere 
kompetenceen til at foretage allkokering af  F&U tilskud møntet på teknologisk udvikling 
af  virksomhederne. For virksomhedsledere peger studierne på den strategiske betydning 
af  hvornår og hvordan virksomheder skal deltage proaktivt i offentlige programmer for 
at udnytte ny viden til teknologisk og innovative evner. 
v 
Table of Contents 
Abstract............................................................................................................................................. i 
Resumé (Summary in Danish) ....................................................................................................iii 
Table of  Contents ..........................................................................................................................v 
1. Introduction................................................................................................................................1 
1.1 Research Background ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.1.1 Public R&D Subsidy: A policy tool for Coping with Market Failure of  R&D
 ................................................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1.2 Behavioral Additionality: A New Perspective of  Evaluation on Effects of  
R&D Subsidy ....................................................................................................................... 3 
1.1.3 Development of  R&D Subsidy in China .............................................................. 4 
1.2 Problem Formulation and Potential Contributions................................................... 10 
1.2.1 Problem Formulation and Delimitation .............................................................. 10 
1.2.2 Potential Contributions .......................................................................................... 12 
1.3 Key Definitions ................................................................................................................ 13 
1.3.1 Public R&D Subsidy ............................................................................................... 13 
1.3.2 Innovation Output .................................................................................................. 13 
1.3.3 Behavioral Additionality from a learning perspective ....................................... 13 
1.4 Dissertation Structure ..................................................................................................... 14 
2. Literature Review and Research Framework ..................................................................... 17 
2.1 Public R&D Subsidy, Input and Output Additionality ............................................. 17 
2.1.1 Market Failures and the Role of  R&D Subsidy ................................................. 17 
2.1.2 The Mechanisms of  R&D Subsidy ...................................................................... 22 
2.1.3 Different types of  R&D subsidy .......................................................................... 26 
vi 
2.1.4 Empirical Studies on R&D Subsidy ..................................................................... 27 
2.2 Public Subsidy and Behavioral Additionality .............................................................. 34 
2.2.1 The Conception of  Behavioral Additionality ..................................................... 34 
2.2.2 Empirical Studies on Behavioral Additionality .................................................. 41 
2.3 Public R&D Subsidy, Behavioral Additionality, and Output Additionality： A 
Comprehensive Perspective ................................................................................................. 53 
2.4 Review of  Existing Literature and Research Framework ......................................... 55 
3. Methodology ........................................................................................................................... 59 
3.1 Paradigm............................................................................................................................ 59 
3.1.1 Ontology and Epistemology ................................................................................. 59 
3.1.2 Positivism, Interpretivism, and Pragmatism ....................................................... 60 
3.2 The Paradigmatic Position of  the Dissertation .......................................................... 62 
3.3 Research Design............................................................................................................... 63 
3.3.1 Theories Selection for Hypotheses Building ...................................................... 63 
3.3.2 Empirical Techniques ............................................................................................. 66 
3.3.3 Samples and Data .................................................................................................... 70 
3.3.4 Technical Roadmap of  Dissertation .................................................................... 72 
4. R&D Subsidy and High-tech SMEs’ Collaborations with Universities ........................ 73 
4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 73 
4.2 Theoretical Development and Hypotheses ................................................................ 75 
4.2.1 The effect of  R&D subsidy on high-tech SMEs’ collaborations with 
universities .......................................................................................................................... 75 
4.2.2 The moderating effect of  high-educational level R&D human resources .... 76 
4.2.3 The moderating effect of  location in science parks .......................................... 78 
4.3 Data and Method ............................................................................................................. 78 
vii 
4.3.1 Data Description ..................................................................................................... 78 
4.3.2 The PSM sampling .................................................................................................. 79 
4.3.3 Methods and Variables ........................................................................................... 81 
4.4 Empirical Results ............................................................................................................. 84 
4.5 Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 90 
4.6 Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 94 
5. R&D Subsidies, Organizational Development Stages, and firm-level exploratory 
learning ......................................................................................................................................... 95 
5.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 95 
5.2 Research Context: R&D Subsidy and Renewable Energy Industry Development in 
China overall and in Jiangsu province specifically............................................................ 96 
5.3 Literature Review and Hypotheses ............................................................................... 98 
5.3.1 R&D Subsidy and the Firm-level Learning Behaviors ..................................... 98 
5.3.2 The Heterogeneous Effects throughout Organizational Development Stages
 .............................................................................................................................................. 99 
5.4 Data and Methods ......................................................................................................... 101 
5.4.1 Data .......................................................................................................................... 101 
5.4.2 Cox Proportional Hazard Model ........................................................................ 102 
5.4.3 Variables .................................................................................................................. 103 
5.5 Empirical Results ........................................................................................................... 106 
5.5.1 The effect of  R&D subsidy on firms' exploratory learning .......................... 106 
5.5.2 Robustness Check ................................................................................................. 109 
5.6 Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 111 
5.7 Appendix ......................................................................................................................... 113 
6. R&D Subsidy Programs, Novel Knowledge Exploration, the Change of  
Technological Focus: the Different Roles of  the Local and Central Governments ..... 117 
viii 
6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 117 
6.2 Theoretical Development and Hypotheses .............................................................. 119 
6.2.1 Firms’ Exploratory Learning behaviors ............................................................ 119 
6.2.2 Public R&D Subsidy and Firms’ Exploratory Learning................................. 120 
6.2.3 Difference between National R&D Subsidy and Provincial R&D Subsidy 122 
6.3 Data, Methods and Measures ...................................................................................... 124 
6.3.1 Data .......................................................................................................................... 124 
6.3.3 Method .................................................................................................................... 125 
6.3.4 Variables Definition .............................................................................................. 125 
6.4. Empirical Result ............................................................................................................ 129 
6.4.1 Influence of  Public R&D Subsidy on Firms’ novel knowledge exploration
 ............................................................................................................................................ 129 
6.4.2 Influence of  Public R&D Subsidy on Changing of  Firms’ Core Industrial 
Technologies .................................................................................................................... 131 
6.4.3 Robustness Check and alternative explanation ................................................ 133 
6.5 Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 138 
6.6 Appendix ......................................................................................................................... 140 
6.6.1 PSM sampling ........................................................................................................ 140 
6.6.2 Industrial and regional distributions .................................................................. 143 
7. Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 145 
8. Conclusion, Implications and Further Studies ................................................................ 151 
8.1 Implications .................................................................................................................... 152 
8.2 Limitations and Further Studies ................................................................................. 154 
Reference List ............................................................................................................................ 157 
PhD Dissertation, Yuchen GAO 
1 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
1.1.1 Public R&D Subsidy: A policy tool for Coping with Market Failure of  R&D 
Public research and development (R&D) subsidy is a series of  policy instruments, 
including a variety of  economic incentives, designed to promote and encourage the 
participation of  the private sector in R&D activities and innovation (Becker, 2015; David, 
Hall, & Toole, 2000; Dimos & Pugh, 2016; Garcia-Quevedo, 2004). By eliminating 
market failures related to R&D and innovation, and motivating R&D activities of  firms, 
R&D subsidy is regarded as having positive externalities on economic development with 
less distortionary effects on the market (David et al., 2000; Klette, Moen, & Griliches, 
2000; Martin & Scott, 2000). In the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement)1 promulgated by the World Trade Organization (WTO), R&D subsidy is 
classified as Non-Actionable Subsidies. Consequently, R&D subsidy is one of  the widely 
adopted, effective policy instruments for the facilitation of  firms’ R&D activities, such 
as the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) of  the United States and 
Horizon 2020 of  the European Union. 
Innovation-related market failures come about for three main well-understood 
reasons: first, the characteristics of  public goods in R&D. R&D activities have non-
competitive and non-exclusive characteristics (Arrow, 1962; Bush, 1945; Nelson, 1959). 
Second, firms undertaking R&D may fail to attract external financial support because of  
information asymmetry from the institutional theory, which results in a situation where 
the value of  R&D cannot be anticipated by external investors (Arrow, 1962). Third, from 
the perspective of  innovation literature, due to the liability of  newness, innovation, 
especially radical innovation, usually suffers a high level of  uncertainty and high risk of  
failure, as the financial returns of  R&D investment are usually long term (Hall & Lerner, 
2010). 
Market failures of  R&D would lead to under-investment in R&D, resulting in the 
inhibition of  the enhancement of  firm-level innovation-related capabilities and, 
subsequently, innovation performance (Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017). Thus, market 
failures are invoked in arguments that government intervention is necessary for 
                                                             
1 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, SCM Agreement 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm_01_e.htm  
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supporting the R&D of  firms (Stiglitz, 1988). Public R&D subsidy, as one of  the 
government interventions at firm-level R&D, is considered to cope with market failures 
by buffering the financial capital shortage, reducing the cost of  R&D, jointly undertaking 
the risk of  R&D and providing endorsement to firms (Amezcua et al., 2013; Dimos & 
Pugh, 2016; Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017; Lee & Cin, 2010). R&D subsidy is not only 
expected to promote firms’ own R&D investment, but to attract external financing 
(Gonzalez & Pazo, 2008; Lerner, 1999; Marino et al., 2016; Toole & Turvey, 2009). R&D 
subsidy is also expected to enhance the innovation-related capabilities of  firms and 
subsequently facilitate firm-level innovation performance in areas such as patent 
application and new product sales (Hussinger, 2008; Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017). 
Present studies focus primarily on the effects of  R&D subsidy on firm-level R&D 
input and output additionality (Cerulli, 2010; David et al., 2000; Garcia-Quevedo, 2004; 
Zuniga-Vicente et al., 2014). Additionality is a key factor in evaluating the effects of  
public R&D subsidy, which refers to the additional R&D input and output generated by 
public intervention beyond the counter-factual levels that firms would have achieved 
without such intervention (Dimos & Pugh, 2016; Georghiou & Clarysse, 2006; Gök & 
Edler, 2012). Input additionality, from a resource-based perspective, investigates whether 
and to what extent firms engage in greater R&D expenditure after receiving public 
support. In other words, input additionality justifies the capacity of  public R&D subsidy 
to stimulate additional private R&D investment to reach the social optimum. The analysis 
of  the input additionality is the most popular among present relevant studies on R&D 
subsidy, due to its straightforward consistency according to standard neoclassical theory 
(Colander, 2000). Output additionality is a result-based concept that considers the 
increase of  R&D output generated by R&D subsidy (Falk, 2007; Guan & Yam, 2015). 
Based on the R&D process, R&D output is further classified into technological output 
and economic output and mainly measured by the creation of  patents and sales of  new 
products, respectively (Guan & Yam, 2015). 
However, evaluating public subsidy from the input and output additionality 
perspective may run the risk of  oversimplifying the innovation process, as it takes for 
granted that additional R&D input would inevitably result in increased firm-level R&D 
outputs (Falk, 2007; Gök & Edler, 2012). This leads to conflicting research results on 
how R&D subsidy generates output additionality (Dimos & Pugh, 2016). A possible 
explanation is that previous studies based on the input and output additionality 
perspective neglect how firms would have changed their R&D-related behaviors after 
PhD Dissertation, Yuchen GAO 
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receiving a given R&D subsidy (Chapman & Hewitt-Dundas, 2015; Gök & Edler, 2012). 
In line with that, the concept of  behavioral additionality is introduced by Buisseret et al. 
(1995) and has attracted increasing research interest in recent years (Gök & Edler, 2012). 
1.1.2 Behavioral Additionality: A New Perspective of  Evaluation on Effects of  
R&D Subsidy 
Behavioral additionality is defined as the firm’s desirable behavioral changes during 
the innovation process, which can result in a more efficient transformation from R&D 
inputs to outputs caused by policy intervention (Buisseret, Cameron, & Georghiou, 1995; 
Falk, 2007). Thus, behavioral additionality can capture the essential enhancements 
generated by R&D subsidy on aspects such as: firm-level managerial capabilities, 
technological know-how, and networking skills (Falk, 2007; Knockaert, Spithoven, & 
Clarysse, 2014). It is also argued that behavioral additionality is associated with a change 
in the process of  exploring, creating, learning, and exploiting new knowledge for 
innovation from the learning perspective (Clarysse, Wright, & Mustar, 2009). This 
conception of  behavioral additionality potentially indicates the effect of  R&D subsidy 
on firm-level R&D activities from a more comprehensive perspective (Georghiou & 
Clarysse, 2006). Furthermore, behavioral additionality goes beyond the basic intervention 
logic of  R&D subsidy which stems from market failure. Behavioral additionality has roots 
in a broader range of  failures, such as system and knowledge processing failures from 
evolutionary and structural views (Gök & Edler, 2012). Thus, an analysis of  behavioral 
additionality, as the third type of  additionality effect of  R&D subsidy, essentially 
complements conventional R&D subsidy studies on input and output additionality 
(Knockaert et al., 2014; Wanzenboeck, Scherngell, & Fischer, 2013). It also enables us to 
further open up the “black box” of  the mechanism of  public R&D subsidy on firm-level 
R&D activities. The evaluation of  behavioral additionality induced by R&D subsidy 
mainly focuses on both internal usage and external linkage for accessing, acquiring and 
exploiting innovation-related resources, such as knowledge (Chapman & Hewitt-Dundas, 
2015; Clarysse et al., 2009; Gök & Edler, 2012). Looking at behavioral additionality helps 
us to understand better the exploitation of  input additionality and the acquisition of  
output additionality generated by R&D subsidy. 
Behavioral additionality can be further classified into several subcategories from 
different perspectives. From the perspective of  sponsored projects implementation, 
behavioral additionality can be classified into scale, scope and acceleration additionality 
(Falk, 2007; Georghiou, 2002; Wanzenboeck et al., 2013). Scale additionality refers to the 
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situation where R&D subsidy recipient firms may conduct R&D projects on a larger scale 
(Wanzenboeck et al., 2013). Scope additionality is the extension of  firm-level R&D 
activities to a wider range of  markets, applications or players (Knockaert et al., 2014) 
while acceleration additionality measures whether firms receiving R&D subsidies 
conduct their projects faster than they would have, had they not usually used external 
funding (Falk, 2007; Gök & Edler, 2012). 
Cognitive capacity additionality, deriving from the perspective of  the increasing 
cognitive capacity of  R&D subsidy recipient firms, is defined as the positive effect on 
firms’ capacities which are crucial for innovation activities and performance (Knockaert 
et al., 2014). Two key additionalities of  cognitive capacity are networks and competence 
additionality (Alexander & Martin, 2013; Antonioli, Marzucchi, & Montresor, 2014). 
Network additionality occurs through external collaboration and network building with 
both individual and organizational learning, thereby enhancing the internal cognitive 
capacities of  firms (Alexander & Martin, 2013; Falk, 2007). Competence additionality is 
conceptualized in terms of  the positive impact that R&D subsidy has on the different 
kinds of  internal individual abilities and organizational capabilities that are required in 
managing the innovation process (Antonioli et al., 2014). 
As stressed by Clarysse et al. (2009), “the distinctions between the different types of  
behavioral additionality are not always clear-cut” (pp. 1519). Clarysse et al. (2009) elaborate 
behavioral additionality from a knowledge-based view combining it with a learning 
perspective. It is argued that firm-level behavioral additionality could be caused by 
changes in organizational learning processes. For example, the methods of  acquisition 
and the search scope of  firms on new technological knowledge may be changed after 
receiving R&D subsidies. More specifically, firms receiving R&D subsidies are more likely 
to obtain new knowledge via formal collaboration with external sources, such as 
universities and research institutes (Afcha Chavez, 2011). Behavioral additionality can 
also be derived from the attitude change of  new knowledge usage within firms (Chapman 
& Hewitt-Dundas, 2015). For example, R&D subsidy recipient firms may have a higher 
motivation and risk-taking level for knowledge recombination with less previous 
experience and relevant knowledge stock, and this may lead to more innovative 
technology, even radical innovation (Beck, Lopes-Bento, & Schenker-Wicki, 2016; 
Clarysse et al., 2009; Zhao, Li, & Liu, 2016). Thus, it is suggested that behavioral 
additionality is directly and indirectly linked with organizational learning. 
1.1.3 Development of  R&D Subsidy in China 
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Transforming from a planned economy to a market-driven economy, the Chinese 
government assigns science and technology an important role in economic development 
(Benner, Liu, & Serger, 2012; OECD, 2008). During the early stages of  economic reform, 
the Chinese government mainly adopted public intervention and national-level science 
and technology (S&T) programs, investing heavily to acquire and develop technologies 
to build S&T capabilities for catching up (Guan & Yam, 2015). 
With fast economic growth, China has been increasingly emphasizing the 
importance of  indigenous innovation and identifies innovation as the key driving force 
for economic development (Serger & Breidne, 2007). Central government sets the goal 
to make China a world-leading innovation country with the adoption of  the National 
Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology Development (2006–2020) 
in 2006 (Liu et al., 2017). The overall deployment of  this plan focuses on indigenous 
innovation in high-tech industries. More specifically, the emphasis of  this plan is to 
enhance technological capacities in several selected high-tech and strategic industries, 
strengthen the weak capacity of  indigenous innovation, and overcome the issue of  under-
investment in S&T (Gao, 2015; Liu, Li, & Li, 2016). The relevant supports are provided 
via various types of  R&D programs with substantial public R&D funding (Boeing, 2016). 
In 2012, the Chinese government launched the Innovation-Driven Development 
Strategy and firms were identified as the core entities of  innovation and economic growth 
(Liu et al., 2016). Following Neo-Schumpeterian Growth Theory, national economic 
growth depends highly on firm-level R&D capabilities of  developing original innovation 
(Aghion, 2011; Aghion & Howitt, 1992). Consequently, central and regional governments 
of  China launched various R&D subsidy programs and deployed a large amount of  
capital resource to support firms’ R&D and innovation activities for enhancing firm-level 
R&D capabilities (Guan & Yam, 2015; Guo, Guo, & Jiang, 2016; Liu et al., 2016; Liu et 
al., 2017; Wang, Li, & Furman, 2017). 
The Chinese government designed different types of  R&D subsidies to provide 
financial capital for firms to carry out R&D and to encourage private-owned firms, in 
particular, to participate in national S&T programs (Larédo, Köhler, & Rammer, 2016). 
The three main R&D subsidy tools in China are direct grants, subsidized loans and tax 
incentives (Guan & Yam, 2015; Xin et al., 2016). 
Direct R&D grants are the traditional and most prevalent tool of  the Chinese 
government to support firms’ innovation activities (Zheng, Singh, & Mitchell, 2015). 
Direct R&D grants can directly compensate for the resource shortage in the private 
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sector with no interest and repayment required (Guan & Yam, 2015). The sponsored 
range of  direct R&D grants depends on the technology level and market prospects of  
target projects applying for public support (Guan & Yam, 2015). The screening process 
is undertaken by government institutions (Xin et al., 2016). Moreover, to avoid the 
crowding-out on firms’ own R&D investment by providing over-funded public money, 
the Chinese government in recent years in principle requires recipient firms’ dollar-to-
dollar matching for direct R&D grants (Guo et al., 2016). It is similar to an upper-
limitation setting in providing direct R&D grants (Hsu & Hsueh, 2009). 
Although some of  the recent studies demonstrate the existence of  an additionality 
effect on firm-level R&D expenditure of  direct R&D grants (Liu et al., 2016), the 
efficiency of  direct R&D grants still remains inconsistent conclusions in China (Boeing, 
2016; Guan & Yam, 2015; Wang et al., 2017). The government failure issue associated 
with public R&D subsidies is exacerbated in China due to profound political interference, 
stronger public intervention and a sophisticated bureaucratic system with Chinese 
characteristics (Guan & Yam, 2015; Wang et al., 2017). According to Guan and Yam’s 
research (2015), direct R&D grants from the Chinese government exert a negative effect 
on firm-level patent applications and new product sales. 
Having noticed the failure of  government intervention, the Chinese government 
introduced more market-orientated R&D subsidies, namely, R&D-subsidized or interest-
reduced loans (贴息贷款  Tiexi Daikuan) and R&D tax incentives (加计扣除  Jiaji 
Kouchu). R&D subsidized loans are essentially a business loan with interest, where the 
government pays back a proportion of  or all the interest to commercial banks on behalf  
of  the subsidy recipients (Grau, Huo, & Neuhoff, 2012). R&D tax incentives are tax 
exemptions or reductions depending on the essential firm-level R&D expenditure (Guan 
& Yam, 2015). R&D subsidized loans and R&D tax incentives are usually used jointly 
with direct R&D grants by regional governments as a kind of  innovation policy. 
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Figure 1.1 National-level R&D Intensity of  China (100%)  
From 2003 to 2015, the national-level R&D intensity of  China was raised from 1.13% 
to 2.07%2 (see Figure 1.1). Total R&D expenditure in China increased from 153.96 
billion RMB in 2003 to 1416.988 billion RMB in 2015 (see Table 1.1), keeping the average 
growth rate at 20.47%. Particularly, R&D expenditure from government funds rose from 
46.06 billion RMB to 301.32 billion RMB from 2003 to 2015, keeping the average growth 
rate at 17.09%. However, the ratio of  public funds on total R&D expenditure dropped 
from 29.9% to 21.3% from 2003 to 2015, while the ratio of  firm-level R&D funds 
increased yearly from 60.1% to 74.7% during the same period (see Figure 1.2). This 
implies that the R&D activities of  Chinese firms become more active, and public funds 
may have more responsibility for leveraging resources from the private sector rather than 
directly bridging the resource gaps of  firm-level R&D activities. 
 
                                                             
2 China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2009-2016, in Chinese) 
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Figure 1.2 the Ratio of  Public and Private Funds on R&D 
Another tendency is that the Chinese government has increasingly emphasized the 
importance of  using public intervention to facilitate firms’ learning behaviors and 
enhance firm-level technological capabilities (Liu et al., 2017). In my pre-research 
interview in 2017, a key official from the provincial science and technology bureau stated 
that the main target of  R&D subsidy now is to guide and motivate high-tech firms to 
acquire, create and apply the frontier S&T knowledge when undertaking R&D activities. 
The enhancement of  firm-level technological capabilities is expected to improve 
innovation performance, thereby supporting regional innovation-driven development. 
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Table 1.1 R&D Expenditure of  China by Sources (2003-2015, billion RMB) 
Year Total Government R&D Funds Firms Self-raised R&D Funds 
2003 153.960 46.060 92.540 
2004 196.630 52.360 129.130 
2005 245.000 64.540 164.250 
2006 300.310 74.210 207.370 
2007 371.020 91.350 261.100 
2008 461.600 108.890 331.150 
2009 580.211 135.827 416.272 
2010 706.258 169.630 506.314 
2011 868.701 188.297 642.064 
2012 1029.841 222.139 762.502 
2013 1184.660 250.057 883.772 
2014 1301.560 263.610 981.650 
2015 1416.988 301.32 1058.860 
 
For example, the formal industry-university R&D collaboration in China is 
maintaining a steady increase (see Figure 1.3). The number of  R&D funds from firms to 
universities has been increasing yearly from 17.17 billion RMB in 2009 to 30.15 billion 
RMB in 2015. In recent years, from 2012 to 2014, the ratio of  funds from firms to 
support R&D of  universities on total R&D funds for universities stands at around 33%. 
Via formal industry-university R&D collaboration, firms are expected to use frontier 
S&T knowledge generated by universities. 
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Figure 1.3 R&D Funds from Firms to Universities in China 
1.2 Problem Formulation and Potential Contributions 
1.2.1 Problem Formulation and Delimitation 
Behavioral additionality is related to the behavioral changes of  firms’ R&D process 
resulting from a public intervention, which occurs during the innovation process 
(Clarysse et al., 2009). Research on the correlation between subsidies and firms’ 
behavioral additionality has grown in recent years. Although present studies have 
contributed greatly to the understanding of  behavioral additionality generated by R&D 
subsidy, relevant research still retains several gaps. 
First, behavioral additionality has been insufficiently tested in empirical studies, as 
there is a narrow focus on a small range of  behavioral dimensions (Clarysse et al., 2009). 
Particularly, very few studies investigate the effects generated by R&D subsidy on firm-
level behavioral additionality in emerging market contexts such as China, especially about 
how R&D subsidy recipient firms change their S&T knowledge learning behaviors. 
Current studies of  R&D subsidy in China usually focus on ascertaining the existence of  
the additionality effect or crowding-out effect from public intervention on firms’ R&D 
input and output (Boeing, 2016; Guan & Yam, 2015; Guo et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016); 
investigating the relationship between firm-level factors and winning R&D subsidy 
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(Wang et al., 2017); and discussing how rent-seeking behaviors can be avoided when 
providing R&D subsidy (Xin et al., 2016). 
Second, current studies also separately investigate the effects of  R&D subsidy on 
behavioral and output additionality, even though more technological output can be 
generated by R&D subsidy through the change of  learning behaviors. A more systemic 
picture showing the interplays between different types of  additionality is also needed 
(Cerulli, Gabriele, & Potì, 2016). 
Furthermore, firm heterogeneity may impact the effectiveness of  public R&D 
subsidies on behavioral additionalities, such as previous experience, technological stock, 
and the development stages of  firms from a learning perspective (Clarysse et al., 2009). 
The context within which subsidized firms are embedded also potentially impacts the 
correlation between R&D subsidies and behavioral additionality. According to previous 
research (Amezcua et al., 2013; Lazzarini, 2015), government capabilities and geographic 
characteristics can moderate the effect of  R&D subsidies. However, the issue of  whether 
such a moderating effect exists on the correlation between R&D subsidies and behavioral 
additionality is still unresolved. 
To better understand the effects of  R&D subsidy in China, this dissertation 
attempts to open further the black box of  the link between R&D subsidy and the firm-
level R&D output by the investigation of  R&D behavioral changes from a learning 
perspective. In my Ph.D. study, the following research questions are formulated: 
1) How do R&D subsidies influence firms’ collaborations with universities? What 
are the moderating roles of  science parks and human resources? 
2) How do public R&D subsidies influence firms’ exploratory learning? Are the 
effects of  public R&D subsidy different at different firms’ development stages? 
3) Can the participation in public R&D subsidy programs promote firms to adopt 
novel knowledge to change their core technological focus or not? Do R&D subsidies 
from central and local governments have different effects on firms’ novel knowledge 
exploration and the change of  their core technological focus? 
More specifically, I first attempt to explore how public R&D subsidy influences 
collaborations between high-tech small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and 
universities. The moderating roles of  the science parks and firms’ high-educational level 
R&D human resources are also tested. Combining the knowledge-based view (KBV) 
with a learning perspective, I will then explore the effects of  R&D subsidy on the 
potential changes in firms’ learning behaviors, mainly novel knowledge exploration. The 
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heterogeneous effects of  different development stages, namely growth, mature, and 
declining stages, are also explored. For the changes of  technological focus via novel 
knowledge exploration, I will focus mainly on whether firms in receipt of  subsidy 
generate more patents beyond their familiar technological fields or not. Firms may be 
reluctant to engage in unfamiliar technological fields, even though more innovative 
knowledge recombination with unfamiliar knowledge may lead to more breakthrough 
inventions, as such behaviors may exacerbate risky levels at the same time. R&D subsidy 
programs from central and local governments will be further classified as well. 
1.2.2 Potential Contributions 
As will be illustrated within this dissertation, the analysis of  public R&D subsidy 
and behavioral additionality in terms of  the knowledge learning process in China 
represents the most important contribution of  my research. 
From a theoretical perspective, the present dissertation will enrich existing R&D 
subsidy literature related to behavioral additionality by extending the use of  
organizational learning perspective in innovation policy studies in China as well as in a 
more generalized context. The dissertation will also deepen the understanding of  the 
relationship between organizational development stages and innovation novelty under 
public sponsorship. 
At the same time, this study explores the different effects of  R&D subsidy programs 
from central and local governments. In addition, the test on the moderating effects of  
science parks and human resources may help to better understand how R&D subsidy can 
underpin high-tech SMEs to overcome system failure. The system failure is related to the 
creation of  knowledge and learning capabilities and the structure and configuration of  
the system, which subsequently influence the evolutionary process of  innovation. 
For practical implications, this present dissertation is expected to extend the 
rationale for public R&D support policy evaluation from an evolutionary theoretical 
background beyond the standard neoclassical approach. Specifically, public R&D support 
policy has increasingly emphasized the enhancement of  firm-level essential technological 
capabilities. The analysis of  behavioral additionality may shed light on the effect 
generated by policy on the firm-level learning process, accumulation of  capabilities, and 
subsequently the R&D outputs. Additionally, it provides references based on empirical 
evidence for firms in the selection of  public R&D support according to which stage they 
are going through in particular organizational development stages. In this sense, the 
present dissertation may provide an opportunity for the policy learning and lessons in 
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designing future policy schemes about successful or failed determinants of  public 
interventions, which also provide several potential managerial implications for firms’ 
strategic decisions on when and how to participate proactively pin governmental projects 
for technological upgrading. 
1.3 Key Definitions 
1.3.1 Public R&D Subsidy 
In this dissertation, public R&D subsidy is defined as one of  the policy instruments 
introduced by governments that adopt economic incentives to promote and encourage 
private firms to undertake and perform research and development (Becker, 2015; David 
et al., 2000; Dimos & Pugh, 2016). Public R&D subsidy includes both direct and indirect 
fiscal support from governments, namely direct R&D grants, R&D subsidized loans and 
tax incentives for R&D. 
1.3.2 Innovation Output 
In this dissertation, innovation output is defined as the results or achievements of  
R&D activities, including economic and technological outputs (Guan & Yam, 2015). The 
former refers to firm-level new products or high-tech product sales, while the latter refers 
to new applied or granted patents (Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002; Georghiou, 2002; 
Griliches, 1990; Guan & Yam, 2015; Guo et al., 2016). 
1.3.3 Behavioral Additionality from a learning perspective  
In this dissertation, behavioral additionality is defined as the changes in the learning 
process that have taken place within R&D subsidy recipient firms (Clarysse et al., 2009). 
More specifically, the present dissertation mainly discusses two behaviors in the 
learning process, knowledge acquisition and knowledge adoption. Based on the Chinese 
context, R&D collaborations with external knowledge institutions and high-level R&D 
human resources upgrading are two main ways of  acquiring novel knowledge. 
Knowledge adoption includes two types of  learning behaviors in this dissertation. 
One is to fully develop and strengthen the knowledge that is deeply rooted in firms’ 
mature technology bases embedded in their technological trajectories, which can be 
defined as familiar knowledge exploitation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Levinthal & March, 
1993). The other is to explore and acquire new knowledge that is new to the firms but 
not necessarily novel for the industry or may even be mature knowledge to other players 
in the market. This is referred to as novel knowledge exploration (Ahuja & Lampert, 
2001; Kim & Park, 2013). 
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1.4 Dissertation Structure 
The dissertation is a monograph combining and integrating three academic papers 
written during my Ph.D. and is comprised of  eight chapters. 
After Chapter 1, the Introduction, the following chapter sets out the literature 
review to elaborate further on the related research status and prevalent adopted theories 
for theoretical analysis. Based on the literature review in Chapter 2, a research framework 
for this dissertation will be presented. 
In Chapter 3, the methodology will be discussed including the paradigm and the 
paradigmatic position of  the thesis. The rationale of  empirical analysis, the specific data 
collection, and the cleaning process will be introduced in Chapter 3, as well as the 
empirical techniques developed. 
Following the methodological discussions, research problems will be tested and 
addressed in three chapters (Chapters 4-6). Chapter 4 will address the question of  how 
R&D subsidy influences high-tech SMEs’ collaborations with universities and explore 
the moderating roles of  science parks and human resources. Chapter 5 will explore the 
effects of  R&D subsidy on firms’ learning behaviors, and discuss the differences in firms’ 
development stages. Subsequently from Chapter 5, the effect of  public R&D subsidy on 
behavioral additionality related to technological focus change will be explored in Chapter 
6. The heterogeneous effects of  R&D subsidy programs from central and local 
governments are also investigated. 
In Chapter 7, based on empirical results, an integrated discussion of  the four 
research questions will be presented to provide theoretical reflections. 
Finally, in Chapter 8, the main findings of  the thesis will be reflected upon and the 
research questions summarized. The policy implication will also be discussed. Moreover, 
the limitations of  this dissertation will be reflected upon and future research directions 
will be presented. The dissertation structure is shown in Figure 1.4. 
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Figure 1.4 Dissertation Structure
Background introduction, 
problem formulation and 
research design 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Review of present studies and 
creation of research framework 
Chapter 2 Literature review 
and research framework 
Elaboration of the paradigm 
and selected research methods 
Chapter 3 Methodology  
How does R&D subsidy 
influence high-tech SMEs’ 
collaborations with 
universities? What are the 
moderating roles of science 
parks and human resources? 
Chapter 4 R&D Subsidy and 
High-tech SMEs’ 
Collaborations with 
Universities 
How does public R&D subsidy 
influence firms’ learning 
behaviors? The different 
effects of firms’ development 
stages? 
Does public R&D subsidy 
facilitate the adoption of novel 
knowledge and change firms’ 
core technological focus? The 
difference between central and 
local governments 
Chapter 5 R&D Subsidies, 
Organizational Development 
Stages and Firm-Level 
Exploratory Learning 
Chapter 6 R&D subsidy 
programs, novel knowledge 
exploration, the change of 
technological focus 
Chapter 7 Discussion 
Discussion based on empirical 
results 
Main conclusions, practical 
implications, limitations and 
further research directions 
Chapter 8 Conclusion, 
Implications and Further Study 
Main Content Chapters 
PhD Dissertation, Yuchen GAO 
17 
2. Literature Review and Research Framework 
2.1 Public R&D Subsidy, Input and Output Additionality 
2.1.1 Market Failures and the Role of  R&D Subsidy 
Existing studies have confirmed the key contributions of  R&D investment for 
economic growth at the firm, industry and country level (Aghion et al., 1998; Arrow, 
1962; Grossman & Helpman, 1994; Romer, 1986, 1990). However, the presence of  
market failures of  R&D leads to underinvestment in R&D and underproduction of  
innovation (Arrow, 1962; Griliches, 1994; Nelson, 1959). 
First, R&D exhibits typical public goods characteristics. R&D activities have non-
competitive and non-exclusive characteristics. The firms’ R&D achievements may spill 
over to their potential competitors, resulting in the private return rate being lower than 
the social return rate, which hinders firms from appropriating the full benefits associated 
with R&D investments (Griliches, 1994). This mismatch of  investment and return could 
reduce firm-level initiative to invest in R&D and innovation activities, which results in 
firm-level R&D investment that does not meet the socially optimal investments on R&D 
(Arrow, 1962; Bush, 1945; Nelson, 1959). 
Second, firms undertaking R&D may fail to attract external financial support 
because of  information asymmetry (Arrow, 1962). The value of  R&D cannot be 
anticipated by external investors as early-stage technologies of  firms are usually 
confidential (Hall, 2002a; Hall & Lerner, 2010). This issue may be exacerbated with the 
imperfect capital markets as well as weak protection of  intellectual property rights (Hall, 
2002a; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013; Klette et al., 2000). As a result, financial support from 
external capital markets on R&D is insufficient. 
In addition, due to the liability of  newness, innovation, especially radical innovation, 
usually suffers a high level of  uncertainty and high risk of  failure. At the same time, 
financial returns of  R&D investment are usually slow, as R&D investment requires 
multiple stages and whole investment lifecycles are long (Hall & Lerner, 2010). These 
factors also reduce the initiative of  investment in R&D from private investors. 
Furthermore, novelties usually lack legitimacy, making it difficult for firms to undertake 
R&D to establish formal collaboration with external knowledge institutions, or attract 
external financial support (Amezcua et al., 2013; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). 
As a consequence, governments increasingly recognize the importance and benefits 
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of  supporting private firm-level R&D investment by public policies. Following the logic 
of  the standard neoclassical approach, the government can use public R&D subsidy, 
including direct grants and tax incentives, to correct firm-level R&D investments and 
encourage the private sector to carry out R&D (Arrow, 1962; Dasgupta, 1988; Dasgupta 
& Stoneman, 2005; Nelson, 1959). 
The neoclassical rationale underlying the public R&D subsidy can be analyzed by 
the interplay between the marginal cost of  capital (MCC) and the marginal rate of  return 
(MRR) of  R&D under public interventions (David et al., 2000). As shown in Figure 2.1, 
the upward-sloping curve is the marginal cost of  capital, while the downward-sloping 
curve is the marginal rate of  return of  R&D. The confluence of  the two curves, R*, is 
the R&D investment. Theoretically, taking a simple example, providing direct R&D 
grants can potentially raise the marginal return of  R&D and enhance R*. Following a 
similar logic, tax incentives can reduce the marginal cost of  R&D, shifting the MCC curve 
to enhance the R&D investment (David et al., 2000). 
 
Figure 2.1 Neoclassical analysis of  R&D subsidy on firm-level R&D investment 
Source: David et al. Research Policy 29 (2000) p. 503 
Theoretical rules are set to evaluate the effectiveness of  R&D subsidy (Lipsey & 
Carlaw, 1998). Accordingly, effectual public interventions via R&D subsidy are required 
to make subsidy recipients undertake R&D with the desired level of  R&D investment in 
the least costly way. The benefits gained by the R&D subsidy should exceed the cost of  
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public intervention. Derived from these criteria, the additionality effect has become a 
core concept for the evaluation of  the effects of  public R&D subsidy. Input additionality 
refers to additional firms’ own R&D spending triggered by R&D subsidy, which is clearer 
due to the straightforward correlation of  R&D input with a subsidy from the standard 
neoclassical perspective (Colander, 2000). 
Conversely, R&D subsidy may also crowd out the R&D input of  recipients ‒the 
crowding-out effect (David et al., 2000; Garcia-Quevedo, 2004). According to the 
conclusions of  Dimos and Pugh (2016), the crowding-out effects on firm-level R&D 
input generated by R&D subsidy can be further elucidated (see Figure 2.2). Overall, the 
crowding-out effects on R&D input can be identified as partial crowding out, full 
crowding out and over-full crowding out (Dimos & Pugh, 2016). More specifically, in the 
situation of  partial crowding out, although the total amount of  R&D investments could 
be more than the amount before receiving R&D subsidy, a part of  firm-level R&D 
investments is replaced with R&D subsidy compared with the counterfactual state of  no 
subsidy, while the situation in which firm-level R&D investments decrease by the full 
amount of  the subsidy and total R&D investments equal the amount of  the 
counterfactual state of  no subsidy is full crowding out. If  R&D subsidy is used in place 
of  firm-level R&D investments and total R&D investments decrease compared with the 
counterfactual state of  no subsidy, this is the over-full crowding out (Dimos & Pugh, 
2016). 
PhD Dissertation, Yuchen GAO 
20 
 
Figure 2.2 Effects of  R&D subsidy on firm-level R&D input 
Source: Dimos & Pugh Research Policy 45 (2016) p. 799 
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with the value of  subsidies. Specifically, output additionality needs to first satisfy the strict 
linear assumption between R&D input and output. This oversimplified model implies 
that additional R&D input would inevitably result in increased firm-level R&D outputs 
(Falk, 2007; Gök & Edler, 2012). However, the actual process is much more complex and 
unpredictable (Georghiou & Clarysse, 2006). Furthermore, the results of  public 
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correlations between R&D subsidies and output without stricter, more focused, and 
appropriate definitions of  R&D outputs (Buisseret et al., 1995; Georghiou, 2002). Thus, 
at an overall level, the additionality effect remains blurred with partial crowding-out effect 
in regard to R&D output (Dimos & Pugh, 2016). The full crowding out and over-full 
crowding out on R&D output can be clearly distinguished (see Figure 2.3). The former 
refers to the situation that R&D output remains at the same level after receiving R&D 
subsidy, compared with the counterfactual state of  no subsidy. The latter is the situation 
that subsidy recipient firms generate smaller R&D output than in the counterfactual state. 
 
Figure 2.3 Effects of  R&D subsidy on firm-level R&D output 
Source: Dimos & Pugh Research Policy 45 (2016) p. 799 
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2.1.2 The Mechanisms of  R&D Subsidy 
2.1.2.1 Buffering Effect: From Resource-Based View and Resource Dependence 
Theory 
A number of  existing studies employ a resource-based view or resource dependence 
theory to analyze the effects on innovation performance generated by public R&D 
subsidy. According to the resource-based view, technological capabilities, as well as 
technology-related resources, are the primary driver for innovation (Verona, 1999). 
Resources deployed on R&D spur innovation and enhance technological capabilities 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). Higher technological capabilities can help firms to optimize resource 
allocation and improve innovation performance (Yam et al., 2004). However, as 
technological innovation is associated with high risk and uncertainties, and has the 
inherent public goods characteristics (Dimos & Pugh, 2016; Hyytinen & Toivanen, 2005; 
Martin & Scott, 2000; Wernerfelt, 1984), firm-level technological innovation activities 
may be constrained by resources (Guariglia & Liu, 2014; Radas et al., 2015). 
According to the resource-based view, the main aim of  public R&D subsidy is 
indirectly increasing the pool of  available resources for firms to undertake innovation 
activities by reducing R&D costs and enhancing returns (David et al., 2000; Radas et al., 
2015; Rangan, Samii, & Van Wassenhove, 2006). Based on resource dependence theory, 
public R&D grants can create a munificent resource environment for firms to undertake 
R&D independently of  other external organizations, which to some degree helps firms 
to manage overall uncertainty and risk (Amezcua et al., 2013). In other words, public 
R&D subsidy also buffers a firm’s resource constraint on R&D. By using public R&D 
grants, recipient firms can occupy more favorable competitive positions, compared to 
rival firms without public resources. To keep a favorable competitive position, firms are 
more likely to allocate resources on R&D activities and enhance their technology-related 
capabilities (Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017). Having been relieved of  resource pressure by 
public R&D subsidies, recipient firms can be protected from potential adverse selection, 
whereby technological capabilities and resources are enhanced and allocated more 
effectively (Rangan et al., 2006). Thus, the additionality effect is expected to occur to 
leverage private resources and enhance firm technological capabilities for innovation with 
public R&D subsidy provided by the government (Aschhoff & Sofka, 2009; Bloom, 
Griffith, & Van Reenen, 2002; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
2.1.2.2 Signaling Effect and Bridging Effect: From Institutional Theory 
Apart from providing the direct resource, public R&D subsidy can also provide a 
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quality signal to potential investors, other innovation actors, and clients to help recipient 
firms gain external financing and collaborate with external partners (Feldman & Kelley, 
2006; Kleer, 2010; Lerner, 1999; Takalo & Tanayama, 2010). Based on the analysis of  the 
Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR), Lerner (1999) finds that firms 
receiving public R&D support can gain endorsements from the government to certify 
their quality. It is important for firms to gain such certification to leverage external 
investments, especially in high tech industries or new markets (Lerner, 1999). 
As mentioned before, information asymmetry is one of  the main reasons to cause 
the market failure of  R&D. Information asymmetry prevents firms from undertaking 
R&D to attract external financing (Kleer, 2010; Takalo & Tanayama, 2010; Wu, 2017). 
On the one hand, firms undertaking R&D are reluctant to disclose technological details 
and secrets for the purpose of  self-protection due to the characteristics of  the public 
good of  R&D. On the other hand, external investors may also lack relevant professional 
knowledge of  R&D activities (Wu, 2017). These may indicate that it is difficult for 
external investors to evaluate the quality and risk of  innovation and R&D projects, and 
subsequently, investors will remain cautious about R&D investment (Kleer, 2010). In 
particular, new technologies exhibit high risk and substantial uncertainty, and asymmetric 
information will result in difficulties for firms to gain external financing (Ensthaler & 
Giebe, 2014). 
The government needs to play a role as an efficient intermediary to reduce the 
information asymmetry between firms and investors. As the government is not a direct 
competitor to firms, firms are more likely to disclose their R&D information to the 
government. The relevant R&D information disclosures also satisfy the requirements of  
the screening process of  the government for seeking public support (Wu, 2017). The 
evaluating R&D projects from the government is, therefore, considered more accurate 
and unprejudiced. With selection based on the evaluation by experts, R&D subsidy 
recipient firms gain the endorsements from the government. These endorsements yield 
signals of  the quality or commercial potential to market-based financiers and thereby 
open the door to accessing external financing (Ensthaler & Giebe, 2014; Kleer, 2010; 
Takalo & Tanayama, 2010). 
Apart from the reducing information asymmetry, endorsements from the 
government via R&D subsidy can also enhance the legitimacy of  firms to effectively 
bridge with outside R&D partners as proposed in institutional theory (Baum & Oliver, 
1991; Zeng, Xie, & Tam, 2010; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Due to newness liability, 
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firms undertaking R&D and innovation may lack legitimacy at the initial stage. Firms’ 
poor reputation and the high uncertainty of  innovation may impede the establishment 
of  formal relationships with external partners (Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017; Kim & Park, 
2015; Motohashi, 2013). However, collaboration with external partners is important, as 
collaboration may reduce the risk level of  R&D and provide key complementary assets 
for firms to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage (Czarnitzki & Delanote, 2017; 
Flynn, 1993; Rodan & Galunic, 2004). Endorsements from the government, via R&D 
subsidy, certify the quality of  recipient firms, and thereby help them to attract external 
partners to establish formal collaborative relationships (Amezcua et al., 2013; Jourdan & 
Kivleniece, 2017). Empirical evidence shows that firms participating in public-sponsored 
R&D projects are more likely to establish a collaborative relationship with universities 
and research institutes (Feldman & Kelley, 2006). R&D collaboration also serves as a 
quality signal for investors to increase their confidence that investment-seeking firms can 
gain successful R&D achievements (Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 2012). This bridging 
mechanism is also expected to contribute to the R&D output enhancement of  subsidy 
recipient firms (Amezcua et al., 2013; Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017). 
2.1.2.3 The Crowding-Out Effect: from public choice theory 
As mentioned before, public R&D subsidy may, however, exert negative effects on 
firm-level R&D investment, which results in government failure (Jourdan & Kivleniece, 
2017; Wolff, 2002). The main negative effect is the so-called crowding-out effect which 
stems from public choice theory (Dimos & Pugh, 2016). 
One of  the key reasons for the generation of  crowding-out effect is the “picking 
the winner” behavior of  government (Dai & Cheng, 2015a; Lach, 2002; Wang et al., 
2017). This behavior may result in sponsored firms substituting public funds for private 
funds. The “picking the winner” behavior stems from governments’ avoidance of  the 
loss of  state assets due to the misallocation of  public funds. R&D subsidy is more likely 
to be provided to “winner” firms with higher success probabilities and private financial 
return rates (Lach, 2002). However, these “winner” firms would have been motivated on 
R&D investment without R&D subsidy (“deadweight effects”). Thus, public R&D 
subsidy is, de facto, superfluous for these “winner” firms (Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017). At 
the same time, “winner” firms have no need to invest additional capital to secure the 
success of  R&D activities (Lach, 2002). Firms are more willing to use public funds than 
their own resources in innovation, as direct financial capital from the public sector is 
much cheaper than that of  firms themselves and the capital market (Carpenter & 
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Petersen, 2002; Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017). It is argued that funding such “winner” 
firms fails to reach social optimum, even though public funding agencies may achieve 
high-profile successes (Wang et al., 2017). The “picking the winners” behaviors cannot 
essentially induce the success of  R&D by providing R&D subsidy to firms that are 
financially vulnerable and would fail without public support (Wallsten, 2000). 
The characteristics of  the public sector, such as unclear property rights, the blurred 
linkage between managerial actions and performance, weak incentives and different goals 
from those of  the private sector, etc., may also reduce co-investment willingness of  the 
private sector with public financial support (Dixit, 1997; Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017). 
Governments are more likely to support R&D activities that satisfy national science and 
technology strategies and offer high degrees of  social return (Stiglitz & Wallsten, 1999). 
As a consequence, basic research, cutting-edge technologies, and innovation with greater 
knowledge spillover would be more likely to receive an R&D subsidy (Stiglitz & Wallsten, 
1999). However, these potentially sponsored R&D activities may not necessarily match 
the market-driven targets of  profit-seeking firms. This separation of  the strategic 
objectives of  governments and the market reduces firms’ own R&D input as well as 
reducing the output in subsidy recipients (Wang et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, the mismatch of  targets may result in the distortion of  managerial 
behaviors and the removal of  market competition (Wang et al., 2017). With public 
resources, firms can survive by satisfying the requirements of  the government without 
improving the firms’ own technological capabilities and resources (Jourdan & Kivleniece, 
2017). Firms tend to secure access to public resources and switch the development focus 
from technological capabilities to political rent-seeking capabilities (Bonardi, 2008; Chen 
et al., 2011). This resource altering effect results in the stagnation or even an eventual 
decline in the firms’ technological capabilities and resources, and the inhibition of  R&D-
related performance (Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017). 
In addition, it is also difficult to evaluate and pick firms with technological and 
market potential to support, if  R&D subsidy-bestowing decisions are made by 
government bureaucrats with limited technological and business expertise (Wang et al., 
2017). This may not improve firm-level R&D input and output either. Although public 
R&D subsidy is professionally administered, it is insufficient to facilitate firm-level R&D 
and innovation without a developed innovation ecosystem (Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2008; 
Martin & Scott, 2000). In the absence of  institutions with intellectual property protection, 
inter-organizational collaboration facilitation, and information exchange promotion, 
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R&D subsidy-providing would fail to improve firm-level R&D performance (Mcdermott 
& Kruse, 2009; Stuart & Wang, 2016; Wang et al., 2017) 
2.1.3 Different types of  R&D subsidy 
Traditionally, public R&D subsidy is provided through direct grants, which is a type 
of  sponsorship through direct injection of  public funds to firms. Direct R&D grants 
with no interest and repayment, which can directly compensate resource shortage in 
private sectors, are the most prevalent type of  R&D subsidy, especially in transitional 
economies where the capital markets are less developed (Zheng et al., 2015). Although 
some of  the recent studies demonstrate the existence of  an additionality effect on firm-
level R&D expenditure of  direct R&D grants (Liu et al., 2016), the efficiency of  direct 
R&D grants still remains subject to skepticism in China (Guan & Yam, 2015; Guo et al., 
2016). Direct R&D grants, as an ex-ante administrative subsidy, are supposed to stimulate 
crowding-out effects on private R&D investment, poor efficiency of  public funds and 
subsequently productive insufficiency of  R&D activities (Hall & Van Reenen, 2000; 
Perez-Sebastian, 2015). This government failure issue is exacerbated in China due to 
profound political interference, stronger public intervention and a sophisticated 
bureaucratic system with Chinese characteristics (Guan & Yam, 2015; Wang et al., 2017). 
In other words, the Chinese government has greater power, which may result in market 
distortion and be more likely to crowd out firm-level R&D input and output by public 
funds allocation. 
Other types of  public R&D subsidy are designed to remedy the shortages of  direct 
grants. Tax incentives are the most developed instruments (Hall & Van Reenen, 2000). 
Unlike direct grants, tax incentives minimize the discretionary decisions on the selection 
of  sponsored firms, which is neutral as to industry and the nature of  the firm (Busom, 
Corchuelo, & Martinez-Ros, 2014; Czarnitzki, Hanel, & Rosa, 2011). This means that, 
regardless of  projects or industrial sectors, tax incentives are available to all firms 
undertaking R&D activities. The basic mechanism of  tax incentives is the direct reduction 
of  the marginal cost of  R&D, and firms are required to invest in R&D in response to 
linked tax incentives (David et al., 2000; Radas et al., 2015). Tax incentives for R&D are 
expected to avoid the crowding-out effect on firm-level R&D expenditure, and at the 
same time, enable recipient firms to gain the highest rate of  private return without any 
governmental control on the usage of  R&D subsidy (Busom et al., 2014; David et al., 
2000; Hall & Van Reenen, 2000). 
However, tax credits can affect the composition of  R&D (Czarnitzki et al., 2011; 
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David et al., 2000). With tax incentives, firms are more likely to expand their R&D 
funding and concentrate financial resources on projects that will generate fast returns 
without governmental control (Czarnitzki et al., 2011). Consequently, long-run 
exploratory projects with high social welfare may be less favored under the sponsorship 
of  tax incentives. This implies that, although tax incentives are an effective way to 
minimize "government failure", it does not seem to be the most effective policy 
instrument to correct the "market failure" of  R&D due to the gap between the social and 
private returns from innovation (Czarnitzki et al., 2011).  
Another type of  R&D subsidy is also identified ‒ low-interest loans for R&D 
(Huergo & Trenado, 2010). In China, this type of  R&D subsidy is allocated via subsidized 
loans. For example, R&D subsidized loans are widely adopted to support firm-level R&D 
in manufacturing sectors in Jiangsu, such as the photovoltaic industry and the LED 
industry (Grau et al., 2012; Jiang, Wang, & Chen, 2012; Liang, 2014). This distinct type 
of  subsidy plays an important role in the elimination of  the distortion of  R&D behaviors 
of  firms that are rooted in the public characteristics of  direct governmental funds (Xin 
et al., 2016). Governments expect to rely on banks’ more market-driven criteria to select 
R&D subsidized loan receivers with a stronger willingness to undertake R&D and higher 
market potential (Xin et al., 2016). R&D risk should not only be borne by the government, 
but by banks as well. R&D subsidized loans also impose stricter self-discipline on the 
utilization and the improvement of  the efficiency of  R&D funds of  the recipients 
(Huergo & Moreno, 2014; Huergo, Trenado, & Ubierna, 2016). 
However, subsidized loans may lead to more severe selection bias. Commercial 
banks by nature choose promising firms with the capability to repay the loan(Huergo & 
Trenado, 2010). Banks in China are more likely to select loan receivers from amongst 
those government-certified high-quality firms through their own screening criteria, which 
are stricter than the government’s (Xin et al., 2016). Thus, the effects of  R&D subsidized 
loans for overcoming market failures of  R&D are still debated. 
2.1.4 Empirical Studies on R&D Subsidy 
Initially, the empirical evidence confirms the mismatch between the private rate and 
social rate of  returns without public interventions, which provides supports of  the 
rationale of  public R&D subsidy (Griliches, 1998). Focusing on the effectiveness of  
R&D subsidy, previous studies have provided plenty of  empirical evidence. 
Most studies focus on providing empirical evidence of  the effect of  R&D subsidy 
on firm-level R&D expenditures, namely R&D input, as the more clear definition of  
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R&D input and its straightforward logical correlation with public funds according to 
standard neoclassical analysis (Colander, 2000; Dimos & Pugh, 2016). On the other hand, 
very few empirical studies are provided to investigate the correlation between R&D 
subsidy and firm-level R&D output (Dimos & Pugh, 2016). For example, according to a 
recent literature review by Dimos and Pugh (2016), 48 of 52 studies from 2000 to 2013 
discuss the effect of R&D subsidy on firm-level R&D input, among which 15 studies 
discuss the effect on R&D output as well. Only four studies have specifically discussed 
the correlations between R&D subsidy and firm-level R&D output. 
2.1.4.1 Methods on the Empirical Studies of  R&D Subsidy 
For methodological issues, the major challenges of  an empirical study of  R&D 
subsidy are endogeneity and potential selection bias, and the evaluation studies also 
struggle with establishing fully matched control groups (Almus & Czarnitzki, 2003; 
Becker, 2015; David et al., 2000; Klette et al., 2000). The endogeneity issue of  R&D 
subsidy stems mainly from the governmental screening processes and criteria on recipient 
firms (Becker, 2015). More specifically, the success of  an application for R&D subsidy 
depends on the characteristics of  the firm, which may result in the issue of  mutual 
causality (Becker, 2015). In addition, unobservable factors may contribute to the success 
of  applying for R&D subsidies, in other words, receiving R&D subsidy or not may be 
correlated with the error term (Busom, 2000; Guo et al., 2016). The endogeneity issue 
will result in inconclusive or even conflicting findings in linear regressions (Klette et al., 
2000). Instrumental variables (IVs) are usually used to control for endogeneity (Beck et 
al., 2016; Guo et al., 2016). 
For example, by adopting an instrumental variable approach, Oezcelik and Taymaz 
(2008) indicate that public R&D subsidy has significantly positive effects on firms’ own 
R&D investment in Turkish manufacturing firms. Hewitt-Dundas and Roper (2010) find 
additionality effects generated by public R&D funds on the firm-level output of Irish 
firms. They also argue that public R&D grants are effective in both radical and 
incremental innovations of subsidized firms (Hewitt-Dundas & Roper, 2010). 
Selection biases issue is another methodological challenge that stems from the 
“picking-the-winner” strategy of public sector actors (Dimos & Pugh, 2016). R&D 
intensive and innovative firms may have a greater propensity to apply for a subsidy (David 
et al., 2000). At the same time, public agencies are more likely to support those firms 
which have higher success probabilities on the generation of economic and innovation 
spillovers (Almus & Czarnitzki, 2003). Therefore, to gain robust results about the 
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essential contributions of public R&D subsidy, the counter-factual situation related to 
the situation that subsidy recipient firms had not gained public funds should be carefully 
considered (Almus & Czarnitzki, 2003). However, most of the studies before 2000 
neglected this selection bias (David et al., 2000). To cope with the selection bias issue, a 
matching approach, mainly including nonparametric matching and propensity score 
matching, has been gradually become one of the prevalent methods to evaluate the effects 
of R&D subsidy after 2000 (Almus & Czarnitzki, 2003; Becker, 2015). 
2.1.4.2 The Effects of  R&D Subsidy on Inputs and Outputs 
By using matching approaches, for example, the effects of public R&D subsidy on 
private R&D investment of Spanish, Italian, Finnish, Flemish and German firms are 
investigated (Aerts & Schmidt, 2008; Almus & Czarnitzki, 2003; Cerulli & Poti, 2012; 
Czarnitzki & Lopes-Bento, 2013; Czarnitzki, Ebersberger, & Fier, 2007; Gonzalez & 
Pazo, 2008). Overall, these empirical results reject the crowding-out effect of R&D 
subsidy on firm-level R&D input. Apart from the research on EU countries, Koga (2005) 
finds that public R&D subsidy is a complement to private-financed R&D based on panel 
data of 223 Japanese high-technology start-ups. This additionality effect on R&D input 
is also supported in developing countries such as Turkey (Oezcelik & Taymaz, 2008). In 
addition, several other empirical studies have analyzed the signaling or certification 
effects of  R&D subsidy for accessing external financing to enhance R&D input indirectly 
(Lerner, 1999; Meuleman & De Maeseneire, 2012). For example, Meuleman and De 
Maeseneire (2008) find a positive certification effect of  R&D grants for a Belgian firm 
to attract external financing, and this certification effect is stronger for infant firms. 
Several scholars also investigated the effects of R&D subsidy on firm-level R&D 
output including technological output measured by patents and commercial output 
measured by new product sales. In the research of Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), they 
reject the crowding-out effect from R&D subsidy on firms’ patent applications. At the 
same time, it was found that the R&D subsidy generates positive productivity on patents 
(Czarnitzki & Hussinger, 2004). Czarnitzki et al. (2007) further support Czarnitzki and 
Hussinger’s research findings that the crowding-out effect is rejected on R&D output in 
Germany. They also find that the R&D subsidy significantly improves the patenting 
activities of Finnish firms. Hussinger (2008) finds that public R&D subsidy positively 
influences both R&D intensity and new product sales of firms through applying 
parametric and semiparametric two-step selection models based on manufacturing firms 
in Germany. Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014) indicate that greater sales are generated 
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for firms from innovation by receiving R&D subsidies. Bronzini and Piselli (2016) find 
that R&D subsidy significantly improves the number of  patent applications of  firms by 
using regression discontinuity design based on Italian data. However, in recent research, 
Czarnitzki and Delanote do not find a significant additionality effect of  R&D subsidy on 
firms’ new product sales, even though they largely confirm the additionality effect on 
R&D input (Czarnitzki & Delanote, 2017). 
2.1.4.3 The Non-Linear Effects of  R&D Subsidy 
Dual effects also exist according to several empirical results. In other words, the 
correlation between R&D subsidy and private R&D input may potentially be non-linear. 
An inverted U-shape correlation between R&D subsidy and private R&D spending is 
found by Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003) in a sample of  OECD 
countries. Public R&D subsidy promotes private R&D up to a certain threshold where 
R&D subsidy accounts for 10% of  firm-level R&D, and then R&D subsidy begins to 
substitute for private R&D (Guellec & Van Pottelsberghe De La Potterie, 2003). Görg 
and Strobl (2007) also find similar empirical evidence by using the conditional difference-
in-differences technique to analyze Irish manufacturing firms. They argue that small 
grants can generate additionality effects on private financing of  R&D, but too large a 
grant may crowd out the private R&D. An inverted U-shaped correlation also exists 
between public R&D sponsorship and firms’ output over time due to the accumulation 
of  repeated public resources, even though the public sponsorship exerts positive effects 
at the beginning (Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017). 
2.1.4.4 Heterogeneity in the Effects of  R&D Subsidy 
Studies related to R&D subsidy have increasingly considered the heterogeneity at 
different levels as key factors to impact on the effectiveness of R&D subsidy (Becker, 
2015; Liu et al., 2016). At the firm level, firm size, as a typical example, remains related 
to the effectiveness of R&D subsidy (Busom, 2000). Lach (2002) finds that R&D subsidy 
can greatly enhance small firms’ own R&D expenditures, but has a negative effect on 
large firms in Israel. R&D subsidy also increases innovation output, and the effects differ 
depending on firm size (Herrera & Sanchez-Gonzalez, 2013). It is shown that the 
additionality effect of  R&D subsidy on patent applications is more significant for smaller 
firms (Bronzini & Piselli, 2016). Additionally, the development stages of firms also 
influence the effects of R&D subsidy (Koga, 2005). 
At the industry-level, the effect of R&D subsidy differs based on the technological 
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level of sector firms operate in (Becker & Hall, 2013; Gonzalez & Pazo, 2008; Hall, Lotti, 
& Mairesse, 2009). Gonzalez and Pazo (2008) report that rejection of the crowding-out 
effect between public subsidy and private investment mainly occurs in Spanish 
manufacturing firms operating in low technology sectors. Becker and Hall (2013), based 
on data from the UK, have presented similar findings that public funds only significantly 
improve low-tech firms’ R&D spending. However, Hall et al. (2009) report different 
empirical results for Italian firms. They find that the boost generated by subsidies on 
private R&D efforts is more significant in high-tech industries. 
At a macrolevel, different embedded economies or periods may result in different 
effects of  R&D subsidy. For example, Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) find the empirical 
evidence that the additionality effect of  R&D subsidy on firm-level R&D input in 
Eastern Germany during the transition period is larger than in Western Germany. Output 
additionality is more pronounced in Western Germany, in which the innovation system 
is more developed (Czarnitzki & Licht, 2006). Hud and Hussinger, (2015) find differential 
effects of  R&D subsidy on firms’ inputs before and after the economic crisis in 2008. 
More specifically, significant additionality effects are found before 2008, while a 
crowding-out effect is found in 2009 (Hud & Hussinger, 2015).  
2.1.4.5 The Effects of  Different R&D Subsidy Types on Firms’ Innovation 
Several scholars further classify direct R&D grants based on different uses for 
empirical studies. For example, it is shown empirically that subsidies for research can 
enhance firms’ R&D spending while development subsidies crowd out such spending 
(Clausen, 2009). 
Apart from R&D grants, the effects of  other types of  R&D subsidies, including tax 
incentives and low-interest loans, have also been studied empirically. For tax incentives, 
studies show that tax incentives cause additionality effects on firm-level R&D investment 
(Baghana & Mohnen, 2009; Guellec & Van Pottelsberghe De La Potterie, 2003; 
Kobayashi, 2014). It is also shown empirically that tax incentives appear to stimulate 
private R&D financing more effectively than direct grants in Italy (Carboni, 2011). 
Furthermore, several other studies on tax incentives indicate that additional firm-level 
R&D outputs, such as producing new products, and patent applications, can be generated 
by tax incentives (Berube & Mohnen, 2009; Cappelen, Raknerud, & Rybalka, 2012; 
Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Radas et al., 2015). 
For low-interest loans, several studies analyze empirically the determinants of  firms 
that are more likely to apply for low-interest loans to finance their R&D activities. It is 
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found that young firms involved in high or medium-tech industries with previous public-
sponsored experience have a higher probability of  filing loan applications (Heijs, 2005; 
Huergo & Trenado, 2010). The recent study of  Huergo et al. (2016) also shows 
empirically that low-interest loans can stimulate firms’ own R&D investment in Spanish 
firms. In addition, the additionality effects of  low-interest loans are larger for smaller 
firms and manufacturing firms (Huergo et al., 2016). 
2.1.4.6 Effects of  R&D Subsidy in the Context of  China 
The number of  empirical studies related to the effects of  public R&D subsidy in 
the context of  China has increased in recent years. 
Most studies of  Chinese R&D subsidy usually focus on testifying to the existence 
of  additionality effect or crowding-out effect from public intervention on firms’ R&D 
inputs, mainly measured by firm-level R&D expenditure or R&D intensity (Boeing, 2016; 
Cheng & Chen, 2006; Dai & Cheng, 2015b; Liu et al., 2016; Xin et al., 2016; Yu et al., 
2016).  
Cheng and Chen (2006) show empirically that R&D subsidy has an insignificant 
effect on private firms’ R&D expenditures in Zhejiang province by using a PSM 
(propensity score matching) method. While also using a PSM method, Liu et al. (2016) 
demonstrate the existence of  a significant additionality effect generated by R&D subsidy 
on firm-level R&D expenditure in Jiangsu province. They further find that the 
additionality effect is stronger for smaller firms, more financially constrained firms, and 
privately-owned firms. Boeing (2016), based on the data of  Chinese listed firms between 
2001 and 2006, finds that R&D subsidy instantaneously crowds out firms’ R&D 
investment but is neutral in later periods. 
Dai and Cheng (2015b) explore an inverted-U correlation between firms’ private 
R&D investment and the R&D subsidy for Chinese manufacturing firms. The firms’ own 
R&D spending can be stimulated above a threshold value of  R&D subsidy; a further 
increase in public subsidy would crowd out firm-level R&D investment. Similarly to Dai 
and Cheng’s empirical findings (2015b), Yu et al. (2016) find the threshold effect of  R&D 
subsidy on the own R&D expenditure of  firms involving Chinese renewable energy 
sectors. Their results show that public R&D subsidy can only stimulate firm-level R&D 
inputs by increasing subsidies within a certain range, otherwise, the R&D subsidy exerts 
negative effects on firms’ R&D investment behaviors. 
Xin et al. (2016) discuss and compare the effectiveness of  different R&D subsidy 
types, including loan interest subsidies and direct grants. The results indicate that more 
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competitive based loan interest subsidies are more effective in enhancing firm-level R&D 
inputs, rather than direct grants. Furthermore, this additionality effect is mainly driven by 
private-owned firms. 
Other mainstream research is related to the effects generated by R&D subsidy on 
firm-level R&D outputs, which are usually measured by patent applications and new 
product producing or sales (Guan & Yam, 2015; Guo et al., 2016; Hong et al., 2016; Jia, 
Huang, & Zhang, 2019; Xiong & Yang, 2016; Xu, Huang, & Xu, 2014; Zhou et al., 2018). 
At the industry-level, Hong et al. (2016) explore a negative influence exerted by 
public R&D subsidy on patenting activities of  high-tech industries in China by using a 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). At the firm level, Guan and Yam (2015) empirically test 
the effects of  Chinese R&D subsidy in the 1990s. The results show that direct R&D 
grants from the Chinese government exert a negative effect on firms’ patent applications 
and new product sales. Furthermore, more market-driven subsidy tools, such as special 
loans and tax incentives, can positively influence the new product sales of  firms. Thus 
they argue that the centrally planned funding system is ineffective for enhancing the 
technological capabilities of  Chinese firms. 
By combining PSM with two-stage estimation approaches, Guo et al. (2016) 
investigated the effects of  Innofund, one of  the largest public R&D sponsorship programs 
for small and medium-sized enterprises in China, on firms’ outputs including the number 
of  patents, new products sales, and exports. They found that subsidy recipient firms 
generate significantly higher outputs than non-recipient counterparts. Xu et al. (2014) 
also found a significantly positive correlation between R&D subsidy and firms’ new 
product development based on an empirical investigation of  270 Chinese firms. 
Xiong and Yang (2016) found a positive effect of  R&D subsidy on firms’ outputs 
at the early exploratory stage in the photovoltaic industry, but little effect at the 
intermediate stage and mature stage. Based on these results, they also suggest the best 
entry occasion and a suitable exit occasion of  public intervention by using R&D subsidies. 
Zhou et al. (2018) distinguish the effects of  local and central governments’ R&D 
subsidy on firms’ radical and incremental innovation based on new product sales in 
Chinese cultural and creative industries. They further discuss the moderating effects of  
firm-level knowledge stocks. Similarly, Jia et al. (2019) also investigate the effects of  R&D 
subsidy on firm-level innovation novelty in Chinese state-owned enterprises. 
Several other scholars investigate the issue of  subsidy allocation and the 
determinants for winning R&D subsidy in China (Boeing, 2016; Wang et al., 2017). 
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Wang et al. (2017), using a regression discontinuity (RD) design, found that firms 
with observable advantages and political ties are more likely to receive Innofund grants. 
They also empirically test the causal effects between R&D subsidy and firms’ survival 
rates, patenting, or attracting venture capital. Boeing (2016) found that the Chinese 
government prefers to provide R&D subsidies to firms which have prior grants, high-
quality inventions and state-owned background.  
A few studies also test empirically the signal or certification effect of  R&D subsidy 
in China (Wei & Zuo, 2018; Wu, 2017). Wu (2017) found that firms can attract more 
external finance by receiving R&D subsidy, based on data of  Chinese listed corporations 
from 2009 to 2013. This signal effect generated by R&D subsidy is stronger for private 
firms, rather than state-owned firms in China. Wei and Zuo (2018) investigated the 
different signaling effects generated by receiving R&D subsidy from local and central 
governments. 
2.2 Public Subsidy and Behavioral Additionality 
2.2.1 The Conception of  Behavioral Additionality 
2.2.1.1 The Definition and Classifications of  Behavioral Additionality 
Behavioral additionality, as the third type of  additionality generated by policy 
intervention on firms’ R&D and innovation activities, has been conceptualized in the 
academic literature (Buisseret et al., 1995; Falk, 2007; Georghiou, 2002; Georghiou & 
Clarysse, 2006). Buisseret et al. (1995) first show an explicit conception of  behavioral 
additionality as the persistent changes that occur in firms’ R&D and innovation-related 
behaviors as well as strategies. These changes are attributable to the policy intervention, 
for example, firms may undertake R&D activities with higher risk and acquire more 
knowledge via R&D collaborations by receiving public R&D subsidy. Thus, Falk (2007) 
refines the concept of  behavioral additionality as desirable changes in the process of  
R&D and innovation by using policy intervention. 
The main advantage of  the efficiency evaluation of  public intervention by using 
behavioral additionality is to assess the essential changes in the recipient firms’ innovation 
process, and subsequently the improvements of  related technological capabilities. These 
profound effects generated by the public intervention may not be captured by the input 
and output additionality assessments (Antonioli & Marzucchi, 2012). The conception of  
behavioral additionality helps to understand better how public intervention can 
essentially change the process of  R&D and how innovation can be done in a more 
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consistent way (Georghiou & Laredo, 2006). More specifically, for the research on public 
R&D subsidy, the conception of  behavioral additionality can interpret the effects of  
public R&D subsidy in a more comprehensive way (Georghiou & Clarysse, 2006). Thus, 
the conception of  behavioral additionality has gained considerable attention in academic 
literature (Antonioli & Marzucchi, 2012; Falk, 2007; Gök & Edler, 2012). Subsequently, 
the evidence on the existence and nature of  behavioral additionality is increasingly sought 
in evaluation practice for designing innovation policy (Georghiou & Clarysse, 2006). 
Based on the basic definition, the conception of  behavioral additionality has been 
extended to be more specific and further classified (Chapman & Hewitt-Dundas, 2015; 
Falk, 2007; Gök & Edler, 2012). Current classifications on behavioral additionality can 
be found in several perspectives, mainly including R&D project implementation and 
firm-level cognitive capacity enhancement (Falk, 2007; Georghiou, 2002; Knockaert et 
al., 2014). 
From the R&D project implementation perspective, behavioral additionality can be 
further classified into scope additionality, acceleration additionality and scale additionality 
(Falk, 2007; Georghiou, 2002). Scope additionality occurs in situations where R&D 
projects undertaken by firms have been extended to “a wider range of  markets, applications 
or players” (Falk, 2007, p. 668) on receiving the R&D subsidy. By extending the scope into 
new research areas, firms may encounter a greater level of  both technological and 
commercial risks stemming from unfamiliar areas in which firms lack related 
technological competencies and business experience (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). Scope 
extending could also be reflected in the establishment of  new partnerships with external 
actors which can potentially enlarge firm-level knowledge scope (Clarysse et al., 2009). 
However, the cost arises for firms due to the coordination and maintaining of  the new 
relationships with external partners (Dyer & Singh, 1998). By receiving R&D subsidy, 
firms can, to some extent, reduce the risk as well as cost related to the scope extending. 
Thus, the R&D subsidy is expected to generate scope additionality (Falk, 2007). 
Acceleration additionality is defined as the effects generated by R&D subsidy on 
the timing of  the R&D projects, usually the speeding up of  projects to meet a market 
window (Georghiou, 2002). Acceleration additionality could be, for example, “an earlier 
starting date, a shorter implementation phase, or the earlier completion of  the project” (Falk, 2007, pp 
668) without resource constraints under public support. Firms can also shorten the time 
to market by acceleration additionality. To generate acceleration additionality, firms 
usually prefer to engage in short-term projects rather than long-term projects. However, 
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if  long-term projects are required to be undertaken by sponsored firms to satisfy public 
strategical targets, firms may decide to get involved in research areas beyond their short-
term business needs. In this situation, acceleration additionality would appear with scope 
additionality at the same time (Falk, 2007). 
Scale additionality refers to the situation where a specific R&D project is conducted 
on a larger scale than previously intended by the firm as a result of  government support 
(Georghiou, 2002; Wanzenboeck et al., 2013). In other words, scale additionality occurs 
when firms adopt a larger scale of  their R&D projects or investments after receiving 
R&D subsidies (Falk, 2007). Falk (2007) also argues that scale additionality can capture 
and depict the gradual change in R&D project implementation. 
Another key perspective of  behavioral additionality is cognitive capacity 
additionality, which refers to the enhancements generated by R&D subsidies on aspects 
such as firm-level managerial capabilities, technological know-how and networking skills 
(Bach & Matt, 2002, 2005; Falk, 2007; Knockaert et al., 2014). The core issue of  the 
cognitive capacity additionality related to R&D subsidy is concerned with whether public 
support changes the cognitive capacity of  the sponsored firms (Bach & Matt, 2002, 2005). 
Bach and Matt (2002) argue that the changes to firm-level cognitive capacity can result in 
permanent or persistent changes in firm behaviors at the strategic level or at the level of  
acquired competences. It is also argued that these aforementioned changes could have 
stronger significant effects on firms’ R&D activities in the long run (Bach & Matt, 2002, 
2005). Thus, it is argued that the concept of  cognitive capacity additionality reflects an 
evolutionary-structuralist perspective (Georghiou, 2002). 
It is proposed that cognitive capacity additionality can be further classified into 
network additionality and competence additionality (Antonioli et al., 2014; Knockaert et 
al., 2014). The network additionality refers to firms’ external collaboration and network 
building with public support (Alexander & Martin, 2013; Falk, 2007). The R&D-related 
collaborative network can be established not only with knowledge institutes, such as 
universities and research institutes, but also with industrial actors, including suppliers, 
users, complementors, even rivals as well (Afcha Chavez, 2011; Antonioli et al., 2014; 
Guisado-Gonzalez, Ferro-Soto, & Guisado-Tato, 2016; Marzucchi, Antonioli, & 
Montresor, 2015; Wanzenboeck et al., 2013). Network additionality implies the extending 
of  collaboration networks within or between sectors, therefore, network additionality can 
also be regarded as a type of  scope additionality (Falk, 2007). 
Competence additionality refers to the upgrading of  firms’ internal competence 
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with receiving public R&D funds (Chapman & Hewitt-Dundas, 2015; Knockaert et al., 
2014). Currently, the upgrading of  human resources, such as the recruitment of  high-
quality R&D employees and training of  staff  members, is used to capture competence 
additionality, as human resources play a key role in the innovation process and 
enhancement of  internal capabilities (Antonioli et al., 2014; Chapman & Hewitt-Dundas, 
2015; Knockaert et al., 2014). It is argued that the two types of  cognitive capacity 
additionality are not wholly separable (Georghiou, 2002). The generation of  network 
additionality, for example, usually requires firms to overcome the issue of  lack of  the 
necessary competences to manage a partnership, which can be regarded as competence 
additionality (Afcha & Garcia-Quevedo, 2016). 
For cognitive capacity additionality, several scholars have sought to examine the 
persistency and legacy effects of  R&D subsidy on it (Chapman & Hewitt-Dundas, 2015; 
Clarysse et al., 2009; Gök & Edler, 2012). The legacy effect is defined as the further 
effects or benefits emerging from additional short-term effects, usually in the subsidy 
period (Roper & Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). Persistency effects refer to the longer-term 
additional effects being sustained beyond the subsidy period (Chapman & Hewitt-
Dundas, 2015). As mentioned before, the firm-level cognitive capacity additionality can 
result in permanent or persistent changes in firm behaviors at the strategic level or at the 
level of  acquired competences. Thus, persistency and legacy effects are key aspects to 
better understand cognitive capacity additionality (Gök & Edler, 2012). The omission of  
these effects may result in inaccurate evaluations of  the additionality effects generated by 
public support on cognitive capacity (Chapman & Hewitt-Dundas, 2015). Although it is 
acknowledged that the persistent and legacy effects are crucial, such effects have not been 
fully explored (Chapman & Hewitt-Dundas, 2015).  
In addition, one of  the latest studies investigates the behavioral additionality 
generated by R&D subsidy from the perspective of  innovation-orientated attitudes 
among senior managers, with three sub-categories, which are comprised of  support for 
innovation, risk tolerance, and openness to external knowledge (Chapman & Hewitt-
Dundas, 2018). More specifically, support for innovation from senior managers is related 
to the assistance for innovative behaviors such as the development of  new ideas and the 
provision of  adequate resources for innovation activities. Risk tolerance is related to 
senior managers’ ability and willingness to undertake innovation activities under 
conditions of  uncertainty. Openness to external knowledge reflects senior managers’ 
tendency to regularly utilize external knowledge to drive innovation activities (Chapman 
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& Hewitt-Dundas, 2018). 
2.2.1.2 Behavioral Additionality: Beyond the Market Failures to the System 
Failures 
The original intention of  public R&D subsidy is to tackle R&D-related market 
failures, such as under-investment in R&D for innovation (Arrow, 1962; David et al., 
2000; Dimos & Pugh, 2016). However, the conception of  behavioral additionality goes 
beyond the market failure rationale (Gök & Edler, 2012). The behavioral additionality is 
based on an evolutionary perspective to overcome a broader range of  failures including 
system and knowledge processing failures (Hall, 2002b; Metcalfe & Georghiou, 1997; 
Smith, 2000). Evolutionary theory provides several key tools to interpret and better 
understand the system failures rationale for introducing the basic intervention logic of  
innovation policy (Antonioli & Marzucchi, 2012).  
According to evolutionary theory, firms’ innovation behaviors are heterogeneous, 
which can be attributed to firm-level specific rules, competencies, cognitive capabilities 
and particular strategies (Metcalfe, 1995; Nelson & Winter, 1982). These factors 
constitute firms’ routines that determine firms’ innovation behaviors (Metcalfe, 1995). 
At the same time, from the perspective of  neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary theory, the 
firm-level routines are dynamic and selectable (Dosi & Nelson, 1994). Firm-level factors 
that constitute routines for innovation are influenced by complementary and 
interconnected factors both internal and external to the firms (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986). 
Based on this argument, the innovation system perspective further emphasizes that firms 
do not undertake innovation activities in isolation (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). Firms 
carry out innovation by interacting and collaborating with other actors, such as other 
R&D-performing firms and universities (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). All relevant 
actors and their interactions constitute the innovation system (Edquist, 2005). Thus, 
according to the evolutionary theory, the institutional setting and the framework 
conditions are also important to support firms’ innovation activities (Lundvall, 1992; 
Nelson, 1993). 
Unlike neoclassical theory, which emphasizes the supplement and promotion 
generated by public support on firms’ innovation-related resource allocations, 
evolutionary theory, and the innovation system perspective emphasize the enhancement 
of  firm-level innovation capabilities and promotion of  an embedded innovation system 
(Metcalfe, 2005). The role of  the innovation policy should be rethought from a more 
comprehensive perspective. Thus, innovation policy is not simply designed and 
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implemented to overcome the market failures due to under-investment in R&D and 
underproduction of  innovation. Innovation policy should also be designed to tackle 
system failures (Smith, 2000). 
According to existing literature, two main system failures can be identified 
(Antonioli & Marzucchi, 2012). The first is the failure in regard to the creation of  
knowledge and learning capabilities, and subsequently the evolutionary process of  
innovation (Malerba, 2009). The other is the failure related to the structure and the 
configuration of  the system (Smith, 2000). 
The system failures related to the creation of  knowledge and learning capabilities 
usually stem from insufficient human resources and firm-level internal technological 
knowledge for absorbing external new knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). 
Furthermore, this type of  system failure can also be the result of  unbalanced evolutionary 
trade-offs between exploration and exploitation (Antonioli & Marzucchi, 2012). For 
example, where the innovation activities of  firms are characterized by low-level 
exploration but high-level exploitation, firms are more likely to concentrate their 
resources on familiar technological fields with sufficient knowledge stock, disregarding 
novelties (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). The existing core capabilities which can be regarded 
as rigidities result in path dependence (Leonard Barton, 1992). 
For the system failures related to the structure and the configuration of  the system, 
Antonioli and Marzucchi (2012) conclude two main reasons that result in such failures. 
The first reason is the weak functioning of  both formal and informal institutions, 
including regulations, standards, common norms, trust, and culture, etc. (Smith, 2000). 
These institutions shape the external environment, which has significant impacts on 
firms’ innovation behaviors and performances. 
Second, the inappropriate or missing components and the interactions between 
these components may result in system failures (Edquist, 2005; Malerba, 2009; Metcalfe, 
2005). A number of  key components and their interactions have profound effects on 
firms’ innovation from the innovation system perspective (Edquist, 2005). On the one 
hand, missing appropriate components may trap firms in limited interactive learning, 
inhibiting the acquirement of  essential resources (e.g., external knowledge) and 
development of  key capabilities via learning for innovation (Malerba, 2009; Metcalfe, 
2005). Weak interactions also reduce the possibility for the creation of  a common vision 
for the development of  new technologies and exert negative effects on the coordination 
between actors in the innovation systems, resulting in system failures on innovation 
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(Carlsson & Jacobsson, 1997). On the other hand, inappropriate components and 
interactions may result in networks that are too strong. In such networks, the inertia can 
enhance firms’ risk of  locking in existing trajectories (Woolthuis, Lankhuizen, & Gilsing, 
2005).  
In order to tackle the system failures, it should be taken into consideration that 
policy intervention on R&D and innovation via R&D subsidy needs to be designed and 
implemented to essentially enlarge firms’ knowledge stock and enhance firm-level 
internal competencies, such as technological capabilities and absorptive capacities. R&D 
subsidy is also required to provide more opportunities for firms to interact with external 
actors, especially learning with other innovation-related actors. To briefly conclude, R&D 
subsidy is expected to generate firm-level behavioral additionality. 
2.2.1.3 Behavioral Additionality from Learning Perspective 
Organizational learning perspective has been drawn on to examine firm-level 
behavioral changes stemming from public support (Clarysse et al., 2009; Knockaert et al., 
2014). From a learning perspective, R&D subsidy may change firms’ routines or 
behaviors on acquiring, absorbing, creating and exploiting new knowledge (Clarysse et 
al., 2009). More specifically, R&D subsidy may potentially improve the formation of  
firms’ external networks for acquiring knowledge, the accumulation of  firms’ internal 
knowledge stock, the development of  firms’ technological capabilities and subsequently 
enhance R&D productivity and commercial benefits from R&D (Roper & Hewitt-
Dundas, 2014). 
Three sub-categories of  behavioral additionality from the learning perspective are 
identified, including congenital additionality, inter-organizational additionality and 
experiential additionality (Roper & Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). These three behavioral 
additionalities stem from the examination of  Clarysse et al. (2009) on the effect of  R&D 
subsidy on organizational learning, namely congenital learning, inter-organizational 
learning, and experiential learning. This classification of  behavioral additionality based 
on the learning perspective also closely mirrors the cognitive capacity additionality 
adopted by Knockaert et al. (2013).  
Congenital learning refers to the firms’ internal knowledge stock built up in the past 
which is closely related to the “absorptive capacity” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Huber, 
1991). Absorptive capacity is important in R&D subsidy research, as the policy evaluation 
based on input and output additionality is complicated by the fact that firms do R&D for 
other purposes, such as technological upgrading through exploratory innovation, rather 
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than purely getting new products to market or applying for new patents. Congenital 
learning can be also defined as the stock of  human capital at the firm level, which is 
captured by the education and experience of  firms’ employees (Roper & Hewitt-Dundas, 
2014). Thus, congenital additionality refers to the improvements in the quality of  skills 
of  firms’ human resources generated by receiving public R&D subsidy (Roper & Hewitt-
Dundas, 2014). At the same time, congenital additionality is also closely related to 
competence additionality (Knockaert et al., 2014). 
Inter-organizational learning refers to firms’ R&D collaborations for transfer and 
sharing of  both codified skills and tacit knowledge outside firms (Autio, Kanninen, & 
Gustafsson, 2008; Levitt & March, 1988). Inter-organizational additionality is defined as 
the enhancement led by public support on the development of  new inter-organizational 
collaborations for potential external knowledge transfer (Roper & Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). 
R&D subsidy encourages firms to broaden or deepen their external linkages related to 
R&D behaviors. Inter-organizational additionality is similar to network additionality and 
is closely linked with congenital additionality (Falk, 2007; Knockaert et al., 2014; Roper 
& Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). On the one hand, inter-organizational additionality provides 
more opportunities for both individual and organizational learning with external actors, 
and increasing firm-level competencies and absorptive capacity (Falk, 2007), and 
enhancing network competences as well (Ritter & Gemünden, 2003). On the other hand, 
inter-organizational additionality may be path-dependent according to previously 
acquired knowledge, in other words, inter-organizational additionality may be constrained 
by congenital additionality (Roper & Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). 
Experiential learning refers to learning-by-doing which is related to knowledge 
embedding to firms through specific routines and resource configuration (Clarysse et al., 
2009; Cyert & March, 1963). Experiential additionality is defined as the potential 
reconfiguration of  existing R&D processes and routines or the introduction of  new ones 
through exploration by receiving R&D subsidy (Roper & Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). 
2.2.2 Empirical Studies on Behavioral Additionality 
2.2.2.1 The Measurements of  Behavioral Additionality 
After clarifying the definition of  behavioral additionality, several scholars began to 
verify the effect of  public R&D subsidy on firm-level behavioral additionality by 
employing empirical analysis. In the empirical studies related to behavioral additionality, 
the first core problem to be addressed is to clarify the measurements of  behavioral 
additionality (Antonioli & Marzucchi, 2012; Falk, 2007; Gök & Edler, 2012). 
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From the perspective of  cognitive additionality, the growth of  internal knowledge 
stocks and the expansion of  external inter-organizational learning networks measure the 
firm-level competence additionality and network additionality, respectively (Knockaert et 
al., 2014; Roper & Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). More specifically, based on organizational 
learning theory, human resources are the carriers of  complex tacit knowledge and are 
closely related to the firms’ use of  knowledge to enhance their R&D capabilities (Roper 
& Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). In this way, the internal knowledge stocks can be captured by 
the upgrade of  R&D related human resources, that is, the educational level, the growth 
of  R&D experience and capabilities of  the R&D staff  members of  firms. For example, 
firms can acquire R&D-related capabilities by hiring high-quality researchers (Chapman 
& Hewitt-Dundas, 2015; Georghiou & Clarysse, 2006). The current studies use counting 
or continuous variables to directly measure the enhancement of  both quantity and quality 
of  employees for capturing the firm-level competence additionality, such as “the ratio of  
the number of  employees with a doctoral degree to the total number of  employees” 
(Kang & Park, 2012), “the differences between the values of  natural logarithm of  the 
actual and predicted employment” (Link & Scott, 2013), “the number of  tertiary-
educated workers divided by the total number of  workers” (Gustafsson et al., 2016), and 
“the recruitment of  Ph.D. holders” (Afcha & Garcia-Quevedo, 2016). Antonioli et al. 
(2014) measure the firm-level competence additionality via a questionnaire survey by 
setting up three dummy variables related to human resource upgrading. These three 
variables indicate “whether the workers’ competencies have been widened as a result of  the firm’s 
organizational practices”; “whether undifferentiated training programs have been implemented”; and 
“whether the firm has organized training programs to improve specific specialized competencies”. 
The external inter-organizational learning network is usually measured by the firms’ 
external R&D collaborations in existing research to depict the expansion of  the firms’ 
external channels for accessing R&D-related knowledge (Knockaert et al., 2014; Roper 
& Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). The firm-level external R&D cooperation can be further 
divided into cooperation with knowledge institutions and industrial partners. Knowledge 
institutions include universities and research institutes. Cooperation with industrial 
partners includes vertical cooperation and horizontal cooperation. Vertical cooperation 
refers to cooperation between firms and their upstream suppliers and downstream users; 
horizontal cooperation refers to the participation in strategic alliances, cooperation with 
firms affiliated with the same group, even industrial competitors (Afcha Chavez, 2011; 
Franco & Gussoni, 2014). 
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The measurements of  firm-level network additionality are diversified, mainly 
including dummy variables, counting variables, scoring variables based on questionnaires, 
and continuous variables. Specifically, the dummy variables directly depict whether a firm 
has R&D cooperation with external organizations (Afcha Chavez, 2011; Antonioli et al., 
2014; Busom & Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Guisado-Gonzalez et al., 2016; Marzucchi et al., 
2015; Segarra-Blasco & Arauzo-Carod, 2008). For example, Guisado-González et al. 
(2016) set up 40 dummy variables of  R&D cooperation by identifying 40 cooperation 
sources classified by regions and partners based on the data of  the Spanish Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS). The counting variables usually measure the firms’ cooperative 
behaviors by taking the number of  partners of  firms (Kang & Park, 2012). The scoring 
variables are usually defined based on the specific content of  the questionnaire (Cerulli 
et al., 2016; Knockaert et al., 2014). For example, Cerulli et al. (2016) scored 0-6 for the 
firm-level cooperation based on the Italian Community Innovation Survey (CIS) by 
considering the factors including the types and geographic locations of  the partners for 
firms. A score of  0 means that a firm has no cooperation at all, and a score of  6 means 
that the firm has all types of  partners. Knockaert et al. (2014) rated the firm-level network 
additionality by using the seven-point Likert Scale, which included questions about “The 
project allowed us to network with universities or public research centers” (p.382). However, Carboni 
(2012) argues that the measurements of  network additionality by the use of  
discontinuous variables may lose a large amount of  specific information in R&D 
cooperation, while the continuous variables can compensate for these losses. Thus, he 
used the ratio of  collaborative R&D expenditure to the number of  employees as a 
variable to measure the network additionality (Carboni, 2012). 
In addition, there are few empirical studies related to the behavioral additionality 
from the perspective of  implementation on R&D projects. Existing studies usually adopt 
dummy variables to measure the additionality on the scale, scope and speed of  R&D 
projects (Wanzenboeck et al., 2013). In a recent study, firm-level behavioral additionality 
from an innovation-oriented perspective was measured by the five-point Likert Scale 
(Chapman & Hewitt-Dundas, 2018). 
2.2.2.2 Public R&D Subsidy and Firm-Level Behavioral Additionality 
The empirical studies of  the additional effects generated by public R&D subsidy on 
firm-level R&D behaviors also encounter the issues of  selection bias and endogeneity 
related to research on policies. At the same time, due to the characteristics of  
measurements of  behavioral additionality, the existing prevalent empirical research 
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methods are mainly matching models (Antonioli & Marzucchi, 2012). 
Similarly to the research on the effects of  R&D subsidy on the firms’ input and 
output additionality, most studies adopt propensity score matching (PSM) for controlling 
selection bias and endogeneity issues (Afcha Chavez, 2011; Antonioli et al., 2014; Busom 
& Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Chapman & Hewitt-Dundas, 2018; Marzucchi et al., 2015). 
Apart from the PSM algorithm, two related studies used coarsened exact matching (CEM) 
(Afcha & Garcia-Quevedo, 2016; Gustafsson et al., 2016). Compared with the PSM 
algorithm, CEM does not need to estimate firms’ propensity probabilities for obtaining 
the R&D subsidy at first, that is, it does not need to estimate the propensity score via the 
logit or probit regression (Afcha & Garcia-Quevedo, 2016; Gustafsson et al., 2016). The 
CEM algorithm layers and weights related variables that affect firms’ acquirements of  
R&D subsidy in accordance with the distance between the treated and control groups. 
Thus, the CEM algorithm is suited to situations in which the factors influencing the R&D 
subsidy allocation are continuous variables (Gustafsson et al., 2016). 
Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008) investigate the effect of  R&D subsidies on 
firms’ collaborations with public research organizations as well as other firms including 
customers and suppliers. Based on the data from 716 Spanish manufacturing firms in 
1998, Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008) adopted a parametric structural model and a 
score matching method as their empirical technique. The results show that public R&D 
subsidies significantly enhance the likelihood of  firms’ external R&D collaboration. 
Specifically, on the one hand, the probability of  R&D collaboration between recipient 
firms and public research institutions has increased by 28%. On the other hand, although 
public R&D subsidies promote collaborations between firms and customers and 
suppliers, such additionality effects are not as significant as that between firms and public 
research institutions. In addition, these additionality effects of  R&D subsidy on 
collaborations between firms and the private industrial partners are significant only when 
recipient firms have certain intangible knowledge assets. 
Afcha Chávez (2011) analyzed the additionality effects of  public R&D subsidies 
from central and local governments on the manufacturing firms’ technological 
cooperation. The study further differentiates the firms’ cooperation with universities or 
technology centers, as well as with customers and suppliers. Based on a set of  panel data 
from a group of  Spanish manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2005, the study adopts the 
PSM algorithm. The empirical results show that R&D subsidies from central and local 
governments can significantly promote cooperation between firms and universities or 
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technology centers. However, such additionality effects are insignificant on the 
promotion of  cooperation between firms with customers and suppliers. Furthermore, 
the study also finds that local R&D subsidies exert higher additionality effects on firms 
without antecedent experience in R&D cooperation, whereas subsidies from the central 
government are more effective in fostering cooperation in those firms already engaged 
in R&D cooperation. 
Antonioli et al. (2014) explore the effects of  R&D subsidies on both firm-level 
competence and network additionalities at the same time. By adopting PSM based on a 
set of  regional firm-level data from Italy in 2006-2008, the study finds that firms 
sponsored by R&D subsidy are more likely to upgrade their internal capabilities. However, 
the R&D cooperation of  these firms is not significantly affected by receiving such R&D 
subsidies. 
Based on a business dataset for the Italian region of  Emilia-Romagna, Marzucchi et 
al. (2015) first verified the significant contribution of  R&D subsidy to cooperation 
between firms and universities or research institutes by adopting PSM. They further 
indicate that the R&D subsidy to regional firms affects their intra-regional more than 
their extra-regional cooperation. A generalized propensity score matching technique is 
then employed to explore the effect of  the amount of  subsidy. It is found that R&D 
subsidy can promote firms’ cooperation with extra-regional universities only when the 
amount of  provided subsidy reaches a minimum threshold. The potential reason is that 
extra-regional cooperation has a higher cost. 
Gustafsson et al. (2016) tested the question about whether R&D subsidy has a 
positive effect on firms’ performance. They adopted CEM and diff-in-diff  approaches 
combined with a qualitative case study of  the Swedish public innovation subsidy program. 
The firms’ human resource upgrading is an important indicator to measure firms’ 
performance. The empirical results show that the R&D subsidies exert a significantly 
positive but short-run effect on the firms’ human capital investment. However, no 
significant effects of  R&D subsidy can be found on the long-term performance of  firms. 
Afcha and Garcia-Quevedo (2016) examine the effects of  R&D subsidies from 
national and regional governments on firms’ R&D personnel recruitment. First, this 
study evaluated the efficiency of  R&D subsidies on firm-level R&D expenditures and 
the number of  R&D staff  members. Second, this study further focuses on the effect of  
public R&D subsidies on the recruitment of  R&D personnel with a high educational 
level. Based on a dataset from the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel from 2006 to 
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2011, the research adopts a combination of  CEM and PSM to control selection bias and 
endogeneity issues. The empirical results indicate that R&D subsidies significantly 
increase the number of  R&D employees. It is also shown that regardless of  the firm size, 
R&D subsidies would significantly increase firms’ recruitment of  employees with a Ph.D. 
degree in the first year after receiving public funds. From the perspective of  the sources 
of  subsidies, the additionality effects of  R&D subsidy on the recruitment of  Ph.D. 
holders are insignificant when firms only receive subsidies from the regional government. 
In a recent study in 2018, Chapman and Hewitt-Dundas (2018) adopted PSM to 
explore the effects of  R&D subsidies on innovation-orientated attitudes of  firms’ senior 
managers. Their empirical results show that public support induces the most significant 
positive change in openness to external knowledge, followed by the risk tolerance of  
senior managers. The positive effect of  R&D subsidy on senior manager attitudes for 
supporting innovation is the smallest. 
Apart from the matching algorithm, several other empirical techniques have been 
employed in existing related research. To cope with the endogeneity issue, most studies 
choose to set the instrumental variables. The endogenous nature of  the effects of  R&D 
subsidy on firm-level behavioral additionality in empirical research mainly comes from 
unobservable factors that may have effects on firms’ R&D behaviors (Antonioli & 
Marzucchi, 2012). On the other hand, to enhance the probability of  successful 
acquirement of  R&D subsidy, firms will deliberately change their R&D behaviors based 
on the application requirements to cater to public agencies (Georghiou, Clarysse, & 
Steurs, 2004). This may result in reverse causality issues to generate endogeneity. 
The selection of  instrumental variables in existing research is mainly comprised of  
firm-level and industry-level variables. The firm-level instrumental variables are closely 
correlated to the possibilities of  firms’ acquirement of  R&D subsidy, but not directly 
related to the behavioral additionality. For example, Link and Scott (2013) use “whether a 
firm acquires other public support before receiving public R&D subsidy” and Guisado-Gonzalez et 
al. (2016) use “firms’ export share” as instrumental variables. The industry-level 
instrumental variables depict the degree of  innovation as well as the priority of  obtaining 
an R&D subsidy of  the industry in which the firm engages. The industry-level 
instrumental variables do not directly affect firm-level behavioral additionality as well. 
For example, Carboni (2012) uses “the amount of  industry grant per worker”; Franco and 
Gussoni (2014) use “the innovation costs, incoming spillovers, appropriability and permanent R&D 
at industrial level”; Guisado- Gonzalez et al. (2016) used “mean of  R&D subsidy at the industry 
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level” as instrumental variables (see Table 2.2 for a summary of  instrumental variables). 
Based on the instrumental variables, the existing studies adopt the Structural Equation 
Model (SEM), Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regression as the main empirical 
techniques (Franco & Gussoni, 2014; Guisado-Gonzalez et al., 2016; Link & Scott, 2013). 
Link and Scott (2013) investigate conditions in which R&D subsidies promote the 
employment growth of  SMEs sponsored by the Small Business Innovation Research 
program (SBIR). By using linear regression with instrumental variables, the study finds 
that R&D subsidy has more significant stimulating effects on employment growth under 
two conditions. First, the recipient firms acquire additional funding from external 
investors for the R&D at the same time. Second, the firms create an exceptional amount 
of  intellectual property with publicly subsidized R&D. In addition, the signing of  
commercial agreements between subsidized firms and other firms has played an 
important role in employment growth. This also promotes the success of  the 
commercialization of  technological achievements which are developed under R&D 
subsidy. 
Franco and Gussoni (2014) explore the effect of  R&D subsidy on firms’ R&D 
cooperation. This study adopted SEM with instrumental variables based on a dataset of  
innovative firms in seven European countries. The results show that R&D subsidy has a 
significantly positive effect on firms’ participation in various types of  R&D cooperation 
in all countries. At the same time, R&D subsidy has a higher effect on firm-level network 
additionality in the service sector. 
Guisado-Gonzalez et al. (2016) verified that public R&D subsidy has significant 
additionality effects on firms’ R&D cooperation. The study uses a two-stage least squares 
method with instrumental variables based on a set of  cross-sectional data from a group 
of  4,311 Spanish manufacturing companies in 2010. The study also finds that the 
implementation of  differentiation strategies will have a significant adverse effect on R&D 
cooperation. Firms with differentiated strategies may have different knowledge and 
therefore are not keen to gain competitive advantage by the R&D spillovers generated by 
other firms. Consequently, these firms may not have much interest in the establishment 
of  R&D cooperation. Thus, the government should grant more support for firms’ R&D 
to firms positioned in a differentiation strategy, rather than encourage firms to establish 
more R&D cooperation via such subsidies. 
Carboni (2012) explores whether public R&D subsidy is a determinant in promoting 
firm-level R&D cooperation. Continuous variables are used to measure behavioral 
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additionality, which is the ratio of  cooperative R&D expenditure to the number of  
employees. Due to the censoring bias, the Tobit model with instrumental variables is 
adopted after the preprocessing of  the dependent variable by using the Inverse 
Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) transformation. The empirical results show that public R&D 
subsidy has a significantly positive effect on R&D cooperation. Besides, the absorption 
capacity measured by the R&D personnel intensity is also significantly positively 
correlated with the level of  cooperative R&D expenditure. 
At the same time, several studies do not set instrumental variables. For example, 
Segarra-Blasco and Arauzo-Carod (2008) adopt a logit model to explore the determinants 
of  R&D cooperation establishment between firms and five types of  partners (i.e., firms 
under the same groups, customers and suppliers, competitors, universities and public 
research institutes). R&D subsidy is found to significantly promote firms’ R&D 
cooperation with all these five types of  partners, resulting in additionality effects. The 
study further distinguishes the sources of  R&D subsidy into region-level, state-level, and 
EU-level. The empirical results show that regional subsidy only significantly promotes 
cooperation between firms and universities and research institutes, while national and EU 
subsidies significantly promote all types of  cooperation. In addition, R&D subsidy at the 
state-level significantly promotes firms’ cooperation with domestic universities, while EU 
subsidy has significant additionality effects on firms’ cooperation with foreign universities. 
Kang and Park (2012) adopt the SEM to explore the effects of  R&D subsidy on 
firm-level internal R&D activities and external collaborations with universities, research 
institutes and other firms based on the survey data of  Korean biotechnology SMEs from 
2005 to 2007. The empirical results indicate that R&D subsidy has significantly enhanced 
the internal R&D investment and the recruitment of  highly educated employees of  
Korean firms. At the same time, the R&D subsidy also plays an essential role in 
promoting firms’ domestic and international R&D cooperation. 
Based on the Italian Community Innovation Survey data, Cerulli et al. (2016) employ 
the treatment random coefficient model to verify the effects of  public R&D subsidy on 
firms’ R&D cooperation. The research results show that the R&D subsidy has a 
significant additionality effect on firm-level R&D cooperation with external partners. 
In addition, several empirical studies also explore the correlations between firm-
level heterogeneity and behavioral additionality. For example, Clarysse et al. (2009) 
investigated the additionality effects of  three firm-level learning behaviors on firms’ 
R&D behaviors, including “change way the research path is managed in the firm” (p.1521), 
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“formalize the innovation management process within the firm”, and “increase the innovation 
management capabilities” (p.1521). They found that congenital learning and inter-
organizational learning can significantly generate the firms’ behavioral additionality, but 
this additionality effect will be eroded if  firms have participated in public R&D programs 
before. 
The research of  Wanzenboeck et al. (2013) indicates that the firm size, age, and 
degree of  technological specialization will affect behavioral additionality. They find that 
the smaller, younger and more specialized firms are more likely to generate behavioral 
additionality with public R&D subsidy. 
Knockaert et al. (2014) investigate the effects of  technology intermediaries and 
firm-level absorptive capacity on firms’ competence and network additionality. The 
empirical results show that these two factors cannot directly promote behavioral 
additionality. However, the higher the absorptive capacity of  the firm, the more the firm 
can fully use the services provided by the technology intermediaries, resulting in higher 
behavioral additionality. 
To sum up, current empirical studies on the effects of  public R&D subsidy on firms’ 
R&D behaviors mainly adopt matching algorithms and regressions with instrumental 
variables. Discontinuous variables including dummy and counting variables are mainly 
used to measure R&D subsidy. Dummy variables are also used for the measurement of  
behavioral additionality in almost all the existing related studies, and very a few studies 
adopt continuous variables, such as the research of  Carboni (2012). The existing studies 
have also differentiated the effects of  R&D subsidy on firm-level R&D behaviors by 
considering the heterogeneity factors. In terms of  the sources of  R&D subsidy, the 
effects of  subsidies from local, central governments and the European Union were tested. 
The types of  behavioral additionality were further classified, such as cooperation with 
different partners, and short-run and long-run growth of  firm-level competences. 
Different factors of  firms were also considered including firm size, industries the firms 
were engaged in, and firm-level strategies, which may potentially affect the correlations 
between R&D subsidy and firm-level behavioral additionality (see Table 2.1 for the 
summary of  relevant empirical studies). In addition, the firm-level absorptive capacity is 
also an essential factor which influences the behavioral additionality in existing studies.
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Table 2.1 Conclusion of  Empirical Studies of  the Impact of  R&D Subsidies on firms’ Behavioral additionality  
Studies  Empirical 
techniques  
Measurement of  
R&D subsidy  
Measurement of  behavioral 
additionality  
Heterogeneity 
factors 
Results  
Busom & 
Fernández-
Ribas (2008) 
SEM; PSM Dummy variables  Three dummy variables in 
collaborations with public 
research institutes, customers 
and suppliers, and other firms 
 Positive on 
collaborations; 
More positive on 
collaborations with 
public research 
institutes 
Segarra-Blasco 
& Arauzo-
Carod (2008) 
Logit model  Dummy variables  Five dummy variables in 
collaborations with different 
partners 
Sources of  R&D 
subsidies 
Positive on 
collaborations 
Afcha Chávez 
(2011) 
PSM  Dummy variables  Two dummy variables in 
collaborations with universities; 
customers and suppliers 
Sources of  R&D 
subsidies 
positive on 
collaborations with 
universities; 
insignificant on 
collaborations with 
customers and 
suppliers 
Kan & Park 
(2012) 
SEM  Dummy variables  1) Counting variables of  
partners of  R&D 
collaborations; 
2) ratio of  employees with 
Ph.D. degrees 
Domestic or 
foreign 
collaboration  
Positive on both 
collaborations and 
employee recruitment 
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Table 2.2 Cont.  
Studies  Empirical 
techniques  
Measurement of  
R&D subsidy  
Measurement of  behavioral 
additionality  
Heterogeneity 
factors 
Results  
Carboni 
(2012) 
Tobit model 
with IVs  
Dummy variables  Firm’s external R&D 
expenditure divided by the 
number of  employees 
Firms size Positive on 
collaborations 
Link & Scott 
(2013) 
OLS with Ivs  Counting variables 
of  R&D subsidy 
projects 
The natural logarithm of  the 
ratio of  the actual number to 
the expected number of  
employees 
 Positive on 
employee 
recruitment 
Franco & 
Gussoni 
(2014) 
SEM; Ivs  Dummy variables  Four dummy variables in 
collaborations with different 
partners 
Service and 
manufacturing sectors; 
different countries  
Positive on 
collaborations; 
More positive in 
service sectors 
Antonioli et 
al. (2014) 
PSM  Dummy variables  1) 3 dummy variables in 
human resource upgrading; 
2) 8 dummy variables in 
collaborations with different 
partners 
Intra-regional and 
inter-regional 
collaborations 
Positive on human 
resource upgrading; 
insignificant on 
collaborations 
Marzucchi et 
al. (2015) 
PSM  Dummy variables  4 dummy variables in 
collaborations with different 
partners 
Intra-regional and 
inter-regional 
collaborations  
Positive on 
collaborations; 
More positive in 
Intra-regional 
collaborations 
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Table 2.3 Cont.  
Studies  Empirical 
techniques  
Measurement of  
R&D subsidy  
Measurement of  
behavioral additionality  
Heterogeneity 
factors 
Results  
Gustafsson et 
al. (2016) 
CEM; DID 
Fixed-effect 
model 
Dummy variables  the ratio of  educated 
tertiary workers 
Long-term and 
short-term 
performance  
Positive in short-term 
human resource 
upgrading, but 
insignificant in the long 
term 
Afcha & 
Garcia-
Quevedo 
(2016) 
CEM; PSM Dummy variables  Recruitment number of  
employees with Ph.D. 
degrees 
Central and local 
governments  
Positive on employee 
recruitment; but 
insignificant when 
receiving local funds 
Guisado-
Gonzalez et al. 
(2016) 
IVs; 2SLS Dummy variables  40 dummy variables in 
collaborations 
differentiation 
strategy 
Positive on collaborations 
Cerulli et al. 
(2016) 
treatment 
random 
coefficient 
model 
Dummy variables  Counting variables of  the 
score on collaborations  
 Positive on collaborations 
Chapman & 
Hewitt-Dundas 
(2018) 
PSM  Dummy variables  Counting variables of  the 
score on three dimensions 
of  Innovation orientation  
 Positive on the attitude of  
senior managers towards 
innovation  
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Table 2.4 Instrumental variables in R&D subsidy research 
Studies  Instrumental variables 
Carboni (2012) the amount of  industry grant per worker 
Link & Scott (2013) prior funding (i.e., funding for the 
research that was obtained before the 
Phase II SBIR award) 
Franco & Gussoni (2014) The industry level of  1) innovation costs; 
2) incoming spillovers; 3) appropriability; 
4) permanent R&D. 
Guisado-Gonzalez et al. (2016) export intensity, basicness of  R&D, and 
Industry level of  incoming spillovers (at 
the 2-digit NACE level) 
Oezcelik & Taymaz (2008) 1) sectoral share of  supported firms; 2) 
regional share of  supported firms; 3) 
capital intensity; 4) relative labor 
productivity; 5) share of  skilled 
employees 
Guo et al. (2016) 1) the total number of  firms in high-tech 
zones of  the city where the firm is 
located in each given year 
2) the ratio of  total investment in fixed 
assets made by local governments over 
the total GDP at the county level each 
year 
Liu et al. (2016) the natural logarithm of  the amount of  
public funding per technology at the 4-
digit industry level 
 
2.3 Public R&D Subsidy, Behavioral Additionality, and Output 
Additionality： A Comprehensive Perspective 
According to the argument of  Antonioli and Marzucchi (2012), under evolutionary 
theory and the perspective of  the innovation system, close connection and interaction 
exist between firm-level R&D input, output, and behavioral additivity. 
Several scholars have initially explored the relevance of  firms’ R&D behavioral 
additionality, R&D input, and output (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Clarysse et 
al., 2009; George, Zahra, & Wood, 2002; Madsen, Clausen, & Ljunggren, 2008). For 
example, Madsen et al. (2008) analyzed the large-scale survey data of  Norwegian firms 
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and found that the additional behaviors of  the firm, such as launching additional new 
R&D projects, is a prerequisite for generating more R&D investment. Clarysse et al. 
(2009) indicated that firms are more willing to invest in R&D activities and hire R&D 
personnel as they improve their R&D management processes. The research findings of  
Baum et al. (2000) and George et al. (2002) show that firms can increase their knowledge 
stocks through more interactions with external R&D partners. Increased knowledge 
stocks help firms to overcome the deficiency of  information and scientific knowledge 
and to enhance related R&D resources and capabilities, thus gaining more R&D output. 
Since R&D subsidy has a specific effect on the change of  firms’ R&D behaviors, in 
recent years, several scholars have begun to pay more attention to the interaction between 
firm-level R&D input, output and behavioral additionality under the sponsorship of  
R&D subsidy. The relevant studies focus primarily on the research question about how 
R&D subsidy promotes firms’ R&D input or output through the changes in firms’ R&D 
behaviors (Cerulli et al., 2016; Kang & Park, 2012). 
Kang and Park (2012) test the effect of  public R&D subsidy on R&D output 
through the internal competence and external network additionality. They find a 
significant positive correlation between firm-level R&D output (measured by the number 
of  patent applications) and the upgrading of  firms’ human capital. A similar significant 
positive correlation can be also found exerted by the establishment of  R&D 
collaborations on firms’ patent applications. Furthermore, a significantly stronger effect 
is generated by international collaborations, than by domestic collaborations. The study 
argues that South Korea is weaker in the knowledge base and market compared with 
Western developed countries, thus acquiring advanced knowledge through international 
collaborations can promote more R&D output of  biotechnology firms in South Korea. 
In addition, the empirical results show that, as an essential way to improve absorptive 
capacity, the upgrading of  firms’ own human capital will play a significant role in 
promoting R&D output. 
Cerulli et al. (2016) explore the mediating role of  R&D input and collaborations in 
the effect of  R&D subsidy on firms’ R&D output. The empirical results show that the 
input additionality, as well as the interaction of  input and investment on collaborations, 
play a significant mediating role in the effect of  R&D subsidy on firms’ R&D output. 
The effect of  investment in R&D collaborations alone on the firm-level R&D output is 
shown as an inverted U-shaped curve. When the investment of  R&D collaborations 
exceeds a certain threshold, it will have a negative effect on firm-level R&D output. 
Cerulli et al. (2016) argued that excess R&D collaborations will increase the coordination 
cost which affects firms’ resource allocation and thus inhibit the generation of  R&D 
output. 
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2.4 Review of  Existing Literature and Research Framework 
According to the literature review, from the logic of  neoclassical economics, the 
effect of  public R&D subsidy on firms’ R&D input has been extensively and thoroughly 
studied and discussed by academia. In recent years, Chinese scholars have also paid 
increasing attention to this research topic. Compared to the discussion around R&D 
input, fewer studies have explored and tested the effect of  the public subsidy on firms’ 
R&D output, and the conclusions are also inconsistent. The complicated “black box” 
exists between R&D input and output. More factors make up this black box, which will 
potentially affect the efficiency of  R&D subsidy on firm-level R&D output. Thus, 
scholars and policymakers are increasingly aware of  the importance of  the effect 
generated by R&D subsidy on firms’ changes in R&D behaviors. Research on behavioral 
additionality brought by public funds is gaining more and more attention. 
Specific to the existing research on R&D subsidy in the Chinese context, according 
to the literature review, several research gaps still remain. First, few studies focus on the 
effect of  public R&D subsidy on firm-level behavioral additionality in the Chinese 
context. At present, the studies related to R&D behavioral additionality provide support 
for our understanding and analysis of  the correlations between R&D subsidy and firms’ 
changes in R&D behaviors. However, the definition of  behavioral additionality still 
requires to be more focused and specific, which can be easily captured and measured for 
empirical analysis. At the same time, the research of  behavioral additionality should echo 
evolutionary theory and the perspective of  the innovation system. As an essential 
resource for R&D and innovation activities, knowledge acquisition and utilization will 
profoundly affect firms’ R&D input and output. Organizational learning theory is closely 
related to knowledge acquisition and utilization, which can reflect the R&D and 
innovation process from a dynamic evolutionary and systemic perspective. At the same 
time, the related research on knowledge-based view and organizational learning theory is 
relatively complete with a systematic theoretical framework and measurements of  
variables. Therefore, based on the current literature review, it is appropriate to study the 
effect of  public R&D subsidy on firm-level behavioral additionality from the learning 
perspective. 
Second, most studies examine the correlations between public R&D subsidy and 
firms’ R&D output, or the correlations between the changes in firms’ R&D behaviors 
and output. Very few studies consider the interactions between these three factors in a 
more comprehensive framework. However, based on the literature review, in order to 
open the “black box” of  the effect on firm-level R&D output generated by public R&D 
subsidy, the deeper mechanisms need to be explored. Thus, behavioral additionality 
should be discussed in conjunction with R&D subsidy and firms’ output from a more 
comprehensive perspective. For example, firms’ absorptive capacities are essential for 
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organizational learning, and the external network building is also crucial for these learning 
behaviors. The question about whether synergistic effects exist between firms’ absorptive 
capacities enhancement or network building and R&D subsidy on firm-level learning 
behaviors is still under-explored. Third, the firms-level heterogeneity, especially the 
characteristics related to organizational learning, may have an impact on the way and 
effect of  using R&D subsidy and thus moderate the effect of  R&D subsidy on firms’ 
R&D behaviors. However, the research of  this moderation effect is scant and this effect 
needs to be studied. 
In addition, the existing literature has formed systematic empirical methods to 
evaluate the effects of  public R&D subsidy. More specifically, the existing literature 
adopts propensity score matching to overcome selection bias, instrumental variables to 
tackle the endogeneity issue, and Tobit regression to cope with censoring bias. These 
methods will also be applied and combined in this dissertation to obtain robust empirical 
results. At the same time, according to the specific issues and data structures, this 
dissertation will also use Cox regression, which is the first instance of  adopting such an 
empirical model in R&D subsidy related studies. In the selection of  variables for R&D 
subsidy, most of  the existing studies employ dummy variables or counting variables, 
which loses information contained in the subsidy amount. Thus, this paper will employ 
continuous variables to measure R&D subsidy. 
In summary, this dissertation will focus on firms’ learning behaviors in the R&D 
process. A knowledge-based view and organizational learning theory are selected as the 
theoretical basis of  this study. The resource-based view and institutional theory will also 
be combined into the theoretical framework. In this dissertation, firm-level learning 
behaviors are further divided into the acquisition and the utilization of  novel knowledge. 
This study will investigate the effect of  public R&D subsidy on firms’ novel knowledge 
acquisition and the adoption behaviors in the context of  China, and then the impact on 
the R&D output of  firms. The research framework of  the work is shown in Figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.1 The research framework 
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3. Methodology 
The purpose of  this chapter is to discuss the paradigmatic position of  this 
dissertation, including essential assumptions and underlying logic. It commences by 
defining a paradigm and its content, based on which the main components underpinning 
this study are explained. Then the research design will be presented, where the reasons 
for the choice of  the methods and techniques of  data collection for this study will be put 
forward. Finally, the research process will be elaborated as well. 
3.1 Paradigm 
It is generally agreed that the paradigmatic foundation of  research has a substantial 
impact on the overall strategy of  the research methods (Kuada, 2012). Therefore several 
philosophical discussions are necessary and the paradigmatic position of  this dissertation 
is required to be explicitly presented.  
The modern use of  the term paradigm is derived from Kuhn (1970), who uses the 
term to describe the structure of  scientific revolution and waves of  research in a given 
scientific field. Overall, a paradigm is defined as a set of  beliefs with common 
understandings, including what should be studied, how research should be done, and how 
results should be interpreted (Kuada, 2012; Kuhn, 1970). Thus, in essence, a paradigm is 
a priori framework for understanding and investigating a phenomenon. First of  all, 
ontology and epistemology are two critical components of  understanding the research 
philosophy, as a paradigm consists of  a common belief  and understanding of  the study 
which guides disciplined inquiry (Kuada, 2012). 
3.1.1 Ontology and Epistemology 
Ontology refers to “assumptions which concern the very essence of  the phenomena 
under investigation” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p.1). In other words, ontology is used to 
describe the nature of  the reality related to what the researcher seeks to know something 
about (Blaikie, 2009). The question about whether social entities need to be perceived as 
objective or subjective is at the central position of  ontology. Accordingly, ontology can 
be further specified as objectivism and subjectivism (see Table 3.1). 
More specifically, objectivism asserts that social phenomena and their meanings are 
pre-given. Social phenomena and their meanings are also independent of  human and 
social actors. Based on this ontological position, an organization is viewed as a tangible 
object with a particular set of  principles, rules, and rules that are learned and applied by 
the individuals involved in it (Bryman & Bell, 2015). In contrast to objectivism, 
subjectivism views reality as purely subjective. Social phenomena and their meanings are 
socially generated and modified by human beings and social actors through continuous 
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interaction. Thus, rather than regarding them as pre-existing, organizations and their 
rules are evolving through the stages of  construction and reconstruction (Bryman & Bell, 
2015).  
Associated with the ontological issues, the epistemological assumption is about “the 
ground of  knowledge, about how one might begin to understand the world and 
communicate this as knowledge to fellow human beings” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p.1). 
In simple terms, epistemology deals with the sources of  knowledge. More specifically, 
possibilities, nature, sources, and limitations of  knowledge in a given field of  study can 
be the central problem of  epistemology (Hallebone & Priest, 2008). Thus, epistemology 
describes the nature of  knowledge and the means of  actually knowing.  
Table 3.1 Classification of  Ontology 
Ontology Descriptions  
Objectivism  Objectivism is “an ontological position that claims that social 
phenomena and their meanings are independent of social actors” 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
Subjectivism  Subjectivism is “an ontological position which asserts that social 
phenomena and their meanings are continually being 
accomplished by social actors” (Bryman & Bell, 2015). 
Ontology and epistemology have direct implications of  a methodological nature 
which refers to “the way in which one attempts to investigate and obtain knowledge 
about the social world” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p.2). Therefore, the methodology is the 
strategy or plan of  action-guiding the entire research, which describes reasons underlying 
the choice of  scientific methods in the research process. Different ontologies and 
epistemologies are likely to result in researchers choosing diversified research 
philosophies that adopt different methodologies. 
3.1.2 Positivism, Interpretivism, and Pragmatism 
Based on different ontological and epistemological assumptions on reality, 
diversified research philosophies exist. In this dissertation, three basic research 
philosophies will be introduced, which are positivism, interpretivism, and Pragmatism 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). 
Positivism research philosophy adheres to the view that it is trustworthy to gain 
“factual” knowledge through observation and measurement (Saunders et al., 2009). In 
positivist studies, researchers are limited to data collection, meaning that they should 
maintain an objective stance and be independent of  the collected data (Wilson, 2014). 
Researchers should also imitate and apply the methods of  natural sciences to the study 
of  social reality, therefore, adopted methods under positivism research philosophy are 
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usually quantitative and highly structured. The research procedure is to generate a 
hypothesis based on the deduction of  theories, and the hypothesis must be verifiable 
(Crowther & Lancaster, 2008). The research findings are usually observable and 
quantifiable. 
In contrast to positivism, interpretivism asserts that social sciences are subjective 
(Saunders et al., 2009). The purpose of  research in the interpretivism research philosophy 
is to understand the roles of  social actors and the subjective meaning of  the social 
phenomena. According to interpretivism research philosophy, it is argued that researchers 
are involved to interpret elements of  studies, in other words, human interest is integrated 
into a study. In simple terms, researchers in terms of  interpretivism research philosophy, 
are part of  what is being researched. It implies that researchers can never be objective 
about the interpretation made by others since our understanding of  others is heavily 
impacted by personal viewpoints and values (Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006). 
From the epistemology perspective, the researcher’s view in terms of  what adequate 
knowledge can be constituted is different in positivism and interpretivism (Saunders et 
al., 2009). Positivism focuses on causality and law-like generalizations. Thus, the source 
of  knowledge of  positivism relies on empirical findings gained via valid and reliable 
measures of  constructs (Saunders et al., 2009). Interpretivism, on the other hand, focuses 
on the reality behind the details of  the situation, related to subjective meanings which 
can motivate actions. Interpretivism accepts personal experiences associated with 
observation, feelings, and senses as a valid source of  knowledge. Thus, qualitative data 
from interviews, observations, documentaries, etc. is the primary data source of  studies 
in interpretivism research philosophy (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Positivism and interpretivism are two extreme, mutually exclusive paradigms 
regarding the nature of  research and sources of  knowledge. However, some research 
topics may shift the philosophical assumptions over time, and move to a new position of  
paradigms (Collis & Hussey, 2013). Pragmatism research philosophy accepts the concept 
that researchers do not have to adopt one single philosophical position. According to 
pragmatism research philosophy, one study can be investigated via many different ways, 
and one single point of  view may fail to give the entire picture to show the multiple 
realities of  the social research (Saunders et al., 2009). Within pragmatism research 
philosophy, research questions are the essential determinant for the selection of  the 
research philosophies. Researchers can integrate research techniques of  both positivist 
and interpretivist positions within a single study based on the research question. The 
differences between these three research philosophies are shown below (see Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2 The differences between Positivism, Interpretivism, and Pragmatism 
 Ontology  Research approach Research strategy 
Positivism Objective  Deductive Quantitative 
Interpretivism Subjective Inductive Qualitative 
Pragmatism 
Objective or 
subjective 
Deductive/Inductive 
Qualitative and/or 
quantitative 
Source: Wilson (2014)  
3.2 The Paradigmatic Position of  the Dissertation 
In order to determine the paradigmatic position of  this research, conceptions from 
the objectivist-subjectivist dispositions in social science need to be compared and the 
specific assumptions, which will be used in this research, need to be chosen. 
First, the aim of  this dissertation is to investigate the correlations between three 
main elements, R&D subsidy, firm-level R&D behaviors, and technological output in 
China. This social phenomenon is explained by observing causal relationships between 
three main elements. Furthermore, by studying the regularities and causal relationships 
between these three key elements, this research is expected to understand and predict the 
social phenomenon related to the effectiveness of  R&D subsidy in China. Thus, the 
ontology of  this study has characteristics of  objectivism or positivism in nature (Kuada, 
2012). 
Second, the epistemological assumption of  this dissertation also satisfies objectivist 
or positivist criteria. More specifically, the number of  relevant existing studies focusing 
on R&D subsidy has provided plenty of  codified knowledge in terms of  appropriate 
theories and models for analysis. Furthermore, existing studies also provide mature 
measurement ways to refine the social phenomenon to the simplest constructs and 
evaluate these primary constructs for research (Saunders et al., 2009). Based on the source 
of  knowledge, prior explanations of  the studied social phenomenon of  this dissertation 
can be provided by hypotheses formed by existing theories related to R&D subsidy 
logically (Babbie, 1989). These hypotheses can then be tested to verify and/or falsify 
according to the empirical evidence generated by the analysis of  objective data (Snieder 
& Larner, 2009; Wilson, 2014). 
Therefore, based on ontological and epistemological assumptions, the methodology 
of  this dissertation can adopt a hypothetic-deductive methodology (Kuada, 2012). In 
management and business studies with a hypothetic-deductive methodology, a set of  
hypotheses deduced from theories are formulated initially. Each hypothesis needs to be 
formulated in operational terms and proposes relationships between two specific 
variables and tested with the application of  appropriate econometric methods. The 
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empirical results need to be examined in order to confirm or reject the hypothesis. The 
hypothetic-deductive method is linked with the positivist paradigm (Crowther & Lancaster, 
2008). By employing a positivist approach, the research procedure of  this dissertation 
needs to be purely objective, and the researcher needs to maintain minimal interaction 
with the research participants (Wilson, 2014). Therefore, in this dissertation, a large set 
of  objective data from Jiangsu manufacturing firms is employed for the analysis to gain 
empirical evidence. 
3.3 Research Design 
Following the logic of  hypothetic-deductive methodology, appropriate theories need to 
be selected for the theories’ deductions for hypotheses building initially. Appropriate 
econometric methods will be then chosen to gain the empirical evidence for testing the 
hypotheses, thus, in the following section, the rationales of  selected theories and 
econometric methods in this dissertation will be elaborated, and samples and data 
resources will also be depicted as well. 
3.3.1 Theories Selection for Hypotheses Building 
3.3.1.1 Organizational Learning Theory 
Organizational learning theory argues that an organization can adapt to the changes 
of  both its internal and external environments through organizational learning (Fiol & 
Lyles, 1985). Organizational learning is related to the effective processing, interpretation 
of, and response to changes both inside and outside the organization by exploration and 
the exploitation of  knowledge, technology, and capabilities. 
Clarysse et al. (2009) argued that organizational learning theory explains how the 
behaviors of  a company change through its learning processes. This learning perspective 
can complement the previous literature in regard to additionality effects generated by 
R&D subsidy by using economic arguments, as existing studies largely neglect the 
organizational theories that might explain different additionality results (Clarysse et al., 
2009). 
Three forms of  learning have been identified with regard to R&D subsidy and 
behavioral additionality, namely: experiential learning, congenital learning and inter-
organizational learning (Clarysse et al., 2009). Experiential learning refers to learning-by-
doing (Cyert & March, 1963). Congenital learning refers to the knowledge stock built up 
in the past (Huber, 1991). The knowledge stock may determine firm-level behaviors and 
is closely related to the “absorptive capacity” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Inter-
organizational learning is related to the R&D collaborations of  firms by knowledge 
transfer and sharing (Autio et al., 2008; Levitt & March, 1988). 
In terms of  the potential changes of  firms’ behaviors generated by receiving R&D 
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subsidy, experiential learning implies the accumulation of  experience related to 
sponsored projects application and operation (Clarysse et al., 2009; Levitt & March, 1988). 
With the increasing experiences on sponsored projects application and operation, 
especially when firms know how they can satisfy the public agencies providing R&D 
subsidy, the efficiency of  experiential learning may decline or even disappear in firms’ 
R&D behavioral changes (Clarysse et al., 2009). In the context of  R&D subsidy, on the 
one hand, congenital learning can contribute to firm-level capabilities for understanding 
new knowledge to undertake R&D activities sponsored by R&D subsidy (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1989; Zahra & George, 2002). On the other hand, congenital learning may 
result in learning inertia with knowledge stock (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). Firms may 
undertake R&D in their familiar technological fields to avoid risk and uncertainty, even 
though they would have received R&D subsidies. For inter-organizational learning, R&D 
subsidy may encourage firms to establish formal R&D collaborations for exchanging 
both codified skills and tacit knowledge. R&D subsidy can also support firms to maintain 
such relationships for inter-organizational learning as well (Autio et al., 2008; Kale, Singh, 
& Perlmutter, 2000). 
3.3.1.2 Knowledge-Based View 
A knowledge-based view considers knowledge as the most strategically significant 
resource of  a firm. It is argued that knowledge-based resources are usually difficult to 
imitate and socially complex. Heterogeneous and unique knowledge determines firm-
level performance and the creation of  sustained competitive advantages accordingly 
(Grant, 1996). Thus, one of  the main tasks of  an organization is to create knowledge 
through knowledge development, integration, and exploitation (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; 
Grant, 1996; Macher & Boerner, 2012). 
To create unique knowledge, firms can access and transfer external knowledge 
across organizations (Grant, 1996). At the same time, firms need to enhance capabilities 
to better absorb and exploit knowledge for the integration with internal resources to 
develop new knowledge, as knowledge development within firms from learning is 
facilitated by technological resources and capabilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Technological resources can be allocated for the acquisition of  new technologies, 
equipment, or even human capital, to improve firm-level technological capabilities (Hitt 
et al., 2001). In turn, firms can optimize technological resource allocation with a higher 
level of  technological capabilities to improve innovation performance (Baker & Sinkula, 
2007). 
However, assimilation and exploitation of  technology-related knowledge are 
complex and costly in nature, and firms may also lack sufficient resources for the 
development of  technological capabilities as well as the deployment of  technology-
related resources (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996). Public R&D subsidy can be 
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provided to enhance technology-related resources and to help firms to facilitate 
technological capabilities (Xu et al., 2014). Thus, public R&D subsidy is expected to be 
helpful for recipient firms to acquire, assimilate, transform, integrate and exploit 
knowledge. 
3.3.1.3 Resource-Based View 
The resource-based view (RBV) argues that the competitive advantages of  a firm 
stem from valuable resources at the firm’s disposal (Barney, 1991; Newbert, 2008). The 
firm-level valuable resources, including physical capital, human capital and organizational 
capital are rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (Galbreath, 2005; Newbert, 2008). 
Controlled by a firm, these valuable resources enable the firm to conceive of  and 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness for obtaining excess 
returns (Peteraf & Barney, 2003; Priem & Butler, 2001). 
However, the cost of  R&D is comparatively high, R&D activities are usually 
associated with high risk and uncertainties with inherent public goods characteristics 
(Dimos & Pugh, 2016). The resources deployed on R&D activities are usually scarce, and 
R&D activities may be constrained by resources. According to the resource-based view, 
public R&D subsidy can directly increase the pool of  available resources for firms to 
undertake innovation activities. At the same time, public R&D subsidy reduces R&D 
costs and enhances returns as well (David et al., 2000; Radas et al., 2015; Rangan et al., 
2006). Thus, governments also play a key role in resource allocation in firms’ resource 
management via providing R&D subsidies based on RBV (Lazzarini, 2015). 
3.3.1.4 Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory (RDT) focuses on the issue of  how external resources 
of  an organization affect its behavior (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Hillman, Withers, & 
Collins, 2009). The theory assumes that organizations are constrained by a network in 
which they have interdependencies with other organizations (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Hillman et al., 2009). RDT proposes that organizations will be dependent upon others in 
order to gain necessary resources when they lack essential resources on their own. At the 
same time, organizations attempt to minimize their own dependence or increase the 
dependence of  other organizations on them for altering their dependence relationships 
with others (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Based on resource dependence theory, public R&D subsidy mainly influences firms’ 
R&D activities via the resource-buffering effect (Amezcua et al., 2013). The R&D subsidy 
creates a resource munificent environment for firms to undertake R&D independent of  
other external organizations, which to some degree helps firms to manage overall 
uncertainty and risk (Amezcua et al., 2013; Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017). By using public 
R&D subsidy, recipient firms can occupy more favorable competitive positions, 
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compared to rival firms without public resources. To keep a favorable competitive 
position, firms are more likely to allocate resources on R&D activities and enhance their 
technology-related capabilities (Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017). Having been released from 
resource pressure by public R&D subsidies, recipient firms can be protected from 
potential adverse selection, whereby technological capabilities and resources are 
enhanced and allocated more effectively (Rangan et al., 2006). 
3.3.1.5 Institutional Theory 
An institutional theory emphasizes rational myths, isomorphism, and legitimacy 
(Scott, 2008). Institutions are governance structures constructed by rules, norms, values, 
and systems of  cultural meaning. According to institutional theory, organizations’ 
behaviors are deeply rooted in institutions, thus, behaviors must be explained on a 
situational basis. In other words, the institutional theory focuses on the processes by 
which external institutions become authoritative guidelines for organizations’ behaviors 
(Scott, 2008). Scott (1995) indicates that organizations must conform to the rules and 
belief  systems dominant in the environment. In this way, organizations will earn the 
organization legitimacy in order to survive (Scott, 1995). The behaviors of  an 
organization for seeking legitimation are the result of  seeking resource stability. 
According to institutional theory, receiving R&D subsidies shows an endorsement 
from the government and enhances firms’ legitimacy (Armanios et al., 2017; Jourdan & 
Kivleniece, 2017). With the enhancement of  legitimacy, a quality signal is provided by 
public R&D subsidy to potential investors, other innovation actors and clients, which is 
helpful for recipient firms to gain external financing and to establish formal collaborative 
relationships with external partners (Feldman & Kelley, 2006; Kleer, 2010; Lerner, 1999; 
Takalo & Tanayama, 2010). Thus, legitimacy enhancement generated by R&D subsidy 
may potentially result in firm-level learning behaviors’ changes. 
3.3.2 Empirical Techniques 
Empirical studies on public R&D subsidy mainly confront three challenges. The 
first is the selection bias generated by the picking-the-winner behavior of  governments 
derived from public choice theory (David et al., 2000; Dimos & Pugh, 2016). Another is 
the endogeneity issue stemming from omitted variables bias, reverse causality and 
measurement error (Guo et al., 2016). The selection bias and endogeneity issue may 
further result in an overestimation of  the actual effect of  R&D subsidy (Boeing, 2016; 
Liu et al., 2016). The evaluation of  the effects of  R&D subsidy is also disturbed by 
unobservable heterogeneity (Boeing, 2016). This means not all firm characteristics that 
determine the reception of  R&D subsidy and influence the effect of  firm-level R&D 
activities can be observed. In addition, the dependent variables in R&D subsidy studies 
are usually non-negative continuous variables but contain amounts of  observations with 
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value 0, which suggests left-censored data. This may result in censoring bias by sampling 
adopting a linear regression model (Carboni, 2012; Li, Xia, & Zajac, 2018). 
Following the suggestions of  previous studies, propensity score matching (PSM), 
fixed-effect regression with instrumental variables (IVs) and Tobit regression are adopted 
as the core empirical techniques of  this dissertation to cope with the aforementioned 
challenges. 
3.3.2.1 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
PSM is a non-parametric estimation which matches the treated to the control 
observations with a set of  similar observable characteristics for eliminating potential 
selection bias (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
More specifically, PSM methods estimate the counterfactual outcomes of  
individuals by using the outcomes from a subsample of  “similar” individuals from the 
other group, i.e., estimate the treatment effect based on outcome differences between 
comparable individuals. This means that control groups present the same likelihood as if  
being treated compared with the treated groups, even though they are not treated in reality. 
The selection into treatment is not random but is systematically correlated with some 
variables that may influence the outcome. Based on PSM, the difference between the 
outcomes in the treated and the control groups can be attributed to the treatment. PSM 
is now prevalent in the research on R&D subsidy (Dimos & Pugh, 2016). For this 
dissertation, R&D subsidy recipient firms are denoted as the treated group while the 
potential effectiveness of  R&D subsidy is the estimated average treatment effect. Control 
groups are built by using a PSM algorithm, which is comprised of  non-recipient firms. 
PSM relies on two main assumptions, namely the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA) and the common support condition (CSC) during the matching 
procedure. The conditional independence assumption (CIA) allows the untreated units 
to be used to construct an unbiased counterfactual for the treatment group. Under the 
CIA, a set of  observable variables, i.e., covariates, exists. After controlling for covariates, 
the potential outcomes are independent of  treatment status which is identified by groups. 
CIA implies that after controlling for covariates, the assignment of  units to treatment is 
“as good as random.” This assumption requires that all variables relevant to the 
probability of  receiving treatment should be observable and included in covariates. 
The common support condition (CSC) ensures that there is sufficient overlap in the 
characteristics of  treated and untreated units to find adequate matches. That is, for each 
possible value of  covariates, there must be a positive probability of  finding both a treated 
and an untreated unit. 
PSM usually has three basic steps for calculating the treatment effects (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2008). The first step is the estimation of  propensity scores. The propensity 
score is defined as the probability of  receiving treatment conditional on the covariates. 
PhD Dissertation, Yuchen GAO 
68 
By comparing propensity scores alone, it is unnecessary to attempt to match on all 
covariates (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). To estimate the propensity score, a logit or probit 
model is usually used with a set of  covariates. Covariates should contain variables that 
influence the treatment status and the outcome variable simultaneously. Furthermore, 
variables that are unaffected by treatment should also be included as covariates in the 
model. To ensure this, variables selected as covariates should either be fixed over time or 
measured before participation. In the context of  this dissertation, obviously explicit 
criteria that satisfy the requirements of  governments in regard to public sponsored R&D 
project or program eligibility should be included as these factors are thought to influence 
self-selection and administrative selection. 
The second step is the selection of  a matching algorithm to match untreated units 
to treated units according to the estimated propensity scores. Four matching algorithms, 
including nearest neighbor matching, radius matching, caliper matching, kernel (local-
linear) matching, are in common use based on estimated propensity scores. More 
specifically, nearest-neighbor matching chooses a fixed number of  nearest neighbors. The 
nearest neighbors could be one or multiple in the match based on the absolute difference 
in the propensity score between treated and untreated units. Radius matching specifies a 
“caliper” or maximum propensity score difference. Larger differences will not result in 
matches, and all units whose differences lie within the caliper’s radius will be chosen. This 
permits variation in the number of  matched observations as a function of  the quality of  
the match. Caliper matching is a combination of  nearest neighbor matching and radius 
matching. Within the caliper’s radius, a “caliper” will be set for matching nearest 
neighbors to avoid “bad matching” (Boeing, 2016). Kernel (local-linear) matching is a 
nonparametric method that compares each treated unit to a weighted average of  the 
outcomes of  all untreated units. In addition, instead of  using propensity scores to 
measure the difference between the treated and the untreated, the matching algorithm 
measuring the distance between covariates of  the treated and those of  the untreated can 
also be used. 
The third step is the estimation of  the impact of  the intervention with the matched 
sample. T-test for significance on the mean value of  matched treatment and control 
groups can be used to measure the validity of  average treatment effects. 
3.3.2.2 Endogeneity Issue and Instrumental Variables 
Generally, the PSM method can control for the selection bias caused by the 
counterfactual outcomes, which cannot eliminate endogeneity bias from an independent 
variable which is correlated with the unobserved error term. An endogeneity issue occurs 
when an independent variable is correlated with the error term (Greene, 2003; 
Wooldridge, 2015). Endogeneity causes estimators of  ordinary least squares regression 
to be biased and inconsistent. Endogeneity can arise as a result of  omitted variables bias, 
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simultaneous causality (or simultaneity), and measurement error (Antonakis et al., 2010; 
Kennedy, 2003). 
Omitted variables bias occurs when a model is created incorrectly by leaving out 
one or more important factors (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2015). In other words, a 
model which omits one or more independent variable that both affect the independent 
variable and separately affects the dependent variable will have an endogeneity issue. The 
model compensates for the missing factor by overestimating or underestimating the 
effect of  one of  the other factors, resulting in estimation bias (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 
2015). Simultaneous causality supposes that two variables are codetermined (Greene, 
2003; Gujarati, 2004; Wooldridge, 2015). It means that at least one of  the independent 
variables is determined simultaneously along with the dependent variable in a system of  
equations. Measurement error occurs as an inherent part of  the results of  measurements 
and of  the measurement process in which proxies are used to measure unobservable 
variables or variables which are hard to quantify. The measurement error is the difference 
existing between a measured value of  a quantity and its true value (Dodge, 2006). 
More specific in the studies of  the R&D subsidy, an endogeneity issue may exist as 
R&D capabilities or management capabilities of  firms are unobserved and unmeasured 
(Guo et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016). However, these capabilities are key for firms to win 
and to allocate R&D subsidy (Guo et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016). Thus, omitted variables 
bias usually occurs in the research of  R&D subsidy. Furthermore, firm-level innovation 
behaviors and performances, such as R&D collaborations and patent applications, can 
influence the decisions of  deployment of  R&D subsidy from public agencies to firms. 
Thus, simultaneous causality may potentially exist in the studies on the correlations 
between R&D subsidy and firm-level innovation behaviors and performances (Cerulli, 
2010; Gonzalez, Jaumandreu, & Pazo, 2005). 
To cope with the endogeneity issue, the method of  instrumental variables (IVs) is 
prevalently adopted. An instrumental variable is a variable that must be strongly 
correlated to the endogenous variable but does not itself  belong in the explanatory 
equation, meaning that the selected instrumental variable is unrelated with unobserved 
variables that may affect dependent variables (Wooldridge, 2015). The main challenge of  
this technique used for the studies on R&D subsidy is to find proper instrumental 
variables (David et al., 2000). Following the suggestions of  previous studies, IVs which 
are related to the probability of  a firm winning public R&D subsidies and have significant 
effect on the R&D grants distribution, but unrelated with unobserved variables that 
affect firm-level innovation inputs and outputs, can be employed (Guo et al., 2016; Jaffe, 
2002; Liu et al., 2016). 
Two-Stage least squares regression analysis (2SLS) is usually used with the IVs 
method. In the first stage regression, IVs are used to estimate the endogenous variables. 
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At the subsequent second regression, the endogenous variables are replaced by their 
estimated value calculated by IVs at first stage regression for the explanatory equations. 
3.3.2.3 Tobit Regression 
Tobit regression can be used for reducing the potential censoring bias (Tobin, 1958). 
The Tobit model takes into account the fact that the underlying distribution of  the 
model’s error term is truncated. The model is estimated by adopting maximum likelihood 
estimation procedures to combine the probit and regression components of  the log-
likelihood function. The two parts represent the traditional regression for the non-limit 
observations and the relevant probabilities for the limit observations. It generates 
consistent estimators for the model parameters. Normally, random effects are used with 
Tobit models. 
3.3.2.4 Cox Regression 
Cox regression is also adopted as the main empirical technique, as the timeline that 
each firm employs novel knowledge or change the technological focus may not coincide 
during the observation period. Cox regression does not require any restrictions on the 
baseline risk function, and it does not require additional assumptions about the baseline 
risk over time (Cox, 1975). Therefore, Cox regression could be appropriate. Since the 
point in time of  novel knowledge usage of  different firms overlap, meaning that multiple 
individuals have the same failure time, the Efron algorithm which can gain more accurate 
results will be employed (Cleves, Gould, & Gutierrez, 2008). 
3.3.3 Samples and Data 
The present dissertation will focus the samples on officially identified high-tech 
firms in the manufacturing sectors in Jiangsu province. 
The effect of  public R&D subsidies is influenced by the embedded S&T and 
economics environment (David et al., 2000), differences in subsidy effect also exist across 
manufacturing and other industries (i.e., service sectors). Thus, a province-level study of  
the manufacturing industry alone can reduce potential unobservable influences regardless 
of  any regional disparity in terms of  economic, policy and culture heterogeneity of  
widely dispersed Chinese provinces (Dimos & Pugh, 2016). 
Jiangsu Province is one of  the earliest areas (from 2004) which set aside various 
funds and developed policy tools to support innovation of  local firms. Jiangsu province 
is also one of  the coastal regions and leading innovative areas in China. In 2016, the total 
R&D expenditure in Jiangsu was 202.68 billion RMB with an R&D intensity of  2.66%, 
and firms’ R&D expenditure was 174.64 billion RMB. The total product value of  the 
high-tech industry in the year 2016 was 6712.4 billion RMB3. Jiangsu has more than 
                                                             
3 2016 Statistical Communiqué on High-tech Industry in Jiangsu Province 
http://www.jssts.com/Item/608.aspx (in Chinese) 
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100,000 active high-tech SMEs. According to the Handbook of  Policies towards Firm's 
Technological Innovation 4 , seven national-level and thirteen provincial-level innovation 
incentive programs can be accessed by Jiangsu firms, among which six programs provide 
public R&D subsidies for SMEs5. 15.3 billion RMB R&D grants were allocated to firms 
in 2016. There are also 167 universities and colleges6 at Jiangsu to provide collaboration 
opportunities and R&D talents. Furthermore, by the end of  2016, Jiangsu had 15 
national-level science parks with 1696 incubating high-tech firms. 
Reasons, why firms in Jiangsu Province are selected, are 1) strong innovation 
capabilities in the private sector, strong government support with diversified support 
tools; and 2) easy-to-match samples on a provincial level. Thus, Jiangsu is an ideal region 
for a provincial-level study. 
One of  my data sources is the database of  the official high-tech firms identified by 
Jiangsu Provincial Science and Technology Bureau. All the data is collected by the Jiangsu 
Provincial Science and Technology Bureau through annual surveys. The time series of  
this data is from 2010 to 2014. Up to 2014, this official database has 7928 firms in the 
manufacturing sector. During the observation period, 1029 manufacture firms have 
received R&D subsidies, accounting for 12.98% of  the total number. Another data source 
is the official patent database of  the State Intellectual Property Office of  the People's 
Republic of  China. Patent information of  2024 firms in the manufacturing sector is 
included in this database. Two databases are matched and combined for this dissertation. 
  
                                                             
4 Handbook of  Policies towards Firm's Technological Innovation 
http://www.jstd.gov.cn/zwgk/fggw/ck348/2009/04/11162315687.html (in Chinese) 
5 Four national level R&D subsidies and two provincial level R&D subsidies for SMEs, 
according to Handbook of  Policies towards Firm's Technological Innovation 
http://www.jstd.gov.cn/zwgk/fggw/ck348/2009/04/11162315687.html (in Chinese)  
6 List of  universities and colleges in Jiangsu (2017) 
http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A03/moe_634/201706/t20170614_306900.html (in 
Chinese) 
PhD Dissertation, Yuchen GAO 
72 
3.3.4 Technical Roadmap of  Dissertation 
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4. R&D Subsidy and High-tech SMEs’ Collaborations 
with Universities 
4.1 Introduction 
The primary purpose of  the study of  this chapter is to explore how public research 
and development (R&D) subsidies influence collaborations between high-tech small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and universities from a knowledge-based view with a 
learning perspective. This study also tests the moderating roles of  science parks and firms’ 
highly educated level R&D human resources on the effects of  R&D subsidy on high-
tech SMEs’ collaborations with universities. 
High-tech SMEs have become an essential driver of  economic growth in the era of  
the knowledge-based economy via new technological knowledge creation in R&D 
activities, as the importance of  the scale of  economies in many fields have been eroded 
by new technologies (Cin, Kim, & Vonortas, 2017; Doh & Kim, 2014). However, high-
tech SMEs still encounter several bottlenecks when undertaking R&D, such as financial 
resource constraints, low technological capabilities and lack of  legitimacy (Arora & 
Cohen, 2015; Caloffi, Rossi, & Russo, 2015; Oughton, Landabaso, & Morgan, 2002). 
Thus, a critical policy concern around the world is the promotion of  technological 
capabilities and knowledge intensity of  high-tech SMEs (Cin et al., 2017). 
In this public support, high-tech SMEs are especially encouraged to collaborate with 
universities (Okamuro & Nishimura, 2015). For example, the innovation coupon of  the 
Netherlands is one of  the typical policy instruments for encouraging high-tech SMEs to 
collaborate with universities. By establishing such R&D collaborations, high-tech SMEs 
are encouraged to acquire and apply frontier scientific and technological (S&T) 
knowledge from universities when undertaking R&D activities. By such facilitations on 
firms’ learning behaviors, high-tech SMEs are expected to expand the scope and depth 
of  knowledge searching and learning (Courseault Trumbach, Payne, & Kongthon, 2006; 
Xu et al., 2014). As a result, high-tech SMEs can substantially enhance technological 
know-how, innovative capabilities, and thereby long-term growth (Courseault Trumbach 
et al., 2006; Jones & Corral De Zubielqui, 2017). 
As a transition economy, China has the legacy of  a socialist planned economy and 
weak capability at the firm level. The government used to play an essential role in 
improving business activities through direct and indirect ways, even after entering the 
WTO. Since 2012, having launched the innovation-driven development strategy, the 
Chinese government increasingly emphasizes the importance of  the enhancement of  
firm-level technological capabilities (Liu et al., 2017). High-tech SMEs in China has 
become a vital force of  innovation and national economic growth (Liu et al., 2017). To 
motivate the SMEs to learn from universities, the Chinese government designed and 
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adopted a series of  R&D subsidy programs. In our pre-research interview in 2017, a key 
official from the provincial science and technology bureau stated that the main target of  
R&D subsidy now is to guide and motivate high-tech firms to acquire the frontier S&T 
knowledge across organizations, especially from universities. At the same time, the 
Chinese government has also launched several support programs for SMEs’ recruitment 
of  highly educated personnel to strengthen firms’ internal absorptive capacities and 
established more than one hundred science parks to provide learning opportunities for 
SMEs with universities. Both internal absorptive capacities and external intermediaries 
are regarded as the key to high-tech SMEs for tacit knowledge transfer from universities 
(Kodama, 2008). 
However, little research on Chinese R&D subsidy focuses on the effect of  R&D 
subsidy on high-tech SMEs in the changing of  S&T knowledge learning behaviors in 
China, which may neglect to consider the black-box of  R&D subsidy. More specifically, 
very few studies investigate the effect of  public funds on SMEs’ R&D collaborations 
with universities, even though universities are the primary source of  advanced S&T 
knowledge in China. Furthermore, the potential moderating effects of  firm-level internal 
and external factors on the learning behavior changes of  sponsored SMEs are also under-
explored. 
On the one hand, highly educated R&D human resources are one typical internal 
factor influencing firms’ absorptive capacities on learning frontier knowledge generated 
from universities (Afcha & Garcia-Quevedo, 2016; Knockaert et al., 2014). However, few 
studies investigate whether synergistic effects exist between such human resources and 
R&D subsidy on firms’ learning from universities. On the other hand, science parks are 
key intermediaries in China to link high-tech SMEs to universities (Armanios et al., 2017; 
Gao & Hu, 2017; Xie et al., 2018), which serves as an important external factor for firms 
to improve knowledge learning. However, science parks in China are usually sponsored 
by public funds, which are also a channel for the government to provide public support. 
Thus, both science parks and R&D subsidy are public resources. Which effects, 
synergistic or antagonistic, can be exerted by the different types of  public resources on 
industry-university R&D collaborations? The empirical evidence is scant. 
This chapter attempts to answer two main questions: 1) how does public R&D 
subsidy influence high-tech SMEs’ collaborations with universities? 2) What is the effect 
of  R&D subsidy on high-tech SMEs’ collaborating with universities moderated by firms’ 
highly educated R&D human resource and science parks? The input and output of  high-
tech SMEs’ R&D collaboration with universities are measured by SMEs’ investment in 
firm-university R&D collaboration and the citation of  knowledge (i.e., patents or 
scientific papers) from universities in SMEs’ patent applications, respectively. Panel data 
Tobit models and negative binomial regression with fixed-effect based on PSM sampling 
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are adopted as the main empirical techniques. 
4.2 Theoretical Development and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 The effect of  R&D subsidy on high-tech SMEs’ collaborations with 
universities 
According to a knowledge-based view and the learning perspective, one primary 
mechanism for firms to obtain long-term and sustainable competitive advantage is to 
create unique knowledge by new knowledge development, integration and exploitation 
(Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996; Macher & Boerner, 2012). New technologies 
usually stem from the recombination of  technology-related knowledge (Ahuja & 
Lampert, 2001; Schoenmakers & Duysters, 2010a). A core path for firms to obtain such 
new knowledge is to access and transfer external knowledge across organizations (Grant, 
1996). Especially for tacit knowledge with the characteristic of  imperfect mobility, the 
transfer of  such knowledge is more likely to require inter-organizational arrangements 
(Das & Teng, 2000). 
More specifically in this study, high-tech SMEs in China are expected to gain frontier 
S&T knowledge and enhance their innovation capabilities by establishing R&D 
collaborations with universities. R&D collaborations with universities can facilitate the 
focal firm to expand and improve its scope and depth of  external knowledge searching 
and learning that results in an increase in the firm-level knowledge base and technological 
capabilities (Clarysse et al., 2009; Xu et al., 2014). Although collaborating with universities 
can potentially benefit firms’ acquirement of  S&T knowledge, enhancement of  
technological capabilities, and even generation of  radical innovation, high-tech SMEs 
may still be reluctant to do so (Arora & Cohen, 2015; Caloffi et al., 2015; Oughton et al., 
2002).  
This is directly due to the complex and costly nature of  new technology-related 
knowledge, especially tacit knowledge (Grant, 1996). The SMEs often lack resources for 
such external knowledge transfer and exploitation (Afcha & Garcia-Quevedo, 2016). The 
high risk and uncertainties of  new but unfamiliar knowledge absorption and exploitation 
also imply massive resource deployment to it (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). This exacerbates 
the SMEs’ unwillingness to form R&D collaboration with universities (Radas et al., 2015). 
Coordination and maintenance costs incurred during the collaboration with external 
partners can sometimes be significant for SMEs constrained by financial resources 
(Cerulli et al., 2016). Further, collaborating with universities may lead to technological 
breakthroughs, but are usually slow in terms of  commercialization (Gao & Hu, 2017; 
Motohashi, 2013). Thus, financially vulnerable SMEs may prefer agile development and 
commercialization of  new products, rather than being involved in long-term and 
uncertain collaborations with universities and research institutes on applying frontier 
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S&T knowledge (Motohashi, 2013). This issue may be exacerbated due to the imperfect 
capital market in China (Wang et al., 2017). In addition, lack of  legitimacy due to low 
reputation and information asymmetry, is another main reason for SMEs to have little 
connection with universities (Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017; Kim & Park, 2015). 
Public R&D subsidy can directly increase the pool of  available resources and create 
a resource-munificent environment for high-tech SMEs, and thus buffer the financial 
constraints of  them for external new knowledge transfer (Amezcua et al., 2013; Xu et al., 
2014). Receiving an R&D subsidy also shows an endorsement from the government and 
enhances SMEs’ legitimacy (Armanios et al., 2017; Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017; Zeng et 
al., 2010). Most top universities in China are public, thus the endorsement from the 
government is of  high relevance for firms to connect with universities, not only for 
knowledge creation but also for social welfare improvement (Xu et al., 2014; Zeng et al., 
2010). Consequently, R&D subsidy recipients are more likely to establish R&D 
collaborations with universities or say SMEs and universities are linked by the 
government (Okamuro & Nishimura, 2015; Zheng et al., 2015). 
At the same time, by using public R&D subsidy to reduce the resource constraints, 
recipient SMEs are more likely to deploy more resources on R&D activities to stimulate 
innovation and enhance technological capabilities (Dimos & Pugh, 2016). Furthermore, 
firms receiving R&D subsidies occupy a favorable competitive position, compared to 
rival firms without public support. To keep a favorable competitive position, firms are 
more likely to allocate resources on R&D activities and enhance their technology-related 
capabilities, in order to differentiate from rivals and sustain their competitive positions 
(Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017). Higher technological capabilities can in turn help firms 
(Yam et al., 2004) to better absorb frontier knowledge generated by universities, and 
hence, optimize SMEs’ resource allocation and improve innovation performance. 
Thus, public R&D subsidy is expected to improve high-tech SMEs’ collaboration 
with universities in China, from both input and output perspectives of  the industry-
university collaborations. We hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Public R&D subsidy generates a positive effect on high-tech SMEs’ initial 
input on R&D collaboration with universities. 
Hypothesis 2: Public R&D subsidy generates a positive effect on high-tech SMEs’ final 
output from R&D collaboration with universities. 
4.2.2 The moderating effect of  high-educational level R&D human resources 
Human resources, especially the recruitment of  highly educated R&D staff, is 
regarded as a critical internal component for firms’ learning process of  the new, especially 
tacit knowledge (Georghiou & Clarysse, 2006; Lundvall, 2008). First, high-educational-
level staff  can foster firms’ internal capacities for knowledge generation (D'Este, 
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Rentocchini, & Vega-Jurado, 2014; Leiponen, 2005; Muscio, 2007). R&D staff  with 
higher education also improves firm-level absorptive capacity for acquiring and absorbing 
external knowledge (Herrera & Nieto, 2015; Muscio, 2007). More specifically, R&D 
personnel, as tacit knowledge carriers, directly expand firms’ knowledge stocks (Huber, 
1991). Such knowledge stocks can help firms deepen their exploitation of  existing 
knowledge and experience (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). On the one hand, firms can identify 
innovation directions with more potential, and thereby choose to learn new knowledge 
that can recombine with existing knowledge more efficiently (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Zahra & George, 2002). On the other hand, the expansion of  knowledge stock enhances 
firms’ absorption capacity, which helps firms better understand and integrate external 
new knowledge with firms’ internal knowledge (Clarysse et al., 2009). Therefore, firms 
with higher absorptive capacity have less difficulty in adopting and using new knowledge 
and implementing innovation than firms with lower absorptive capacity (Clarysse et al., 
2009; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Second, R&D staff  may utilize their social networks helping build SMEs and 
maintaining R&D collaborations with universities (Garcia-Quevedo, Mas-Verdú, & Polo-
Otero, 2012; Herrera & Nieto, 2015). More specifically, in the research careers of  highly 
educated individuals, social capital is accumulated through the interactions between them 
and different professional R&D institutes (Dietz & Bozeman, 2005). Herrera and Nieto 
(2015) argued that such social capital helps firms that recruit more highly educated 
individuals to be closer to scientific knowledge networks. At the same time, highly 
educated individuals more easily maintain informal and formal relationships via alumni 
networks (Gao & Hu, 2017; Motohashi, 2013). Thus, the recruitment of  highly educated 
individuals may help firms to have a better tie with universities or research institutes for 
the improvement of  R&D collaborations (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011), and thereby to 
better absorb frontier external knowledge during the process of  collaborating with 
universities (Afcha & Garcia-Quevedo, 2016). We have the following moderating 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3：The higher the ratio of higher education graduate R&D employees of 
an SME, the more input the SME has on the R&D collaboration with universities, and 
the positive effect of R&D subsidy on firm-level input on R&D collaborations with 
universities is stronger. 
Hypothesis 4：The higher the ratio of highly educated R&D employees of an SME, the 
more output the SME generates from the R&D collaboration with universities, and the 
positive effect of R&D subsidy on firm-level output from R&D collaborations with 
universities is stronger. 
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4.2.3 The moderating effect of  location in science parks 
Science parks, as a core component of the Chinese national innovation system, play 
a significant role in facilitating technological collaborations between Chinese universities 
and high-tech SMEs (Hu & Mathews, 2008; Liu & White, 2001). More specifically, 
science parks facilitate industry-university collaborations by three main mechanisms. First, 
spatial proximity allows SMEs in science parks to have more opportunities for the 
establishment of links with universities (Albahari et al., 2017; Chen & Lin, 2017). 
Through these links, SMEs can facilitate knowledge learning and absorbing from 
universities. In particular, the related tacit knowledge, which is usually spatially diffusion, 
requires face-to-face communication (Chen & Lin, 2017; Motohashi, 2013; X. Li, 2009).  
Second, located in science parks, SMEs can benefit from the endorsements 
provided by the science parks (Armanios & Eesley, 2018; Lecluyse, Knockaert, & 
Spithoven, 2019). On the one hand, science parks play the role of intermediaries to link 
universities and SMEs for knowledge transfer (Amezcua et al., 2013; Armanios et al., 
2017). On the other hand, science parks also facilitate the attraction of  external venture 
capital for firms (Ng et al., 2019; Xie et al., 2018) to enhance SMEs’ willingness to invest 
in R&D collaborations with universities and underpin the success of  knowledge transfer. 
This is important especially in emerging economies where capital markets and legal 
systems are usually imperfect (Eesley, 2016). 
Third, the professional services provided by science parks also facilitate the 
industry-university collaborations of SMEs (Wang et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2018). The 
professional services containing specialized technical and managerial consulting services 
can strengthen SMEs’ R&D capabilities (Lyu et al., 2017). These services can, therefore, 
promote the flow of knowledge and mitigate risks during the collaborations between 
SMEs with universities, enhancing the success of  firms’ knowledge absorption (Lecluyse 
et al., 2019; Xie et al., 2018). Thus, we have the following hypotheses on moderating 
effects: 
Hypothesis 5：Located in science parks, the SME has more input on the R&D 
collaboration with universities, and the positive effect of R&D subsidy on firm-level 
input on R&D collaborations with universities is stronger. 
Hypothesis 6：Located in science parks, the SME generates more output from the R&D 
collaboration with universities, and the positive effect of R&D subsidy on firm-level 
output from R&D collaborations with universities is stronger. 
4.3 Data and Method 
4.3.1 Data Description 
We focus our research on high-tech SMEs. We employ a set of  exclusive panel data 
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from a survey of  high-tech firms conducted by the Jiangsu Science and Technology 
Department, covering the period from 2010 to 2014. This set of  data is used to evaluate 
the effects of  R&D subsidy in Jiangsu Province only through to 2014, which happened 
to be the tenth anniversary since Jiangsu reformed the R&D subsidy policy. We also 
employ a set of  patent data of  Jiangsu high-tech SMEs from the National Intellectual 
Property Administration of  China (SIPO), covering the period from 2009-2015. Based 
on the combination of  these two main databases, several other databases, such as China 
Torch Statistical Yearbook and Municipal Statistical Bulletins of  Jiangsu cities, are also 
used. High-tech SMEs are further identified and selected from this dataset according to 
the criteria7 with no more than 10 years’ history and 300 employees in 2010. For non-
subsidized SMEs, we retain the SMEs without any R&D subsidy from 2010 to 2014. 
We choose a province-level study, as the efficiency of  the public R&D subsidy is 
influenced by the embedded S&T and the wider economic environment (David et al., 
2000). A province-level study can reduce potential unobservable influences regardless of  
any regional disparity in terms of  economic, policy and culture heterogeneity of  
dispersed Chinese provinces (Dimos & Pugh, 2016). 
4.3.2 The PSM sampling 
To create propensity score matching (PSM) samples, we adopt the cross-sectional 
dataset in 2010 as the baseline data. 325 SMEs received public R&D subsidy in 2010, 
which is the first year the firms start their subsidized programs. The treated group in our 
study contains the SMEs receiving public R&D subsidy in 2010. The control group 
presents the same likelihood as if  being treated compared with the treated groups, even 
though they are not treated in reality. PSM is appropriate for our study, as it eliminates 
the selection bias of  the R&D subsidy stemming from the prevalent picking the winner 
behavior of  the government. 
The treatment variable of  our PSM is a dummy variable that measures whether 
firms received public R&D subsidy in 2010 or not (Treat_Govrd). We have 325 treated and 
769 untreated observations for the PSM. A set of  covariates is selected for the first-step 
probit model of  PSM. Basic factors of  firms including industry dummies (the industrial 
distributions are shown in Table 4A.1), firm size (Firm_Size) and firm age (Firm_Age) are 
controlled. Indicators showing firms’ technological level such as R&D employee ratio 
(RD_Emp) and patent stock (Pat_Stock) are also set. The patent stock is calculated by the 
perpetual inventory method8. Capital intensity (Cap_Int) measures the financial strength 
of  firms (Boeing, 2016). In addition, export volume (Export) is considered as a covariate, 
                                                             
7 Ministry of  Industry and Information Technology of  People’s Republic of  China, 
“the standard of  small and medium-sized enterprises” 
8 Pat_stock2010 = (1−δ) Pat_stock2009+Pat_Application2010, rate of  depreciation (δ = 
0.15) 
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as export-oriented firms are assumed to be more innovative if  exposed to international 
competition (Radas et al., 2015). 
To establish PSM samples, we first adopt the probit estimation to compute the 
propensity score for each firm on receiving R&D subsidy. After the estimation of  
propensity scores, 1-1 nearest neighborhood matching (NNM) with replacement is 
performed to identify the control group of  firms that are eligible to apply for R&D 
subsidy but did not apply or did not win such subsidy. Based on the PSM sample, we re-
estimate the propensity scores by probit estimation. 
Table 4.1 Probit Estimation for PSM 
 Model 1 Model 2  
 Pre-matching Post-matching 
Export -0.034*** -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.014) 
Firm_Size 0.124** 0.065 
 (0.058) (0.076) 
Cap_Int 0.055 -0.188 
 (0.040) (0.286) 
Firm_Age -0.042 -0.045 
 (0.086) (0.105) 
Pat_Stock 0.003* 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
RD_Emp 0.793*** 0.342 
 (0.195) (0.236) 
_cons -1.032*** -0.068 
 (0.327) (0.423) 
Number of obs 1094 553 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.5931 
Pseudo R2 0.023 0.002 
Note: 1) Standard errors in parentheses; 2) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 4.1 presents the results of  PSM, and suggest the existence of  additionality. As 
shown in Table 4.1, none of  the covariates remains significant and the pseudo-R2 drops 
sharply from 0.023 to 0.002 after matching. This means that the systematic differences in 
the distribution of  covariates between the treatment and the control groups have been 
removed from our PSM sample. We also provide a balance test for the means of  
covariates between the treatment and control groups (see Table 4.2). 
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Table4.2 Balance Test for PSM 
 Mean t-tests MSB (%) 
Covariates  Treated Control t-Stat p>t  
pre-
matching 
post-
matching 
Export 2.686  2.620  0.250  0.799  -20.900  1.700  
Cap_Int 0.004  0.030  -0.940  0.348  5.700  -1.600  
Pat_Own 19.058  19.235  -0.090  0.931  9.900  -0.700  
Firm_Age 1.773  1.758  0.460  0.643  -6.500  3.300  
Firm_Size 4.578  4.536  0.800  0.425  -3.900  5.200  
RD_Emp 0.398  0.399  -0.040  0.970  25.200  -0.300  
According to the t-test statistic and the corresponding p-value on mean differences 
for covariates, the means of  covariates are balanced between the treatment and control 
groups based on our PSM matching. In addition, the mean standardized bias (MSB) drops 
sharply after matching which suggests that the matching is a success according to Liu et 
al. (2016). Based on PSM results, after supplementing data of  subsequent years, we get 
the final dataset including 553 firms with 2707 firm-year observations for the next step 
analysis. 
4.3.3 Methods and Variables 
Dependent variables 
Following the suggestions of  previous studies, this study adopts the natural 
logarithm of  the R&D expenditure which firms spend on collaborations with universities 
with one year lagged to measure the input of  SMEs’ R&D collaborations with universities 
(Tech_coll). To measure the output of  industrial-university collaborations, this study 
employs the number of  firms’ invention patent applications with citation of  knowledge 
(i.e., patents or scientific papers) from universities (Tech_citation), also with one year lagged 
(Lei, Sun, & Wright, 2012; Li, 2012). 
For the continuous dependent variable, the input of  collaborations, we adopt panel 
data Tobit regressions with controlling time fixed effects. Tobit regression can be used 
for reducing the potential censoring bias (Li et al., 2018). As the dependent variable 
measured by investment on R&D collaborations are usually non-negative continuous 
variable but containing amounts of  observations with value 0, which suggests left 
censored data. 
For the counting dependent variable, the output of  collaborations, we adopt panel 
data negative binomial regression model with controlling fixed effects. The data used in 
this paper in the case of  the number of  patent applications shows excessive dispersion, 
that is, the variance is significantly greater than the mean. Thus, the negative binomial 
regression model, which assumes that the samples come from a negative binomial 
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distribution, is more appropriate than the Poisson model. 
In addition, we also adopt the generalized method of  moments (GMM) with an 
instrumental variable to cope with the potential endogeneity issue of  the correlation 
between R&D subsidy and investment on collaborations with universities to test the 
robustness of  Tobit regression results (Carboni, 2012). The yearly investment on fixed 
assets at the city level is adopted as the instrumental variable, which follows the 
suggestion of  Guo et al. (2016). Furthermore, Cox regression by using the Efron 
algorithm is used for the robust check of  the effect of  R&D subsidy on the citation of  
universities’ knowledge in patent applications. 
Independent variables 
We employ the natural logarithm of  the amount of  R&D subsidy, GovRD, as the 
independent variables (Liu et al., 2016). Following the suggestion of  Li et al. (2018), we 
added 1 to all observations with a value of  zero before transforming by the natural 
logarithm.  
Moderating variables 
High-educational-level R&D human resources (Human_res) are measured by the 
ratio of  R&D employees with a bachelor or higher degree (Afcha & Garcia-Quevedo, 
2016; Soderblom et al., 2015). Located in science parks is measured by a dummy variable 
(Sci_park) which equals 1 if  the SME is located in a science park, otherwise 0 (Ramirez 
& Dickenson, 2010; Zhang, 2005). 
Control variables 
We control firm-level technological capabilities by patent stock per person 
(Pat_Own), and whether the firm has a formal R&D department or not (RD_Dpart) 
(Almus & Czarnitzki, 2003; Guan & Yam, 2015; Hussinger, 2008). We also control for 
the value of  exports for each firm (Export), as export-oriented firms are assumed to be 
more innovative to meet international competition (Radas et al., 2015). We control firm-
level financial strength by capital intensity (Cap_Int) (Boeing, 2016). The ownership is 
also controlled for (SOE), as state-owned enterprises in China are more likely to gain 
public support and collaborate with public-backed universities (Wu, 2017). Basic factors 
including the year dummies and industry dummies firm size (Firm_Size) and firm age 
(Firm_Age) are also controlled for. 
To test the existence of  serious multicollinearity problems, we also conduct a multi-
collinearity test in this study. The results show that the VIF values of  the selected 
variables are acceptable, and there is no serious multi-collinearity problem. Descriptive 
statistics and correlation matrix for variables based on PSM samples are presented in 
Table 4.3. 
 
PhD Dissertation, Yuchen GAO 
83 
Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Tech_coll 1.0000  
           
2 Tech_citation 0.0802* 1.0000  
          
3 GovRD 0.2428* 0.0814* 1.0000  
         
4 Human_res -0.0080  0.0330  0.0452* 1.0000  
        
5 Sci_park -0.1114* 0.0463* -0.0206  0.0308  1.0000  
       
6 RD_Dpart 0.0862* 0.0234  0.0512* -0.0191  -0.1434* 1.0000  
      
7 Pat_Own -0.0265  0.0033  0.0366  0.4965* 0.0603* -0.0022  1.0000  
     
8 Export -0.0376  -0.0296  -0.0170  -0.0043  -0.0005  0.0702* -0.0383* 1.0000  
    
9 Cap_Int 0.0016  -0.0041  0.0214  0.6179* 0.0234  -0.0149  0.7087* -0.0173  1.0000  
   
10 SOE -0.0358  0.0178  0.0417* 0.0338  0.1070* -0.0557* -0.0386* -0.1302* -0.0149  1.0000  
  
11 Firm_Size 0.0918* 0.0156  0.0350  -0.2902* -0.1062* 0.1880* -0.3646* 0.2914* -0.3566* 0.0175  1.0000  
 
12 Firm_Age -0.0389  -0.0246  -0.1012* -0.0402* -0.0477* 0.1164* 0.0005  0.0664* -0.0326  -0.0002  0.1570* 1.0000  
 
Mean 1.705  0.269  2.204  0.223  0.305  0.853  0.268  3.554  0.122  0.075  4.830  2.091  
 
Std.Dev. 2.790  1.528  3.077  0.970  0.460  0.355  0.699  3.984  0.643  0.263  0.807  0.421  
 
N 2150 2706 2706 2706 2706 2706 2706 2706 2706 2706 2706 2706 
Note: * p < 0.05 
 
PhD Dissertation, Yuchen GAO 
84 
4.4 Empirical Results 
Table 4.4 reports the results of the main effect of R&D subsidy on SMEs’ R&D 
collaborations with universities. As depicted in Model 4, R&D subsidy has significantly 
facilitated the SMEs' investment in R&D collaborations with universities (b=0.350; 
p<0.01). The economic effect of  the R&D subsidy is also calculated. Specifically, we 
derived the marginal effect of  a variable on the expected investment in R&D 
collaborations with universities, given that a firm has not been censored (i.e., having an 
investment in R&D collaborations above zero) (Li et al., 2018). It is found that holding 
all other variables at the mean level, receiving R&D subsidy leads to an increase of  firm-
level invention patent applications with familiar knowledge per person by 0.011. For 
every 1% increase in R&D subsidy, SMEs receiving public support increase their 
investment in R&D collaboration by 0.099%. In Model 5, after adding the instrumental 
variable, this significant enhancing effect still exists, proving the robustness of the results. 
To ensure the robustness of the results, the firms receiving specific public funds 
dedicated to supporting industry-university collaborations are further excluded. One of 
the key evaluation criteria of such funds on recipient firms is the investment in the 
industry-university collaborations, which may result in the overestimation of the effect 
of R&D subsidy. Model 6 reports the results of fixed-effect IV regression with samples 
excluding firms receiving specialized funds on industry-university collaborations. The 
result indicates that the R&D subsidy that is not dedicated to facilitating industry-
university collaborations still has a significantly positive effect on firms’ investment in 
collaborations with universities. 
As depicted in Model 8, public R&D subsidy has also significantly promoted SMEs' 
absorption of knowledge from universities and increased the probability of citing 
university patents or scientific papers in their invention patent applications. For every 1% 
increase in R&D subsidies for publicly-sponsored SMEs, the probability of citing 
university patents or scientific papers in invention patent applications increased by 5.5%, 
significantly at the 5% level. In the Cox regression, for every 1% increase in R&D subsidy, 
the probability of citing university knowledge by publicly-sponsored SMEs increases by 
9.4%, significantly at the 1% level. This result is consistent with the result of the negative 
binomial regression, supporting the robustness of the effect of R&D subsidies on SMEs’ 
citing university knowledge. Thus, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported. 
Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 report the moderating effects of firms’ highly educated 
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R&D personnel and science parks on R&D subsidy influencing the investment in 
collaborations and the citations of universities’ knowledge, respectively. As shown in 
Table 4.5, on the one hand, the ratio of highly educated R&D personnel has no significant 
moderating effect on the R&D subsidy affecting R&D collaboration investment (Model 
11). Hypothesis 3 is not supported according to our empirical results. On the other hand, 
being located in science parks has a significantly negatively moderating effect (significant 
at the 1% level, Model 13). At the same time, the investment of SMEs located in the 
science parks on R&D collaborations with universities is 75.4% lower than those outside 
the science parks. Following the suggestion of Li et al. (2018), we draw Figure 4.1 to 
illustrate how science parks moderate the effect of R&D subsidy on SMEs’ investment 
on collaborations with universities, based on Tobit regression results. Figure 4.1 indicates 
that the enhancement effect of R&D subsidy on firm-level investment for collaborations 
is negatively moderated by the location in science parks. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 is not 
supported. 
As shown in Table 4.6, highly educated R&D personnel significantly positively 
moderates the promoting effect of the R&D subsidy on firms’ citation of knowledge 
from universities (Model 16). More specifically, the percentage of R&D personnel in an 
SME increases by 1%, and the R&D subsidy increases by 1%, the probability of citing 
university knowledge has increased from 0.044% to 0.105%, which is significant at the 
10% level. At the same time, the higher the ratio of highly educated R&D employees, the 
higher the probability that the firm will absorb and cite the knowledge generated by 
universities in the invention patent applications. Hypothesis 4 achieves support. Located 
in the science parks, the probability of citing university research achievements by high-
tech SMEs can be significantly improved. The probability of firms in the science parks 
citing university achievements in invention patent applications is 87.76% higher than that 
of firms outside the science parks, which is significant at 10% (Model 17). However, 
located in the science parks will negatively moderate the effect of the R&D subsidy on 
firms’ citations of knowledge from universities. For every 1% increase of the R&D 
subsidy given to high-tech SMEs in the science parks, the probability of citing university 
achievements is reduced by 3.44%, which is significant at the 10% level. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 6 only receives partial support. 
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Table 4.4 the effect of R&D subsidy on SMEs’ R&D collaborations with universities 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 Panel data 
Tobit 
Panel data 
Tobit  
Fixed 
effect-IV 
Fixed 
effect-
IV 
Fixed 
effect-
NBR 
Fixed 
effect-
NBR 
Cox 
regression 
 Tech_coll  Tech_citation 
RD_Dpart 0.149 0.062 -0.361** -0.337* 0.076 0.093 0.059 
 (0.584) (0.578) (0.181) (0.186) (0.228) (0.230) (0.208) 
Firm_Size 0.817** 0.799** 0.041 -0.030 -0.154 -0.161 0.141 
 (0.386) (0.374) (0.159) (0.169) (0.146) (0.146) (0.101) 
Firm_Age -1.403*** -0.869* -0.084 -0.124 -0.674*** -0.620*** -0.106 
 (0.522) (0.524) (0.230) (0.240) (0.178) (0.181) (0.183) 
Export -0.070 -0.078 0.025 0.004 0.007 0.005 -0.036* 
 (0.070) (0.068) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.019) 
Cap_Int 1.079*** 1.026** 0.185 0.170 0.104 0.121 -0.219** 
 (0.413) (0.407) (0.131) (0.131) (0.230) (0.230) (0.106) 
Pat_Own -1.106* -1.132* -0.160 -0.163 -0.196 -0.216 0.329*** 
 (0.639) (0.628) (0.125) (0.125) (0.159) (0.161) (0.094) 
SOE -2.185* -2.263** -0.873 -1.522** 0.338 0.330 0.546** 
 (1.119) (1.072) (0.594) (0.666) (0.464) (0.467) (0.223) 
GovRD  0.350*** 0.209*** 0.193**  0.054** 0.090*** 
  (0.067) (0.073) (0.079)  (0.024) (0.024) 
_cons -4.635** -6.225*** 1.493 2.008** 0.887 0.608  
 (1.995) (1.968) (0.938) (0.961) (0.764) (0.766)  
N 2150 2150 2150 1850 899 899 2190 
Firms 553 553 553 478 180 180 556 
Prob > chi2 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0058 0.0015 0.0000 
Log 
likelihood 
-2684.741 -2674.108 N/A N/A -573.469 -570.844 -1175.974 
left-censored 1527 1527 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
uncensored 623 623 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Note: 1) For models 5, 6 & 9, robust standard errors are in parentheses (clustered 
by firms), for models 3,4,7 & 8, standard errors are in parentheses; 3) *p < 0.1, **p 
< 0.05, *** p< 0.01; 4) industry and year dummies for all models (not reported); 5) 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic): 174.165, Chi-sq (1) 
P-val = 0.0000; 6) Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 194.504, 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size 16.38 
  
PhD Dissertation, Yuchen GAO 
87 
Table 4.5 The moderating effect on R&D subsidy influencing SMEs’ investment on 
R&D collaborations with universities (Panel Tobit regression models with fixed effects) 
 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
DV: Tech_coll      
RD_Dpart 0.236 0.239 0.082 0.148 0.154 
 (0.583) (0.583) (0.584) (0.583) (0.583) 
Firm_Size 0.886** 0.846** 0.778** 0.801** 0.791** 
 (0.385) (0.389) (0.375) (0.371) (0.382) 
Firm_Age -0.222 -0.243 -0.314 -0.366 -0.371 
 (0.613) (0.612) (0.607) (0.605) (0.605) 
Export -0.074 -0.074 -0.071 -0.076 -0.077 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067) 
Cap_Int 0.946** 1.151** 0.907** 0.908** 0.963** 
 (0.408) (0.471) (0.396) (0.389) (0.412) 
Pat_Own -0.971 -0.893 -0.912 -0.819 -0.767 
 (0.598) (0.624) (0.585) (0.550) (0.588) 
SOE -2.245** -2.199** -1.903* -1.813* -1.797* 
 (1.071) (1.071) (1.072) (1.066) (1.066) 
GovRD 0.322*** 0.327*** 0.321*** 0.321*** 0.323*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
Human_res 0.020 -0.387   -0.089 
 (0.293) (0.574)   (0.350) 
GovRD×Human_res  -0.200   -0.071 
  (0.207)   (0.114) 
Sci_park   -2.468*** -2.338*** -2.331*** 
   (0.684) (0.678) (0.678) 
GovRD×Sci_park    -0.376*** -0.368*** 
    (0.139) (0.139) 
_cons -7.688*** -6.798*** -6.192*** -6.312*** -6.276*** 
 (2.110) (2.105) (2.087) (2.033) (2.074) 
N 2150 2150 2150 2150 2150 
Firms 553 553 553 553 553 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Log likelihood -2674.106 -2673.372 -2667.412 -2663.714 -2663.405 
left-censored 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 
uncensored 623 623 623 623 623 
Note: 1) Standard errors are in parentheses; 2) *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, *** p< 0.01; 
3) industry & year dummies for all Models (not reported)  
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Table 4.6 The moderating effect on R&D subsidy influencing SMEs’ citations of 
knowledge from universities (Panel negative binomial regression models with fixed 
effects) 
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 
DV: Tech_citation      
RD_Dpart 0.117 0.072 0.114 0.195 0.097 
 (0.232) (0.232) (0.230) (0.251) (0.233) 
Firm_Size -0.115 -0.183 -0.178 -0.083 -0.184 
 (0.167) (0.174) (0.146) (0.167) (0.177) 
Firm_Age -0.649*** -0.665*** -0.646*** -0.622*** -0.690*** 
 (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.194) (0.184) 
Export 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.017 0.005 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
Cap_Int -1.503 -2.702** 0.143 0.249 -2.529* 
 (1.047) (1.348) (0.234) (0.248) (1.404) 
Pat_Own -0.162 -0.164 -0.242 -0.299 -0.162 
 (0.171) (0.180) (0.162) (0.182) (0.181) 
SOE 0.257 0.264 0.198 0.105 0.185 
 (0.465) (0.466) (0.463) (0.490) (0.465) 
GovRD 0.052** 0.043* 0.050** 0.051** 0.048** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Human_res 0.660** 0.746**   0.639* 
 (0.314) (0.345)   (0.360) 
GovRD× Human_res  0.057*   0.066* 
  (0.033)   (0.037) 
Sci_park   0.630* 0.901** 0.518 
   (0.367) (0.410) (0.379) 
GovRD×Sci_park    -0.086* -0.083* 
    (0.050) (0.048) 
_cons 0.395 1.168 0.583 0.242 1.204 
 (0.860) (0.936) (0.767) (0.912) (0.950) 
N 899 899 899 833 833 
Firms 180 180 180 172 172 
Prob > chi2 0.0005 0.0003 0.0010 0.0076 0.0066 
Log likelihood -567.622 -565.890 -569.311 -519.945 -516.511 
Note: 1) Standard errors are in parentheses; 2) *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, *** p< 0.01; 
3) industry & year dummies for all models (not reported) 
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Figure 4.1 The moderating effect of science parks on R&D subsidy influencing SMEs’ 
investment in collaborations with universities. 
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Table 4.7 The conclusion of the empirical results of Chapter 4 
Hypotheses  Empirical results  
Hypothesis 1: Public R&D subsidy generates a positive effect 
on high-tech SMEs’ input on R&D collaboration with 
universities. 
Support  
Hypothesis 2: Public R&D subsidy generates a positive effect 
on high-tech SMEs’ output from R&D collaboration with 
universities. 
Support  
Hypothesis 3：The higher the ratio of highly educated R&D 
employees of an SME, the more input the SME has on the R&D 
collaboration with universities, and the positive effect of R&D 
subsidy on firm-level input on R&D collaborations with 
universities is stronger. 
 
Not supported  
Hypothesis 4：The higher the ratio of highly educated R&D 
employees of an SME, the more output the SME generates from 
the R&D collaboration with universities, and the positive effect 
of R&D subsidy on firm-level output from R&D collaborations 
with universities is stronger.  
 
Support  
Hypothesis 5：Located in science parks, the SME has more 
input on the R&D collaboration with universities, and the 
positive effect of R&D subsidy on firm-level input on R&D 
collaborations with universities is stronger. 
 
Not supported 
Hypothesis 6：Located in science parks, the SME generates 
more output from the R&D collaboration with universities, and 
the positive effect of R&D subsidy on firm-level output from 
R&D collaborations with universities is stronger. 
 
Partial support  
4.5 Discussion 
The results of the study in this chapter, as expected, indicate that R&D subsidy 
promotes high-tech SMEs’ input and output of collaborations with universities, i.e., 
investment in R&D collaborations with universities and citations of knowledge generated 
by universities in firms’ invention patent applications. Firms’ internal factor, highly 
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educated R&D human resources, is found to positively moderate R&D subsidy to 
promote the firms’ citations of knowledge from universities in invention patents. At the 
same time, highly educated R&D personnel also directly facilitates high-tech SMEs’ 
absorption and exploitation of universities’ research achievements. However, the 
presence of highly educated R&D personnel has no significant moderating effects on the 
correlations between R&D subsidy and investment in R&D collaborations. Surprisingly, 
located in science parks is found to negatively moderate the promotion effects of R&D 
subsidy on SMEs’ investments on industry-university collaborations, as well as the 
citation of knowledge generated by universities. Furthermore, the citations of university 
knowledge are promoted, but the investment in R&D collaborations is inhibited if SMEs 
are located in science parks. These research findings have important theoretical 
contributions. First, we find that the R&D subsidy can help to facilitate the learning 
behaviors of high-tech SMEs for new knowledge acquisition and assimilation from 
universities. We also test the moderating roles of science parks and firms’ highly educated 
R&D human resources, which are two key factors for firms’ learning internally and 
externally. Our findings support extant studies on the positive effects of R&D subsidy 
on industry-university collaborations (Greco, Grimaldi, & Cricelli, 2017; Guisado-
Gonzalez et al., 2016; Kang & Park, 2012; Shin et al., 2019). We also complement current 
technology transfer related studies by identifying the effect of R&D subsidy on SMEs’ 
absorption of knowledge from universities. We hence argue that R&D subsidy is also a 
potential path to solve the question posed by Motohashi (2013) on how financially 
vulnerable high-tech SMEs can be encouraged to establish formal collaboration with 
universities in China for technological knowledge acquirement and absorptive capacities 
enhancement. We deepen our understandings of how public R&D subsidy influences on 
high-tech SMEs’ technological output in emerging economies. 
Second, this study further reinforces and supplements the study of Clarysse et al. 
(2009) by extending the usage of learning perspective on the R&D subsidy studies. The 
internal absorptive capacities or the congenital learning capabilities are found to play a 
key role in industry-university collaborations of SMEs under the support of R&D subsidy. 
This echoes the viewpoints of current R&D subsidy literature related to organizational 
learning (Broekel, Fornahl, & Morrison, 2015; Crass, Rammer, & Aschhoff, 2017; 
Karhunen & Huovari, 2015; Smith, Feldman, & Anderson, 2018). The related findings 
imply that although high-tech SMEs have more chances to gain new knowledge from 
universities under public intervention in China, SMEs should enhance their own 
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absorptive capacities, through, for instance, increasing their highly educated R&D human 
resources. In other words, R&D subsidy recipient firms need to strengthen firm-level 
absorptive capacity to fully grasp and utilize complicated new knowledge gained through 
collaborations with universities and then contribute to technological outputs (Clarysse et 
al., 2009; Knockaert et al., 2014). 
Third, our study has deepened the understanding of the role of the science parks in 
the R&D subsidy research in the Chinese context, which contributes to the studies on 
innovation systems. Our results indicate that antagonistic effects exist between the 
science parks and R&D subsidy. Initially, in the Chinese context, there may be an 
overlapping of public resources between R&D subsidy and science parks. Science parks 
in China, especially national-level university science parks, are often public sponsored 
(Shi et al., 2016; Xie et al., 2018). In addition to providing infrastructure and innovation 
services, these science parks may provide financial support for tenant firms as well (Shi 
et al., 2016; Walcott, 2017; Xie et al., 2018). Therefore, this leads to an oversupply of 
public resources, resulting in an antagonistic effect. Furthermore, science parks, as an 
important innovation intermediary, can provide high-tech SMEs with more inter-
organizational learning opportunities (Del Giudice et al., 2018; Yan et al., 2018). 
Although science parks help to promote collaborations between high-tech SMEs and 
universities, due to geographical proximity, firms in the science parks find it easier to 
establish an informal partnership with universities for tacit knowledge transfer (Lyu et al., 
2017; Motohashi, 2013). This eliminates the need for firms to spend resources on the 
establishment of formal partnerships with universities to avoid high maintenance and 
coordinating costs for such collaboration (Motohashi, 2013). Therefore, the science parks 
will negatively moderate the effectiveness of R&D subsidy and inhibit the investment 
from firms on collaboration, but at the same time significantly promote the tenant firms’ 
absorption of knowledge from universities and citations of such knowledge in their 
invention patent applications. Additionally, due to the public sponsored background of 
science parks, firms in the science parks have more experience of participation in 
governmental R&D programs and can keep more closely in touch with the government 
(Albahari et al., 2017; Armanios et al., 2017; Dalmarco, Hulsink, & Blois, 2018). 
According to the hypothesis of the learning curve’s decreasing returns to experience, the 
experience of undertaking governmental R&D programs has eroded the effect of public 
funding on firms’ learning behavior changes (Clarysse et al., 2009). Specifically, with 
increasing experience gained from implementing public-sponsored programs, firms will 
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be more aware of government requirements and understand how to satisfy such needs 
(Li et al., 2018). In order to achieve the goals of government programs, the incentives for 
firms to seek as well as absorb complicated and expensive knowledge from universities 
will be reduced (Jiang et al., 2018). 
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4.6 Appendix 
Table A4.1 Industrial distribution 
2-digit code Industrial Description  count 
1-5 Agriculture, Forestry, Animal, Husbandry, and Fishery 3 
6-12 Mining 2 
13 Processing of food from Agric products 2 
14 Manufacture of foods  8 
17 Manufacture of textiles  6 
18 Manufacture of textiles, clothing; apparel industry  2 
20 
Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo, 
rattan, palm, and straw products 
1 
22 Manufacture of paper and paper products 1 
23 Printing and recorded media  2 
25 Processing of petroleum, coking, processing of nuclear fuel  2 
26 
Manufacture of chemical raw materials and chemical 
products  
83 
27 Manufacture of medicines  43 
28 Manufacture of chemical fibers  9 
29 Manufacture of rubber and plastics  7 
30 Manuf. of non-metallic mineral products  27 
31 Smelting and processing of ferrous metals 24 
32 Smelting and processing of non-ferrous metals  12 
33 Manufacture of metal products  27 
34 Manufacture of general-purpose machinery  32 
35 Manufacture of special-purpose machinery  132 
36 Manufacture of automobiles  151 
37 
Manufacture of railway, ships, aerospace and other 
transportation equipment  
53 
39 
Manufacture of computers, communication, and other 
electronic equipment  
99 
40 Manufacture of measuring instruments  146 
41 Other manufacturing  55 
42 Comprehensive use of waste resources  5 
43 Repair of metal products, machinery, and equipment  1 
44-46 
Production and Distribution of Electric Power, Gas, and 
Water 
4 
47-50 Construction 11 
53-60 Transport, Storage, and Post 2 
61-62 Hotels and Catering Services 108 
73-75 Scientific Research and Technical Services 8 
76-78 
Management of Water Conservancy, Environment, and 
Public Facilities 
14 
79-81 Services to Households and other services 12 
total  1094 
 
PhD Dissertation, Yuchen GAO 
95 
5. R&D Subsidies, Organizational Development Stages, 
and firm-level exploratory learning 
5.1. Introduction 
The main purpose of  this chapter is to explore how public research and 
development (R&D) subsidy influences firms’ exploratory learning behaviors at different 
organizational development stages. 
Learning lies at the core of  firms’ R&D and innovation activities (Ahuja & Lampert, 
2001; March, 1991). Firms tend to stay in their comfort zone where they “get by” with 
familiar technology and know-how without having to break with the established 
trajectories and face uncertainty and costs (Madhavan & Grover, 1998) and it consume 
vast resources of  firms (Oshri, Pan, & Newell, 2005) to innovate. The expanding of  the 
scope of  searching in order to add to firms’ knowledge-base and the absorbing of  
complex and expensive tacit knowledge in the process (Dunlap Hinkler, Kotabe, & 
Mudambi, 2010; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006) are often costly and seemingly unnecessary. 
However, the excessive use of  familiar knowledge, relying on successful experience, will 
lead to the exhaustion of  knowledge, which is not conducive to the generation of  
heterogeneous resources and make firms to suffer from the loss of  sustained long-term 
competitive advantage (Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Fleming, 2001; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997). 
To gain sustainability, firms need to search for and adopt novel knowledge continuously, 
which is entirely new to the firms, through exploratory learning (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). 
Firms can enter new technological fields and create new technological combinations in 
the generation of  breakthrough inventions during such exploratory learning behaviors, 
which are vital to innovation (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Zhao et al., 2016). However, the 
expanding of  the searching scope in order to add to firms’ knowledge-base and the 
absorbing of  complicated and expensive novel knowledge in the process are often costly 
(Dunlap Hinkler et al., 2010; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006), thus, although exploratory 
learning may improve long-term innovation performance, firms are still reluctant to 
engage. 
Public R&D subsidy is considered one of  the most widely adopted policy 
instruments to spur firm-level R&D (Arrow, 1962; Nelson, 1959). On the one hand, 
several studies from the resource-based view have shown that, by directly compensating, 
R&D subsidy can facilitate R&D activities that are often perceived to bear higher risk 
and uncertainty (Beck et al., 2016; Chapman & Hewitt-Dundas, 2018), such as 
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technological recombination by adopting novel knowledge. R&D subsidy is especially 
important in transitional economies where the capital markets are underdeveloped 
(Zheng et al., 2015). On the other hand, other studies, based on the agency theory and 
multi-stakeholder theory, indicate that government R&D subsidies can promote the full 
exploitation of  familiar knowledge to strengthen the existing technological trajectory (Jia 
et al., 2019; Jiang et al., 2018; Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017). The twofold effect of  R&D 
subsidy calls for a more comprehensive study, especially, when considering the influences 
of  distinct characteristics of  firms presented at different organizational development 
stages on the effectiveness of  R&D subsidies. The accumulation of  resources, knowledge, 
and experience of  firms at different development stages varies (Barbosa, Faria, & Eiriz, 
2014; Dodge, Fullerton, & Robbins, 1994; Hoopes & Madsen, 2008). This leads to 
divergent attitudes toward the focus of  exploratory learning at each development stage 
(Barbosa et al., 2014; Eiriz, Faria, & Barbosa, 2013), and thus, the influencing mechanism 
and the outcome of  R&D subsidy on firm innovation at different development stages 
may show imparity, although it is rarely examined. 
This chapter proposes a dynamic view on the investigation of  the effect of  R&D 
subsidy on firms’ exploratory learning incorporating organizational development stages. 
This section will attempt to answer two main research questions: 1) What are the roles 
of  government subsidy on firms’ exploratory learning? 2) What are the divergent effects 
of  public R&D subsidies at different organizational development stages? Through this 
study, a crucial practical question is expected to be addressed for policymakers in terms 
of  the design of  R&D subsidy: At which development stages of  firms should 
governments subsidize R&D activities in regard to the encouragement of  firms’ learning 
on novel knowledge? 
5.2 Research Context: R&D Subsidy and Renewable Energy 
Industry Development in China overall and in Jiangsu province 
specifically 
This chapter focuses on the research on the firms in the manufacturing sectors of  
renewable energy industries in Jiangsu province. First of  all, considering the overall 
industrial background, according to the report of  the President's Council of  Advisors on 
Science and Technology of  the USA in 2010, China's new energy manufacturing industry 
is in the adoption stage in 2010. At this stage, the primary role of  the firms in the industry 
is learning by using (Xiong & Yang, 2016) where new technologies are constantly 
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absorbed in the application process to improve the technological level of  firms, and 
products are developed to meet market demand based on forming a new technology 
combination. At the same time, the industry at this stage has accumulated ample novel 
knowledge for firms to acquire. Thus, compared with the mature industries which are 
still in the diffusion stage, and infant industries which are still in the front-end stage of  
laboratory research and development, the new energy manufacturing industry is more 
suitable for the research of  firms' new knowledge acquisition behavior. 
Secondly, from the perspective of  the development of  the new energy 
manufacturing industry in Jiangsu Province, the industry includes firms in growth, 
maturity and declining stages in the observation period, which provides an ideal research 
sample for this study. Jiangsu's new energy manufacturing industry is mainly composed 
of  solar photovoltaic, wind power generation equipment and biomass energy 
manufacturing. From 2004 to 2005, with the increasing demand for international new 
energy markets, a small number of  firms began to enter new energy manufacturing. From 
2006 to 2008, with the maturity of  the market, a growing number of  firms entered the 
industry, and at the same time, some firms matured. In 2008, China's 4 trillion RMB 
investment plan was implemented. In 2010, the renewable energy industry is listed as one 
of  the most important high-tech industries with the launch of  the Renewable Energy 
Law of  the People’s Republic of  China (Amendment), and a large number of  firms began 
to enter the industry (Zhang & White, 2016). At this time, the industry has a large number 
of  growing firms, and the firms that entered earlier are in their mature stage as the 
pioneering firms that were there since the very beginning began to decline (He et al., 
2018). By the end of  2016, there were 850 high-tech firms engaged in renewable energy 
industries in Jiangsu1. The total product value of  the renewable energy industries of  
Jiangsu in 2016 is 362.6 billion RMB2. 
Third, the government plays a key role in the development process of  the renewable 
energy industry by using R&D subsidy (John A., David C., & Edward, 2003). Among 
them, Jiangsu Province set up the independent innovation special guiding fund, which is 
the most representative. According to the Handbook of  Policies towards Firm's 
Technological Innovation of  Jiangsu, the special guiding fund for independent 
innovation aims to support the research, development and application demonstration of  
                                                             
1 Data source: Industry and Information Technology Department of  Jiangsu 
2 2016 Statistical Communiqué on High-tech Industry in Jiangsu Province 
(http://www.jssts.com/Item/608.aspx in Chinese)  
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frontier technology and core common technology in key areas, including the new energy 
manufacturing industry, concentrate resources on jointly tackling key problems, to make 
breakthroughs in several key areas and develop a number of  technology and strategic 
products with independent intellectual property rights. At the same time, the special fund 
aims to promote firms to absorb and utilize novel knowledge, realize technological 
leapfrogging, enhance core competitiveness, and provide scientific and technological 
support for the development of  high-tech industries, the upgrading of  traditional 
industries and the cyclic economy in Jiangsu Province. Therefore, exploring the effects 
of  this R&D subsidy program will help us understand the impact of  government funding 
on firms' acquisition of  new knowledge and the creating of  new knowledge 
combinations. 
5.3 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
5.3.1 R&D Subsidy and the Firm-level Learning Behaviors 
According to prior studies, the R&D activities of  firms follow the cyclic interaction 
of  experience and competence (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). Firms are experienced in using 
familiar knowledge and readily available technology due to stronger absorptive capacity 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). It is beneficial to the establishment of  the firm's specialized 
competence and reduces the difficulty of  learning and problem-solving in specific 
technological areas (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Levinthal & March, 1993). However, firms 
may risk being caught in the "familiarity trap" by the exploitation of  a familiar knowledge 
base (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). 
To overcome such learning traps, firms are encouraged to build new knowledge 
recombination with uniqueness and novelty (Hargadon, 2003; Nerkar, 2003). One main 
source of  creating new knowledge recombination is to search, acquire and adopt novel 
knowledge (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Amabile, 1988; Zhou & Li, 2012). However, there 
are some difficulties and obstacles for firms to explore novel and unfamiliar knowledge. 
Firstly, having no prior experience, firms often find new technology to be more expensive 
due to the complexity of  knowledge in essence (Oshri et al., 2005). In order to apply 
novel knowledge, firms have to invest considerable resources in the process of  
continuous utilization of  the newly acquired knowledge to strengthen firms’ absorptive 
capacity for such novel knowledge (Hitt et al., 1996; Madhavan & Grover, 1998). It is 
also expensive for firms to engage in networking and interactions with external 
organizations for novel knowledge search. Secondly, firms may face higher risks when 
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using novel knowledge (Dunlap Hinkler et al., 2010; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006). Lacking 
past experience means higher uncertainty, resulting in the failure of  technology R&D 
(Levinthal & March, 1993) and a waste of  investment. 
The governments can be expected to help and encourage firms’ learning behaviors 
of  novel knowledge with public R&D subsidy. R&D subsidy, according to the resource-
based view, directly increases the pool of  available resources for firms to undertake 
innovation activities, enhancing the return and reducing the cost of  R&D (David et al., 
2000). By helping firms to overcome resource constraints, R&D subsidy encourages 
firms to invest in novel knowledge searching as well as in related technological capabilities 
enhancement (Jiang et al., 2018; Lazzarini, 2015). Furthermore, R&D subsidy increase 
firms’ risk-taking (Chapman & Hewitt-Dundas, 2018), which promotes firms to conduct 
more challenging R&D activities, which have higher uncertainty, and require more novel 
knowledge (Czarnitzki & Delanote, 2015; Hsu & Hsueh, 2009). Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms receiving R&D subsidy are more likely to undertake exploratory 
learning 
5.3.2 The Heterogeneous Effects throughout Organizational Development Stages 
Prior studies argue that knowledge learning behaviors differ in each organizational 
development stage, which also causes firms’ innovation strategies and their outcomes to 
vary at stages (Barbosa et al., 2014; Eiriz et al., 2013; Koberg, Uhlenbruck, & Sarason, 
1996). With the alternation of  stages, organizational structure and firm strategy will also 
adapt (Drazin & Kazanjian, 1990; Milliman, Glinow, & Nathan, 1991). Especially for 
firms in the high-tech industries, the impact of  organizational development stages on the 
pattern of  technological innovation and patent development is even more apparent 
(Barbosa et al., 2014; Eiriz et al., 2013). Studies show that along with the progression of  
development stages, innovation capability of  firms will change dynamically alongside the 
accumulation of  resources, knowledge, and experience (Chang, Lee, & Wong, 2018; 
Hoopes & Madsen, 2008; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). Meanwhile, organizational 
innovation practices also transform, thus influencing and shaping the innovation-related 
capabilities and organizational learning behaviors at different stages (Helfat & Peteraf, 
2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002). In this regard, existing research suggests that the novelty 
of  R&D and innovation declines as firms develop (Balasubramanian & Lee, 2008). The 
main reason is that firms with increasing maturity levels may have higher organizational 
inertia. It is very difficult and costly to adapt organizational practices, processes and 
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structures in response to the need for innovation and the novelty of  R&D activities 
(Henderson, 1993; Miller & Friesen, 1984).  
More specifically, firms in the growth stage are more willing to explore novel 
knowledge in R&D and innovation activities (Barbosa et al., 2014), because they need to 
enhance their R&D and innovation capabilities, which is conducive for seizing markets, 
thereby gaining competitive advantage (Miller & Friesen, 1984). Meanwhile, firms in the 
growth stage have more flexible organizational structures, with which they can effectively 
collect, acquire, adapt and accumulate external novel knowledge, and form tacit 
knowledge rooted in the firm (Barbosa et al., 2014). However, at this stage, firms often 
lack funds (Chang et al., 2018; Clarysse & Bruneel, 2007). With earning pressure, firms 
are eager for efficient economic returns by quickly turning out products with learned 
familiar knowledge (Chang et al., 2018), rather than continuously exploring novel 
knowledge. By alleviating the resource constraints of  firms, R&D subsidies may 
encourage firms in the growth stage to acquire and adopt more novel knowledge. We 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2 a: Firms in the growth stage are more likely to undertake exploratory 
learning if  receiving R&D subsidy. 
Extant studies point out that firms in the mature stage have stronger innovation 
capabilities, such as capital supply, greater market power and organizational capacity, and 
more experience (Aghion et al., 2009; Chandy & Tellis, 2000; Dewar & Dutton, 1986). 
These advantages will enable firms in the mature stage to realize more potential by using 
novel knowledge in innovation (Barbosa et al., 2014). However, the main aim of  firms at 
the mature stage is to further develop existing technology and familiar knowledge to gain 
economic benefits by selling related products (Barbosa et al., 2014). Firms in this stage 
are unwilling to adjust their innovation strategy on a large scale before their existing 
technology reaches economic optimization (Barbosa et al., 2014). Managers will be more 
inclined to carry out less risky R&D activities (Habib & Hasan, 2017). Thus, firms in the 
mature stage may be reluctant to search for and use novel and unfamiliar knowledge in 
R&D activities (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). R&D subsidy, as mentioned before, can 
enhance the risk-bearing level of  firms, and encourage them to explore new knowledge 
and plan for the layout of  technology ahead of  time to ensure the sustainable competitive 
advantage of  firms. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2 b: Firms in the mature stage are more likely to undertake exploratory 
learning if  receiving R&D subsidies. 
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Exploratory learning to break the familiar trap and to innovate is the most important 
strategy for firms in the decline stage (Sirmon et al., 2010). The original technological 
maturity of  firms is saturated. This means that the efficiency of  technological output is 
declining, coupled with the exhaustion of  market potential (Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Sirmon 
et al., 2010). 
Both the profitability and market competitiveness of  firms are declining (Miller & 
Friesen, 1984). At this stage, firms urgently need to break free from the original 
technological trajectory, by novel knowledge exploration to innovate to reboot market 
competitiveness, so that firms may begin a new life cycle (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). As a 
consequence, the risk-taking of  firms in the decline stage is higher (Habib & Hasan, 
2017). However, firms in the decline stage suffer from negative growth due to the 
contraction of  the market, and they face resource constraints (Sirmon et al., 2010). It is 
hard for firms in the decline stage to provide necessary financial support for novel 
knowledge exploration (Faff et al., 2016). R&D subsidy can provide resource buffering, 
and thereby facilitate firms in the decline stage to break their technological routines via 
exploratory learning. 
Hypothesis 2 c: Firms in the decline stage are more likely to undertake exploratory 
learning if  receiving R&D subsidies. 
5.4 Data and Methods 
5.4.1 Data 
The panel data employed in this study is an exclusive survey of  high-tech firms in 
Jiangsu Province conducted by the Jiangsu Science and Technology Department, 
covering the period from 2010 to 2014. We further screened out manufacturing firms 
engaged in renewable energy technology3. At the same time, we have selected 108 new 
energy and environmental protection manufacturing firms that have received the 
government's "independent innovation special guidance fund" from 2010 to 2014. In all, 
128 firms that have never received any form of  R&D subsidy during the observation 
period were retained. The panel data contains 236 firms and 853 observations. The 
industrial distributions based on 2-digit industrial codes are shown in Table A5.1 in the 
appendix of  this chapter. 
Because the ratio of  subsidized to non-subsidized firms is close to 1:1, propensity 
score matching is not viable. Therefore, we take "whether received R&D subsidy" as the 
                                                             
3 Firms coded 501/502/601/602/603/604/605/606 in the technical field 
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dependent variable, using government screening criteria for subsidy recipients as an 
independent variable and applied Probit regression to test for selective bias. The results 
show that there is no significant relationship between the affecting factors and "whether 
received R&D subsidy" except the age of  the sample firms (see Table A.2 in the 
appendix). It can be concluded that there is no obvious selectivity bias in this sample 
(Boeing, 2016). 
Referring to previous studies and considering the actual circumstances of  China's 
renewable energy manufacturing industry, we group the sample firm into three 
development stage groups: growth, maturity, and decline (Anthony & Ramesh, 1992; 
Xiong & Yang, 2016). Specifically, we group the development stages of  firms according 
to the average sales growth rate for five years from 2010 to 2014. On the basis of  sorting, 
we divide the development stages into sub-partitions using 7 and 3 quantiles as cutting 
points. After phasing, 84 firms in our samples appear to be in the growth stage, 81 in 
maturity and 71 in the decline stage. Detailed division of  developmental stages is shown 
in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 The classification of  development stages 
Development stages Growth  Maturity  Decline  
Sales growth rate  >25% 0%~7.1%  Negative 
Established Years <8 8~13 >13 
Number of  firms  84 81 71 
 
5.4.2 Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
To examine the effects of  R&D subsidy on firms’ exploratory learning behaviors, 
this study adopts Cox regression. More specifically, in our study, each sample firm is 
treated as having probabilities of  adopting novel knowledge in its own R&D activities 
once the firm enters the observation period. The timeline in which each firm adopts 
novel knowledge may not coincide during the observation period. All firms which have 
yet to adopt novel knowledge in R&D are right-censored when our observation ends (in 
the year 2014). Since our research interest is about firms’ adoption of  novel knowledge 
rather than their degrees of  exploratory learning, we do not model repeated novel 
knowledge adoption by the same firm. In other words, once an individual firm is 
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observed to adopt novel knowledge, an “exploratory learning” event is coded to occur 
in the year the adoption happened, and the individual firm is removed from the risk set. 
Cox Proportional Hazard function (Cox, 1975) given below is employed to estimate 
a firm’s probabilities to adopt novel knowledge: 
ℎ(t) = ℎ0(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝛽𝑋(𝑡)] 
h(t) is the hazard rate of  exploratory learning. h0(t) is the unspecified baseline 
hazard function, as Cox regression does not require any restrictions on the baseline risk 
function, and it does not require additional assumptions about the baseline risk over time. 
X is a matrix of  time-varying covariates influencing the hazard rate. β are vectors of  
unknown regression parameters. The model indicates that under the influence of  X 
covariates, the hazard rate for a firm to adopt novel knowledge in its R&D activities are 
proportionally amplified or decreased by 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝛽𝑋(𝑡)]. 
Since the point in time of  novel knowledge adoption of  different firms overlap, 
meaning that multiple individuals have the same failure time, the Efron algorithm which 
can gain more accurate results will be employed. 
5.4.3 Variables 
The dependent variable in this study is defined as novel knowledge adoptions of  
firms and we measure it by the appearance of  new combinations of  IPC codes with new 
three-digit technological classes in firms’ invention patent applications. More specifically, 
we refer to the research of  Ahuja and Lampert (2001) in defining the "novel knowledge" 
of  firms. According to the patent history of  a firm, if  the International Patent 
Classification (IPC) codes that have not appeared in the past four years show up in the 
technological combination of  a patent application of  the firm in a specific year, the patent 
can be defined as an application of  novel knowledge (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Phelps, 
2010). The reason for the four-year interval is that, even if  a firm may have used the 
technology four years ago, technical knowledge tends to depreciate or become obsolete 
over time, so technology being idle in the long term can significantly reduce the firm's 
knowledge stock (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). Therefore, for the dependent variable of  
exploratory learning (Novel_Pat), given that in the technology combination of  invention 
patents application of  a firm in a certain year, if  an IPC code has not emerged in any 
patent application in the previous four years, the firm is considered to be adopting novel 
knowledge in the present year, which is valued as 1, otherwise 0. According to the 
requirement of  the Cox model, a survival time variable is measured by years, which is the 
period from firms entering into observation to adopting novel knowledge or to the 
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censored year. 
For the independent variables (RD_Subsidy), we set a dummy variable to record the 
receiving of  R&D subsidy, i.e. special guidance funds for independent innovation. For 
the control variables, we adopt a dummy variable ‘RD_Dpart’ to denote that firms run 
their own formal R&D institutions, such as testing base, R&D center and laboratories 
(Hussinger, 2008) and variable ‘Pat_Stock’ to measure firms’ patent stock at the end of  a 
given year t to control for R&D capabilities (Cappelen et al., 2012; Hud & Hussinger, 
2015). We also control for the value of  exports (Export) as export-oriented firms are 
assumed to be more innovative so as to better cope with international competition (Radas 
et al., 2015). Capital intensity (Cap_int) is used to measure the financial status of  firms 
(Boeing, 2016). Basic firm-level information including firm size (Firm_Size) and firm age 
(Firm_Age) are also controlled for. Moreover, we restrict the time effect by adding in time 
dummy variables. Several industrial dummy variables are also set according to the 
industrial distributions. In addition, we add three regional dummies to control for the 
developmental differences in Jiangsu, namely the north, central and south regions of  
Jiangsu province (the city distributions are shown in Table A5.3 in the appendix). 
To control the potential endogeneity issue for obtaining robust results, an 
instrumental variable for IV-Probit regression is also set. Referring to the study of  Guo, 
Guo, and Jiang (2016), we adopt the ratio of  total investment in fixed assets made by 
local governments over the total GDP at the city level each year as the IV. This IV is 
highly relevant to firms’ probability to gain R&D subsidy but irrelevant to the exploratory 
learning behaviors at firm-level. 
The variables are listed and summarized in Table 5.2. By running a multi-collinearity 
test based on the ordinary least squares model in this study, we detect no serious multi-
collinearity. Table 5.3 depicts the descriptive statistics and correlations matrix. 
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Table 5.2 List of  Variables 
Dependent variable of  Cox   
Novel_Pat Whether firms use novel IPC codes in patent 
applications 
Independent variables  
RD_Subsidy Whether firms gain public R&D subsidy (i.e., Special 
guidance funds for independent innovation) or not 
Control variables  
RD_Dpart 
 
Whether firms run their own formal R&D 
institutions, such as testing base, R&D center, and 
laboratories or not 
Pat_Stock 
 
 
The depreciated sum of  firms’ own patents until t-1 
plus the non-depreciated patent applications in t with 
depreciation rate 0.15 
Export The natural logarithm of  the value of  export 
Cap_Int 
 
The natural logarithm of  net fixed assets divided by 
the number of  employees 
Firm_Age 
 
The natural logarithm of  the number of  years since 
the establishment 
Firm_Size The natural logarithm of  the number of  employees 
Industry_Dummy Based on 2-digit industrial code 
Year_Dummy Based on the years (2010-2014) 
Region_Dummy Based on city located in the regions of  Jiangsu 
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Tobit and Cox Regressions 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Novel_Pat 1.000  
       
2 RD_Subsidy -0.119* 1.000  
      
3 Firm_Age -0.082* -0.107* 1.000  
     
4 Firm_Size -0.023  0.026  0.153* 1.000  
    
5 Cap_int -0.056  0.062  0.027  0.132* 1.000  
   
6 Export -0.029  0.068* 0.092* 0.487* 0.141* 1.000  
  
7 RD_Dpart -0.045  0.010  0.132* 0.195* 0.089* 0.098* 1.000  
 
8 Pat_stock -0.071* -0.015  0.058  0.357* 0.060  0.265* 0.079* 1.000  
  Mean 0.192  0.273  2.374  5.568  5.101  4.530  0.905  46.680  
 
Std. Dev. 0.394  0.446  0.603  1.143  1.194  4.630  0.293  84.517  
  N 853 853 853 853 853 853 853 853 
* p<0.05 
5.5 Empirical Results 
5.5.1 The effect of  R&D subsidy on firms' exploratory learning 
Before Cox regression, we conduct the test based on Schoenfeld Residuals. The 
results are shown in Table 5A.4 in the chapter appendix. Our data satisfies the basic 
assumptions of  Cox regression. 
Table 5.4 shows the effect of  R&D subsidy on firms' exploratory learning. At the 
overall level, firms receiving R&D subsidy are less likely to adopt novel knowledge in 
their invention patent applications. The probability of  exploratory learning of  R&D 
subsidy recipient firms is 51.18% lower than that of  firms without public R&D subsidy 
(Model 2). However, this empirical result may have endogeneity issues as the effect 
became insignificant after employing the regression with instrumental variables (Model 
4). 
Taking the development stage of  firms into consideration, the probability of  novel 
knowledge adoption in invention patents of  firms in the decline stage is 82.25% lower 
than that of  firms without public R&D subsidy during the observation period, and is 
significant at the level of  10% (Model 11). The result of  Probit regression with 
instrumental variables also underpins the significantly negative effect of  R&D subsidy 
on the exploratory learning behavior of  the firm in the decline stage (Model 13). 
Meanwhile, there is no significant impact on the exploratory learning amongst both 
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growth and maturity stage firms (from Model 5 to Model 10). 
Therefore, according to our empirical results as well as the robustness check with 
considering potential endogeneity issues, we can argue that R&D subsidy significantly 
reduces the probability of  novel knowledge adoptions in invention patents, i.e., 
exploratory learning, of  enterprises in the decline stage.
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Table 5.4 The effect of  R&D subsidy on firms' exploratory learning 
 Control  All Growth  Maturity  Decline  
 Cox Cox Probit iv-probit Cox Probit iv-probit Cox Probit iv-probit Cox Probit iv-probit 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Enterprise_Age 0.158 0.176 0.017 0.051 0.572** 0.050 0.065 -0.029 -0.013 -0.199 -0.068 -0.051 -0.051 
 (0.134) (0.137) (0.074) (0.133) (0.236) (0.147) (0.396) (0.211) (0.129) (0.639) (0.257) (0.144) (0.151) 
Enterprise_Size 0.163* 0.195** 0.137** 0.168 0.336* 0.161 0.170 0.199 0.156 0.098 0.296* 0.151 0.271 
 (0.096) (0.097) (0.058) (0.125) (0.181) (0.112) (0.282) (0.200) (0.110) (0.289) (0.163) (0.101) (0.167) 
Cap_Int -0.085 -0.080 -0.051 -0.023 -0.091 -0.014 -0.017 -0.270* -0.179** -0.202** 0.004 -0.055 0.036 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.045) (0.110) (0.162) (0.076) (0.271) (0.139) (0.085) (0.100) (0.156) (0.092) (0.143) 
Export -0.022 -0.023 -0.020 -0.025 -0.024 -0.010 -0.012 -0.038 -0.033 -0.027 -0.005 0.007 0.010 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.013) (0.020) (0.038) (0.026) (0.073) (0.049) (0.024) (0.059) (0.040) (0.024) (0.025) 
RD_Dpart 0.123 0.104 0.090 0.051 0.603 0.198 0.194 -0.835** -0.163 -0.099 0.718 0.621 0.537 
 (0.265) (0.269) (0.182) (0.225) (0.394) (0.295) (0.595) (0.382) (0.289) (0.428) (0.717) (0.416) (0.448) 
Pat_stock -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.010* -0.004 -0.006* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) 
RD_subsidy  -0.717** -0.721*** -1.233 -0.601 -0.993*** -1.068 -0.072 -0.432 1.284 -1.787* -0.961*** -2.100* 
  (0.354) (0.168) (1.790) (0.496) (0.264) (7.429) (0.848) (0.397) (5.076) (0.962) (0.325) (1.091) 
N 463 463 846 830 153 296 289 177 293 289 133 242 237 
Enterprises  234 234 236 234 84 83 84 80 79 80 70 69 70 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: (1) Robust Standard errors (clustered by firms) are in parentheses for Cox Model; (2) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; (3) 
All models include a set of industrial, year and regional dummies (not reported)
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5.5.2 Robustness Check 
According to agency theory, in order to quickly and better satisfy government 
requirements, and subsequently obtain government resources, firms tend to pursue the 
number of  patent applications, especially utility model and design patents (Jia et al., 2019; 
Jiang et al., 2018). Utility model and design patents are often considered to be a patent 
with low technology content with less new technological know-how. Thus, by examining 
if  more utility model and design patents are applied after receiving subsidies, i.e., agency 
risk, I can supplement and support the conclusions of  this paper from other theoretical 
perspectives. 
This study adopts the count number of  the utility model and design patent 
applications with one year lagged of  a firm as a dependent variable. Panel data negative 
binomial regression with fixed effects is employed as the empirical technique. As shown 
in Table 5.5, R&D subsidies do not significantly promote utility model and design of  
firms in the growth and maturity stages (Model 14 and Model 16), which means that the 
agency risk of  firms in these two stages is weak. However, for enterprises in the decline 
stage, R&D subsidies significantly increase their probability of  non-invention patent 
applications (Model 18). We also provide results of  panel data fix-effect regression with 
the instrumental variable as yearly city-level fixed asset investment (Model 15, 17 & 19). 
The estimated results are nearly identical to the results of  the negative binomial 
regressions. This implies that the negative effect of  R&D subsidy on exploratory learning 
of  enterprises in the decline stage may be a result of  recipients’ agency risk. 
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Table 5.5 Robustness check for firms’ familiar knowledge exploitation 
 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 
 Growth Maturity Decline 
RD_subsidy -0.264 1.429 0.112 0.260 0.572** 0.556* 
 (0.220) (0.837) (0.274) (0.174) (0.224) (0.302) 
Enterprise_Age 0.245 0.323 -0.107 -0.999*** -0.010 -0.823** 
 (0.207) (1.239) (0.198) (0.315) (0.118) (0.373) 
Enterprise_Size 0.080 -1.271 0.230* 0.393** 0.262* -0.056 
 (0.136) (1.032) (0.133) (0.198) (0.141) (0.584) 
Cap_Int -0.036 -0.280 -0.079 0.183 -0.223** 0.246 
 (0.062) (0.437) (0.074) (0.140) (0.093) (0.368) 
Export 0.008 -0.176 0.006 0.014 -0.011 -0.064 
 (0.026) (0.197) (0.025) (0.038) (0.018) (0.090) 
RD_Dpart 0.587*** -2.298 0.211 0.058 0.632** -0.441 
 (0.221) (1.834) (0.230) (0.278) (0.309) (0.697) 
Pat_stock 0.002** 0.052*** -0.002*** 0.032*** 0.009*** 0.057*** 
 (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) 
N 291 268 295 261 237 221 
Enterprises 75 71 75 68 64 62 
Prob > F or 
chi2 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: (1) Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses; (2) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01; (3) All models include a set of  industrial, year and regional dummies (not 
reported) 
 
Table 5.6 The conclusion of the empirical results of Chapter 5 
Hypotheses  Empirical 
results  
Hypothesis 1: Firms receiving R&D subsidy are more likely to 
undertake exploratory learning. 
 
Not supported  
(insignificant) 
Hypothesis 2 a: Firms in the growth stage are more likely to 
undertake exploratory learning by receiving R&D subsidy. 
 
Not supported  
(insignificant) 
Hypothesis 2 b: Firms in the mature stage are more likely to 
undertake exploratory learning by receiving R&D subsidy. 
 
Not supported  
(insignificant) 
Hypothesis 2 c: Firms in the decline stage are more likely to 
undertake exploratory learning by receiving R&D subsidy. 
 
Not supported  
(negative) 
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5.6 Discussion 
The empirical results show that public R&D subsidies cannot provoke firms’ 
exploratory learning to overcome the learning traps. This study further suggests that the 
effects of  R&D subsidy on firms’ novel knowledge adoptions vary at different 
development stages. One of  the key findings is that R&D subsidies can significantly 
reduce the likelihood of  firms in the decline stage to explore, absorb and adopt novel 
knowledge, however they will prominently increase the number of  utility model and 
design patent applications. For firms in the growth and mature stages, R&D subsidy has 
no effect on exploratory learning behaviors nor on utility model and design patent 
applications. 
Previous studies have shown that firms in the decline stage need to adopt novel 
knowledge to break the original technology lock-in and avoid the "familiar trap" in order 
to form a new technology portfolio and open up new markets because of  the exhaustion 
of  existing ones (Ahuja & Katila, 2004). In the research sample, 50 out of  71 firms in the 
decline stage engaged in exploratory learning, which also confirms extant findings. 
However, most firms in the decline stage that have been adopting novel knowledge did 
not receive R&D subsidies. Meanwhile, the empirical results further reveal that R&D 
subsidies significantly inhibit firms in the decline stage from exploratory learning. It fails 
to promote the adoption of  novel knowledge in their R&D activities for various potential 
reasons. First, market competition is distorted due to the intervention of  cheap public 
funds (Bonardi, 2008; Chen et al., 2011). Firms can survive without improving their own 
technological capabilities and resource bases (Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017), and the 
incentives to use novel but perhaps risky know-how may, therefore, be reduced. Second, 
firms may use cheap resources (R&D subsidies) to extend the original technology track 
to “the last gasp”. On the one hand, firms expect to gain fast economic returns with 
lower risks; on the other hand, firms want to rapidly expand patent applications, such as 
utility model and design patents, in order to meet the government's requirements to gain 
subsequent subsidies. Under the quantitative evaluation criteria of  government-
subsidized R&D projects, the novelty of  R&D and the real growth of  R&D and the 
innovation ability of  firms are difficult to measure. Meeting the bar for the subsidy has 
become the primary goal of  firms receiving R&D subsidy (Li et al., 2018). Firms will 
simply pursue the required quantity of  R&D and innovation achievements rather than 
pursuing the novelty of  the technology and the improvement of  innovation ability and 
market competitiveness (Jia et al., 2019). In addition, the results of  the robustness check 
also strengthen this argument from the perspective of  agency risk. 
Moreover, what is unexpected is that R&D subsidies have no significant impact on 
exploratory learning behaviors of  firms in growth and maturity stages. Firms in the 
growth stage, on the one hand, are less likely to be confronted with path-dependence 
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caused by the accumulation of  long-term technology development and experience. On 
the other hand, growing firms are more active in exploring and absorbing mature but 
unfamiliar knowledge from the industry to enhance their technological capabilities 
rapidly and speed up product development. With the accumulation of  knowledge and 
experience, firms in the growth stage will gradually and continuously collect, acquire and 
utilize novel knowledge to innovate in order to build a cycle of  learning and experience 
to enhance their knowledge stock and strengthen technological competitiveness. In other 
words, whether firms are supported by the government does not affect their inclinations 
to seek and adopt novel knowledge. 
For firms in the maturity stage, the insignificant effect of  R&D subsidy is mainly 
because firms whose core technology has entered maturity have built up strong technical 
capabilities and related resources. Specifically, at this stage, with the increasing maturity 
of  technology, firms can maintain and develop suited technological capabilities to obtain 
sustained profits. Presently, firms in the maturity stage with sufficient financial resources 
rely less on government resources, and hence, the government's influence on them is 
weakened. Meanwhile, the internal level of  hierarchy in such firms is complicated, and 
the decision-making process gradually forms a certain path dependence. It is difficult for 
the government to influence the R&D strategic decision-making of  firms in the maturity 
stage through just R&D subsidy. Therefore, public R&D subsidies have no significant 
impact on the R&D activities of  mature firms. This finding echoes Barbosa et al. (2014). 
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5.7 Appendix 
Table 5A.1 Industrial Distribution based on 2-digit industrial codes 
2-digit 
industrial 
code  
Industrial name  
Firm 
number 
26 
Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical 
Products 
10 
29 Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Products 2 
30 Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products 3 
33 Manufacture of Metal Products 4 
34 Manufacture of General-Purpose Machinery 25 
35 Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 76 
36 Manufacture of Automobile Equipment 10 
37 Manufacture of Transport Equipment 6 
38 Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Equipment 62 
39 
Manufacture of communications and other electronic 
equipment 
35 
40 
Manufacture of Measuring Instruments and Machinery for 
Cultural Activity and Office Work 
3 
Total   236 
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Table 5A.2 Selection Bias Check 
DV: receiving R&D subsidy or not Probit 
Regression 
The age of firms -0.264*** 
 (0.101) 
The employees of firms 0.009 
 (0.068) 
Firms’ capital intensity 0.059 
 (0.057) 
Firms’ export value 0.022 
 (0.016) 
Whether the firms run their own formal R&D institutions 0.071 
 (0.220) 
Firms’ knowledge stock -0.001 
 (0.001) 
_cons -0.478 
 (0.491) 
N 853 
Firms  236 
Prob > chi2 0.135 
Pseudo R2 0.019 
Notes: (1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; (2) All models include a set of  
industrial, year and regional dummies (not reported) 
According to the Handbook of  Policies towards Firm's Technological Innovation of  Jiangsu, 
subsidy in Jiangsu Province in support of  firms in the renewable energy industry is 
allocated to firms that meet the following requirements: 1) have good research and 
development foundation and conditions; and 2) have sound business credit. Based on the 
screening criteria, we select several factors that may influence the probability of  receiving 
R&D subsidies. The results of  probit regression indicate that all the factors except firms’ 
age have no significant effects on the probability of  receiving R&D subsidy, thus, it is 
argued that our samples do not have serious selection bias related to the R&D subsidy 
received. 
Table 5A.3 City distributions in Jiangsu 
Regions Cities 
The north region of  Jiangsu Xuzhou, Lianyungang, Huai’an, Yancheng, Suqian 
The central region of  Jiangsu Yangzhou, Taizhou, Nantong 
The south region of  Jiangsu Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, Zhenjiang 
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Table 5A.4 Test for Cox regression based on Schoenfeld Residuals 
 All firms Growth Maturity Decline 
Firm_Age 0.950 0.091 0.857 0.495 
Firm_Size 0.130 0.740 0.106 0.853 
Fix_Asst 0.419 0.105 0.323 0.761 
Export 0.357 0.925 0.345 0.221 
RD_Dpart 0.371 0.959 0.712 0.049 
Pat_stock 0.708 0.989 0.120 0.403 
RD_Subsidy 0.293 0.360 0.116 0.089 
 
The results show that the proportional risk assumptions for Cox regression are supported 
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6. R&D Subsidy Programs, Novel Knowledge Exploration, 
the Change of Technological Focus: the Different Roles of 
the Local and Central Governments 
6.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of  this chapter is to explore how participating in public R&D 
subsidy programs promotes firms’ learning and adoption of  novel knowledge and it is, 
furthermore, the purpose to explore potential heterogeneity effects between central and 
local governments. 
Chinse firms have been catching up quickly through technological innovations since 
the economic transition. However, it is recognized by researchers that China's rapid 
development model has two problems (Guan & Yam, 2015; Liu et al., 2017). First, most 
of  the time, Chinese firms emphasize imitating existing products and conducting 
incremental innovation and secondary innovation, stimulated by cost advantage and 
enormous domestic market demand (Liu et al., 2017; Wu, Ma, & Xu, 2009). Second, most 
Chinese manufacturing firms are locked into the low end of  the global value chain with 
a very low technological level (Guan & Yam, 2015). This current innovation model is not 
sustainable for long-term growth, as China is facing challenges from the labor cost 
increase, environmental pollution, and shortage of  resources. Thus, the Chinese 
government has launched the National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Science and 
Technology Development (2006-2020). The Chinese government has been urging firms 
to upgrade industrial technology, enter new technological fields and create new markets. 
At the same time, the Chinese government also emphasizes the indigenous innovation 
of  firms, and finally promotes sustainable economic development (Liu et al., 2017). 
To achieve innovation-driven development, the Chinese government encourages 
firms to carry out exploratory learning of  novel knowledge. Novel knowledge is defined 
as a type of  knowledge that is entirely new to the firms but not necessarily novel for the 
industry or may even be mature knowledge to other players in the market (Ahuja & 
Lampert, 2001). Exploratory learning of  novel knowledge, on the one hand, provides 
sources for firms’ new technological combinations to break the learning traps generated 
by path dependence on familiar knowledge and problem-solving methods (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2004; Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). It helps developing country firms to create 
breakthrough inventions, subsequently breaking the trajectories developed by firms from 
developed countries. It also helps firms to capture emerging new technological 
opportunities that are as yet ignored by incumbents. On the other hand, exploratory 
learning helps firms, especially those engaging in traditional sectors with low and medium 
technologies, to enter new technological fields and change their core technological 
PhD Dissertation, Yuchen GAO 
118 
focuses to accomplish the industrial upgrading (Liu et al., 2017). 
However, there are various obstacles for developing countries firms to explore 
unfamiliar novel knowledge. First, to search for new technology and knowledge leads to 
higher costs compared to using existing familiar knowledge (Oshri et al., 2005). Second, 
firms may face higher risks when using novel but unfamiliar knowledge due to the 
associated higher uncertainties (Dunlap Hinkler et al., 2010; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006). 
Thus, although exploratory learning on novel knowledge may lead to technological 
upgrading and firms’ competitive advantages, incentives to pursue such learning behavior 
are still weak. 
To break the deadlock of  learning traps, the government can play an important role 
in promoting firms’ exploratory learning. With public R&D subsidies, the government 
can reduce firms’ research and development costs (Boeing, 2016; Dimos & Pugh, 2016) 
incurred by exploratory learning. Moreover, the government can also endorse R&D 
subsidy recipient firms with the legitimacy of  novel knowledge seeking (Wang et al., 
2017). However, very few studies focus on the effects of  R&D subsidy on firms’ 
exploratory learning so as to help firms entering new technological fields and further 
change their technological focuses. 
Thus, the study in this chapter, at first, will focus on the question: “can participating 
in public R&D subsidy programs promote firms’ exploratory learning?” Second, this 
study will further explore the extent to which firms use novel knowledge after 
participating in public R&D subsidy programs. More specifically, this study attempts to 
answer the question: “does public R&D subsidy facilitate firms to use new knowledge to 
change their core technological focus?” The conception of  exploratory learning in this 
chapter is similar to that in Chapter 5, however, this chapter further considers the degree 
of  exploratory learning. According to previous studies, the results of  exploratory learning 
may remain different (Geels & Schot, 2007; Hall & Andriani, 2003). One possibility is 
that novel knowledge can be used to strengthen and improve the firms’ existing 
technologies, which are add-on technologies (Geels & Schot, 2007). The other possibility 
is that novel knowledge may help firms to change the current core technological focus 
they are engaged in (Hall & Andriani, 2003). This may result in firm-level technological 
upgrading. In the pilot research for this study, both public agencies and firms claimed 
that participation in public R&D support programs helps firms to change their 
technological focus. For example, several sponsored firms have transferred from coating 
composition to polymeric compound, from medical preparation to microbial and enzyme 
assays and test methods or from textile to R&D on new materials. Third, the Chinese 
public R&D subsidy programs can be further divided into central and local levels. The 
degree of  information asymmetry with firms, subsidy targets, and evaluation criteria are 
different between central and local governments due to the proximity to local firms (Wei 
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& Zuo, 2018; Zheng et al., 2015; Zhou et al., 2018). Therefore, the effects of  R&D 
subsidies from central and local governments on exploratory learning may differ. 
Accordingly, “do R&D subsidies from central and local governments have different 
effects on firms’ novel technologies and new knowledge exploitation behaviors?” is 
another key question of  this study. 
6.2 Theoretical Development and Hypotheses 
6.2.1 Firms’ Exploratory Learning behaviors 
According to a learning perspective, firms can expand their knowledge base or enter 
an entirely new technological area by exploring and adopting novel knowledge (Ahuja & 
Lampert, 2001; Grant, 1996). Novel knowledge exploration also helps firms to enhance 
their experience of  using new and unfamiliar technologies, and strengthens their ability 
to solve problems in the face of  new technological challenges, and thereby helps firms 
to form new and more efficient technology solutions (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Amabile, 
1988; Zhou & Li, 2012). 
By novel knowledge exploration, firms can also break the cognitive rigidity 
generated by an existing knowledge base. Firms often fall into “familiarity traps” of  
technology due to the path dependence derived from the momentum of  familiar 
knowledge exploitation (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). More specifically, previous experience 
of  familiar knowledge has enhanced firms’ absorptive capacity of  such knowledge (Ahuja 
& Lampert, 2001; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This promotes the development of  such 
technology and increases its competitive advantage. The competitive advantage afforded 
by higher technology promotes firms’ use of  such technology, which in turn increases 
firms’ experience (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The cyclical interaction of  experience and 
capabilities benefits a firm’s establishment of  professional ability and decreases the 
difficulty of  learning and problem-solving in a specific technological area (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Henderson & Clark, 1990). However, firms may be locked into well-
understood and familiar technologies, which limits the firms’ capabilities for radical 
innovation (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). Novel knowledge exploration, to a certain extent, 
provides a new perspective, not only for a better understanding of  novel knowledge, but 
for existing knowledge as well (Lei, Hitt, & Bettis, 1996). This can help firms to create 
technological combinations of  novel knowledge with existing knowledge (Utterback, 
1994), or combine existing but less relevant knowledge areas (Keijl et al., 2016; 
Schoenmakers & Duysters, 2010b). Therefore, learning and using novel knowledge can 
promote the firms’ knowledge recombination, and even change firms’ core technological 
focus, further providing a foundation for firms’ technological upgrading (Ahuja & 
Lampert, 2001). 
However, novel knowledge exploration often leads to higher costs to acquire both 
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generic and specialized resources (Jiang et al., 2018; Schilling, 2010; Wang et al., 2014). 
This is mainly due to the complexity of  novel knowledge. On the one hand, firms need 
to acquire and understand novel knowledge by building and upgrading relevant skills, 
which require heavy resource investments (Hitt et al., 1996; Madhavan & Grover, 1998). 
At the same time, heavy investment is also required to strengthen firms’ absorptive 
capacity on novel knowledge and relevant specialized complementary knowledge (March, 
1991; Sheng, Zhou, & Li, 2011). Furthermore, firms need to strengthen their absorptive 
capacities (Zahra & George, 2002), by means such as recruiting new employees to 
understand and use novel knowledge, which also incurs high costs (Wang et al., 2014). 
On the other hand, by deepening understanding of  firms’ existing knowledge and 
experience, firms can reduce the possibility of  making mistakes in learning and using 
novel knowledge (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Vrontis et al., 2017; Zahra & George, 2002). 
However, there remains resource competition between familiar knowledge exploitation 
and novel knowledge exploration due to different organizational processes and cultures 
(March, 1991; O Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). Firms need to 
invest heavy resources to ensure the balance between these two learning behaviors (Zhao 
et al., 2016). In addition, due to high risk and high uncertainty, it is also difficult for firms 
to attract external funding to supplement resource constraints and when to apply novel 
knowledge in R&D activities (Czarnitzki, Hottenrott, & Thorwarth, 2010). As a 
consequence, firms tend to use their familiar knowledge to conduct technological R&D 
to obtain fast returns with lower uncertainty (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Levinthal & 
March, 1993; March, 1991), rather than developing new, efficient technological 
combinations with novel knowledge (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Lei et al., 1996). 
6.2.2 Public R&D Subsidy and Firms’ Exploratory Learning 
By joining the R&D subsidy programs, firms can be buffered by resources from 
governments (Jourdan & Kivleniece, 2017). Extant research suggests that resources 
including both generic and specialized resources have a profound impact on firms’ novel 
knowledge exploration (Hitt et al., 2004; Jiang et al., 2018), especially for firms in 
emerging economies (Li et al., 2013). Generic resources usually refer to finance and 
infrastructure etc., which do not need to adjust according to technological innovation 
and can apply to all knowledge acquisition processes (Lazzarini, 2015). Specialized 
resources are codified and tacit knowledge of  specific innovation activity, which depends 
on specific novel knowledge (Jiang et al., 2018; Teece, 1986). Studies have shown that 
specialized resources play a more prominent role in novel knowledge exploration to enter 
new technological fields (Kash & Rycroft, 2002; Mitchell, 1989). 
R&D subsidy programs are argued to mainly provide firms with generic financial 
resources but little specialized resources for novel knowledge exploration (Hitt et al., 
2004; Jiang et al., 2018; Sheng et al., 2011). However, this generic financial resource can 
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help firms overcome resource constraints and promote their external exchange of  
specialized resources (Jiang et al., 2018; Kim & Bettis, 2014; Lazzarini, 2015). For 
example, governmental resources can promote firms’ recruitment of  high-quality R&D 
employees as tacit knowledge carriers, which can enhance firm-level absorptive capacities 
(Afcha & Garcia-Quevedo, 2016) and promote firms’ novel knowledge exploration. The 
public funds can also help firms to ease resource competition between exploitative and 
exploratory learning behaviors (Cao, Gedajlovic, & Zhang, 2009; Mathews, 2002). Firms 
that receive public R&D subsidy can allocate sufficient budget for both learning activities 
(Sheng et al., 2011). In addition, R&D subsidy increases firms’ risk tolerance levels 
(Chapman & Hewitt-Dundas, 2018). This promotes firms to conduct more challenging 
research and development activities, which have higher uncertainty, and require more 
novel knowledge (Czarnitzki & Delanote, 2015; Hsu, Horng, & Hsueh, 2009). 
By joining public subsidy programs, firms can also obtain governmental 
endorsements. From the perspective of  institutional theory, the government is the tool 
to create competitive environments that benefit firms (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Especially 
for emerging economies, an unsound institutional environment reduces trust between 
organizations (Atuahene-Gima & Li, 2002). In this way, information transmitted through 
the government may be more reliable than information obtained in other ways (Luo, 
2003). Therefore, on the one hand, government endorsements release beneficial signals 
to the market and promote their access to external financing (Kleer, 2010; Wu, 2017; 
Zhou, Wu, & Li, 2019). On the other hand, government endorsements connect firms 
with other firms, which help firms learn and obtain key specialized resources and 
complementary knowledge that can promote firms’ exploratory learning (Amezcua et al., 
2013; Jiang et al., 2018). Furthermore, since China's top universities and research 
institutes are often publicly owned, government endorsements also promote formal 
partnerships between firms and universities and research institutions. This can provide 
firms with more opportunities to learn from universities and research institutions, and 
increase firms’ capabilities to adopt novel knowledge (Xu et al., 2014). 
According to the “experience-capacity” cycle model, firms need to allocate more 
resources to gain more direct experience and specialized resources for the change of  
technological focus by adopting novel knowledge (Kash & Rycroft, 2002). This may 
result in higher costs and greater risk. Public R&D subsidy can make up for the shortage 
of  resources and strengthen the relationship between firms and external partners to 
support firms in gaining access to resources, especially specialized resources. Thus, this 
will promote firms to change their technological focus and enter an entirely new 
technological field, which firms are not familiar with. Therefore, it is proposed that: 
Hypothesis 1 a: Participation in public R&D subsidy programs will facilitate firms' novel 
knowledge exploration behaviors. 
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Hypothesis 1 b: Participation in public R&D subsidy programs will encourage firms to 
change core technological focus. 
6.2.3 Difference between National R&D Subsidy and Provincial R&D Subsidy 
Different effects may exist between R&D subsidy programs of  Chinese central and 
local governments on firms’ novel knowledge exploration and further change of  the 
technological focus. The differences stem from the different degrees of  central and local 
governments’ administrative, economic and geographic proximity to local firms (Jiao et 
al., 2016; Qian & Roland, 1998; Zhou et al., 2018). The proximity implies central and 
local governments’ different functions and targets, interaction degree with local firms, 
speed of  response to local business needs, and policies and resource supplies (Nee, 1992; 
Qian & Weingast, 1997). 
The central government is argued to have broader responsibilities as well as strategic 
targets, and needs to allocate R&D resources nationwide (Pfeffer, 1972). Although the 
proximity to local firms is less, the central government has more generic financial 
resources. For example, China's banking industry is mostly under the control of  the 
central government (Shi, Markóczy, & Stan, 2014). Therefore, by participating in the 
central R&D subsidy programs, firms can often get more generic resources (Arnoldi & 
Villadsen, 2015; Zhou et al., 2018). The resource munificence helps to reduce firms’ 
dependence on external resources to a greater extent (Zheng et al., 2015) and further 
strengthen their capabilities of  the acquisition on specialized resources related to novel 
knowledge exploration (Jiang et al., 2018). For example, by joining a central R&D subsidy 
program, firms’ collaborations with higher-level research institutes can be facilitated 
(Hong & Su, 2013; Zheng et al., 2015) to acquire the necessary complementary 
knowledge for exploratory learning. In addition, participating in central programs will 
help to improve firms’ legitimacy nationwide and help firms to attract high-quality R&D 
talent. Extant studies have shown that accepting national R&D subsidies has significantly 
encouraged firms to attract and recruit R&D personnel with doctoral degrees (Afcha & 
Garcia-Quevedo, 2016). These can also enhance the capabilities of  exploratory learning. 
Although the generic resource provision is less than that of  the central government, 
local governments also have the power to allocate scarce and critical resources for the 
promotion of  firms’ technological innovations (Li & Zhao, 2015; Zhang et al., 2016). 
Valuable resources provided by local government can help firms to break resource 
constraints on novel knowledge exploration (Li & Zhao, 2015). Local governments also 
promote collaboration of  sponsored firms with other local firms and research institutes 
(Krug & Hendrischke, 2008; Marzucchi et al., 2015), helping firms to acquire specialized 
resources related to the novel knowledge exploration and learning. Therefore, this study 
proposes that: 
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Hypothesis 2 a: Participation in the central R&D subsidy programs can promote firms’ 
novel knowledge exploration behaviors. 
Hypothesis 2 b: Participation in the local R&D subsidy programs can promote firms’ 
novel knowledge exploration behaviors. 
To change firms’ technological focus and make them enter new fields with novel 
knowledge exploration, the related specialized resources are the most important (Kash 
& Rycroft, 2002). Local government, due to its greater geographic proximity, has more 
interactions and information exchange with local firms (Jiao et al., 2016; Qian & Weingast, 
1997). This close interaction helps to reduce information asymmetry (Adler & Kwon, 
2002), which enables local governments to understand the actual needs of  firms on 
exploratory learning and subsequent change of  technological focus. Thus, local 
governments can better help firms with exploratory learning by providing sophisticated 
specialized resources with greater specificity and immediacy (Krug & Hendrischke, 2008; 
Nee, 1992; Prud'Homme, 1995). 
Local government also has greater economic proximity to firms (Walder, 1995). 
Local governments can experience directly the benefits of  the development of  firms 
within their jurisdiction (Walder, 1995). Thus, local governments have more incentives 
to promote and maintain the sustainable development of  the local economy. As a result, 
local governments emphasize firm-level industrial upgrading by changing firms’ 
technological focus (Nahm, 2017; Zhou et al., 2018), in order to serve local economic 
development. Especially in China, local governments are playing an increasingly 
important role in industrial upgrading (Boeing, 2016; Springut, Schlaikjer, & Chen, 2011). 
At the same time, local governments have greater administrative proximity to local 
firms. Local firms are directly affected by the regulations and policies of  local 
governments (Trounstine, 2009; Zhou et al., 2018). To explore novel knowledge for the 
change of  technological focus, firms may confront higher uncertainty concerning the 
need for regulatory approval (Zhang, Tan, & Wong, 2015). For example, the major 
changes to existing producing processes and products require new permit applications. 
By participating in local R&D subsidy programs, firms can establish ties with local 
governments. The institutional flexibility and fast response can facilitate the adjustment 
of  local government regulations and policies for the reduction of  uncertainty during 
firms’ radical changes in R&D activities (Zhang et al., 2015), which will underpin changes 
in firms’ technological focus via novel knowledge exploration. 
In contrast, policies and regulations from the central government cannot have a 
direct influence on firms. The central government focuses more on a macro perspective 
and takes the overall strategic plan view for national innovation and development. 
Therefore, the central government usually does not interact closely with local firms 
(Zheng et al., 2015). As a result, the central government fails to meet the specific needs 
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of  firms in terms of  changing technological focus as quickly and accurately as local 
governments (Prud'Homme, 1995). At the same time, national R&D subsidy programs 
often select technology-leading firms to undertake major national R&D projects 
(Altuzarra, 2010; Blanes & Busom, 2004). These firms tend to have higher technical 
rigidity and it is difficult to change their main technological focus. Although the firms 
actively adopt novel knowledge, the purpose of  the exploration of  novel knowledge 
maybe just to assist in strengthening the existing technologies. 
In addition, firms need to reshape R&D processes and R&D paths and reconfigure 
resources in order to change technological focus. Excessive generic resources from 
governments may also strengthen firms' dependence and limit firms’ flexibility to adjust 
the R&D process to adapt to industrial technology changes (Zhao et al., 2016). Existing 
studies show that the higher the level of  government to access resources from, the tighter 
the restrictions on firms’ reconstruction of  the R&D process (Li et al., 2018). Therefore, 
although national R&D subsidies may promote firms’ exploratory learning, they cannot 
further promote firms’ technological focus changing by adopting such novel knowledge. 
This study proposes that: 
Hypothesis 3 a: Participation in the central R&D subsidy programs may inhibit the 
change of  firms’ technological focus. 
Hypothesis 3 b: Participation in the local R&D subsidy programs can encourage the 
change of  firms’ technological focus. 
6.3 Data, Methods and Measures 
6.3.1 Data 
This study employs an exclusive panel dataset from a survey of  firms in 
manufacturing sectors conducted by the Jiangsu Science and Technology Department, 
covering the period from 2010 to 2014. This set of  data is used to evaluate the effects of  
R&D subsidy in Jiangsu Province only through to 2014, which happened to be the tenth 
anniversary since Jiangsu reformed the R&D subsidy policy. Up to 2014, this dataset is 
comprised of  firms’ basic information, main R&D and financial data from 7,928 firms. 
This study also collects patent data from 2,024 manufacturing firms in Jiangsu with the 
period from 2006 to 2016 from the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) website. 
This study subsequently illustrates technological development roadmaps of  each firm 
drawn from 4-digit IPC (International Patent Classification) codes, at subclasses level, of  
the patents. IPC code provides a hierarchical system similar to bibliographic retrieval, 
which classifies patents according to their technical fields (Park & Yoon, 2017; 
Verhoeven, Bakker, & Veugelers, 2016). Subclasses further define technologies with the 
heterogeneity of  process, structure, and functionality (Kim et al., 2011). Existing studies 
use subclasses of  IPC codes to illustrate the trends of  firms’ core technological changes 
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(Park & Yoon, 2017) and capture the development of  core technologies and other 
relevant capabilities of  firms (Ruiz-Navas & Miyazaki, 2017). 
The firm and patent databases are combined according to the firm name. This study 
further retains the firms that have not received any R&D subsidies in 2010-2014 and the 
firms that only participate in central or local R&D subsidy programs with the sponsored 
period from 2010 to 2014. Innofund provided by the central government is selected as the 
focus central R&D subsidy program. This study also selected the corresponding local 
technological innovation fund that has similar screening criteria as the innofund. According 
to the Handbook of  Policies towards Firm's Technological Innovation of  Jiangsu, the aim of  both 
aforementioned central and local funds is to support the development of  high-tech 
industries and upgrading of  traditional industries, through promoting firms’ innovation 
capabilities. 
The initial database of  this study contains 1424 firms with 6171 firm-year 
observations, among which 395 firms have participated in subsidy programs. 129 firms 
have only joined the local R&D subsidy programs, while 266 firms have joined the central 
R&D subsidy programs. To control the potential selective bias, this study employs 
propensity score matching (PSM) (more details of  the PSM process are shown in PSM 
sampling in the chapter appendix). Based on the matching results of  the base period, the 
corresponding subsequent data in the follow-up period are supplemented, and the final 
PSM sampling comprises 790 firms with 2960 firm-year observations. The industrial 
distribution of  these firms (based on the 2-digit industrial code 12 ) and regional 
distributions can be found in Table 6A.3 and 6A.4 in the appendix, respectively. 
6.3.3 Method 
In this study, similar to the study of  Chapter 5, Cox regression is adopted as the 
main empirical technique. Cox regression does not require any restrictions on the baseline 
risk function, and it does not require additional assumptions about the baseline risk over 
time (Cox, 1975). The timelines in which each firm employs novel knowledge or changes 
the technological focus may not coincide during the observation period, therefore, Cox 
regression could be appropriate. Since the point in time when novel knowledge usage of  
different firms overlap, meaning that multiple individuals have the same failure time, the 
Efron algorithm which can gain more accurate results will be employed (Cleves et al., 
2008). 
6.3.4 Variables Definition 
Dependent variables 
Following the measurement of  "novel technology" in the research of  Ahuja and 
                                                             
12 Industrial Classification for National Economic Activities (GB T4754-2011) 
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Lampert (2001), this study measures the firms’ novel knowledge exploration behaviors 
and technological focus change. According to each firm’s technological roadmaps, if  the 
main IPC codes that have not appeared in the past four years show up in at least one 
patent applied by the firm in a certain year, it can be defined as firms’ novel knowledge 
exploration (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). The dependent variable "novel knowledge 
exploration (NewTech_App)" takes a value of  1, otherwise 0. The reason for using a 4-
year interval is that even if  the firm may have used the same technology 4 years ago, 
technological knowledge tends to depreciate or become obsolete over time. Therefore, 
technology being idle for the long term can significantly reduce the firm's knowledge 
stock (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001). In existing research on technology-intensive industries, 
a four- to five-year time window has also been used to assess the validity of  knowledge 
stocks for specific technologies (Ahuja, 2000; Stuart & Podolny, 1996). If  the number of  
patent applications with new main IPC codes for two consecutive years, it is regarded 
that this firm has changed its core technological focus (NewTech_Turn) (Li, 2011, 2009). 
According to event definition, a total of  697 firms adopt novel knowledge during the 
observation period, and 467 firms changed their core technological focus in the PSM 
sampling. 
Independent Variables 
This study set three dummy variables as the independent variables, which are: 
participation in public R&D subsidy programs (Public_project), local programs (Local_only) 
and central programs (Central_only). If  a firm participates in local or central programs, 
Public_project valued 1, otherwise 0. Considering the governmental levels of  R&D 
programs, if  a firm only participates in local programs, Local_only valued 1, otherwise 0. 
Similarly, if  a firm only participates in central programs, Central_only valued 1, otherwise 
0. 
Control Variables 
The novel knowledge exploration and the change of  technological focus can be 
influenced by firms’ own learning behaviors (Clarysse et al., 2009). Thus, this study first 
controls for the three main learning behaviors of  firms, namely congenital learning, inter-
organizational learning and experiential learning (Clarysse et al., 2009; Roper & Hewitt-
Dundas, 2014).  
Extant studies suggest that congenital learning has a close correlation with firm-
level knowledge stock (Roper & Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). The knowledge stock is reflected 
in the technological accumulation of  firms (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Park & Park, 2006) 
and in the reserve of  talent as a carrier of  tacit knowledge (Bontis, 1998; Roper & Hewitt-
Dundas, 2014). With reference to the relevant studies, this study controls for the 
knowledge stock (Know_stock) by adopting firms’ patent stock. The patent stock of  a firm 
at t is the depreciated sum of  firms’ own patents until t-1, plus the non-depreciated patent 
PhD Dissertation, Yuchen GAO 
127 
applications in t with depreciation rate 0.15 (Cappelen et al., 2012). This study also 
controls for the ratio of  employees with a high educational level (Hi_edu_emp), which is 
measured by the proportion of  employees with a bachelor's degree or above in the total 
number of  employees (Afcha & Garcia-Quevedo, 2016). 
For inter-organizational learning, this study mainly controls for firms’ R&D 
collaborations with universities and public research institutes. The variable “Tech_coll” is 
measured by the natural logarithm of  R&D expenditures of  firms invested in the 
collaborations with universities and public research institutes (Carboni, 2012; Gök & 
Edler, 2012; Roper & Hewitt-Dundas, 2014). 
Experiential learning, in the studies of  R&D subsidy, may lead to changes in firm 
R&D behaviors and enable firms to reconfigure R&D-related resources (Clarysse et al., 
2009). That is, firms may embed the prior experience of  undertaking governmental R&D 
subsidies programs in the R&D process (Kotabe, Jiang, & Murray, 2011; Luo, 2003). For 
example, Clarysse et al. (2009) measure experiential learning by the number of  R&D 
subsidy programs that firms have joined before. Therefore, this study set the control 
variable of  experiential learning (Pre_subsidy) measured by a dummy of whether the 
company has experience in the participation in governmental R&D subsidy programs in 
the three years prior to the observation period. 
Besides the above three learning behaviors, basic information of  firms is also 
controlled for in this study. The study controls for firm size (Firm_Size) and firm age 
(Firm_Age), capital intensity (Cap_int) and the value of  export (Export). This study also 
controls for the ratio of  employees with a high educational level (Hi_edu_emp), which is 
measured by the proportion of  employees with a bachelor's degree or above in the total 
number of  employees (Afcha & Garcia-Quevedo, 2016). This study adopts a dummy 
variable ‘RD_Dpart’ to delegate that firms have their own R&D institutions, such as 
testing base, R&D center and laboratories to control for R&D capabilities (Hussinger, 
2008). Whether the firms are engaged in the high-tech manufacture sectors (Hi_Tech_ind) 
is also controlled. This study also sets 28 industry dummies (Industry_Dummy) based on 
2-digit industrial codes (Table 6A.3); three regional dummies (Region_Dummy) based on 
south, north and central areas of  Jiangsu; five year dummies (Year_Dummy) are also set 
due to the different annual macroeconomic environments. The statistical description and 
correlation matrix based on PSM sampling are shown in Table 6.1. The correlation 
between “Nation_only” and “Public_project” with the value 0.733, means that more R&D 
subsidy recipient firms in my samples participate in the central government program. 
This study conducts a multi-collinearity test based on OLS. The results show that the 
VIF values of  the selected variables are acceptable, indicating no serious multi-collinearity 
problem. 
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Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics 
    1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  
1  NewTech_Turn 1.000                
2  NewTech_Add 0.118* 1.000               
3  Public_project 0.052* 0.017  1.000              
4  Province_only 0.021 0.011  0.436* 1.000             
5  Nation_only 0.040* 0.009  0.733* -0.292* 1.000            
6  Know_stock -0.064* 0.041* 0.036  0.206* -0.117* 1.000           
7  Hi_edu_emp -0.011  -0.003  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.005  1.000          
8  Tech_Coll 0.044* -0.006  0.120* 0.271* -0.078* 0.086* -0.002  1.000         
9  Pre_subsidy -0.087* -0.160* -0.116* 0.044* -0.157* 0.015  -0.009  0.019  1.000        
10  Firm_Age -0.110* 0.012  -0.002  0.127* -0.098* 0.087* -0.020  0.102* 0.053* 1.000       
11  Firm_Size -0.052* -0.015  -0.061* 0.386* -0.357* 0.342* -0.163* 0.251* 0.007  0.244* 1.000      
12  Hi_Tech_ind -0.043* -0.013  -0.009  0.018  -0.022  -0.042* 0.009  0.021  0.031  -0.052* -0.060* 1.000     
13  Export -0.020  0.006  -0.041* 0.187* -0.185* 0.174* -0.023  0.055* 0.000  0.088* 0.416* -0.018  1.000    
14  Cap_int -0.021  -0.029  -0.013  0.201* -0.166* 0.048* 0.152* 0.097* -0.027  0.007  0.140* -0.067* 0.166* 1.000   
15  RD_dpart -0.043* -0.001  -0.018  0.073* -0.075* 0.069* -0.034  0.113* 0.055* 0.154* 0.175* -0.128* 0.050* 0.060* 1.000  
  N 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 2,960 
  Mean 0.158  0.635  0.477  0.148  0.329  39.949  0.217  2.077 0.077  2.468  5.376  0.284  4.708  4.970  0.905  
  Std.Dev 0.365  0.481  0.500  0.355  0.470  77.806  2.005  3.165  0.267  0.524  1.123  0.451  4.371  1.163  0.293  
* p<0.05 
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6.4. Empirical Result 
6.4.1 Influence of  Public R&D Subsidy on Firms’ novel knowledge exploration 
As shown in Table 6.2, in general, the results illustrate no significant influence of 
participation in public R&D subsidy programs on firms’ novel knowledge exploration 
behaviors (Model 2). After distinguishing the level of programs, neither local nor central 
R&D subsidy has significant effects on firms’ novel knowledge exploration (Model 3 and 
Model 4). 
As to firms’ congenital learning behaviors (Model 1), firms’ highly educated human 
resource has a negative influence on firms' novel knowledge exploration at the 5% 
significance level. The results show that, when firms’ highly educated employee ratio 
increases by 1%, there is a decrease of 13.5% in firms’ novel knowledge exploration 
(Model 1). As to inter-organizational learning behavior, the variable selected in this study 
has no significant impact on the firms' novel knowledge exploration. In terms of firms’ 
experiential learning, firms that have participated in public subsidy programs have a 65.29% 
lower probability of novel knowledge exploration than other firms at 1% significant level 
(Model 1). 
At the same time, firms involved in high-tech manufacturing sectors are less likely 
to learn and adopt novel knowledge. Larger-scale firms also have lower propensities to 
explore novel knowledge, while longer-established firms have greater incentives to 
explore and adopt novel knowledge. 
  
PhD Dissertation, Yuchen GAO 
130 
Table 6.2 Cox Regression Model (Event: Novel Knowledge Exploration) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Know_stock -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Hi_edu_emp -0.145** -0.142** -0.142** -0.146** -0.143** 
 (0.061) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) 
Tech_Coll 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.020 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Pre_subsidy -1.058*** -1.079*** -1.055*** -1.082*** -1.081*** 
 (0.177) (0.180) (0.177) (0.180) (0.180) 
Firm_Age 0.182** 0.180** 0.182** 0.180** 0.179** 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
Firm_Size -0.156*** -0.162*** -0.153*** -0.166*** -0.163*** 
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) 
Hi_Tech_ind -0.328** -0.332** -0.325** -0.337** -0.333** 
 (0.158) (0.159) (0.159) (0.160) (0.160) 
Export 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Cap_int -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
RD_dpart -0.114 -0.117 -0.113 -0.118 -0.117 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.119) (0.118) (0.118) 
Public_project  -0.072    
  (0.079)    
Province_only   -0.045  -0.064 
   (0.126)  (0.128) 
Nation_only    -0.067 -0.075 
    (0.090) (0.091) 
N 1239 1239 1239 1239 1239 
Firms 765 765 765 765 765 
Log pseudolikelihood -3724.1067 -3723.7306 -3724.0464 -3723.8443 -3723.7277 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: 1) Robust Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level; 2) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; 3) Efron method for ties; 4) All models include 
a set of  industrial, regional and year dummies (not reported).  
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6.4.2 Influence of  Public R&D Subsidy on Changing of  Firms’ Core Industrial 
Technologies 
As shown in Table 6.3, in general, the results illustrate that firms participating in 
public R&D subsidy programs have a higher probability (30.34%) of changing their 
technological focus than other firms (Model 7) at 1% significance level. After 
distinguishing the level of programs, this significant positive influence can be observed 
when firms only participated in local R&D subsidy programs. Firms are 44.05% more 
likely to change their technological focus than others when participating in local 
programs (Model 8), at the 1% significance level. No such facilitation effect can be found 
when firms only receive national R&D subsidies (Model 9). 
As to firms’ congenital learning behavior (Model 6), firms’ knowledge stock has a 
negative effect on the firms' changing of its technological focus at the 5% significance 
level. When firms’ knowledge stock increases by 1%, there is a decrease of 0.30% in firms’ 
changing of its technological focus. Inter-organizational learning, i.e., collaboration with 
universities, has no effect on firms’ technological focus change. In terms of firms' 
experiential learning, firms that have participated in public subsidy programs have a 78.97% 
lower probability of changing their technological focus than other firms at 1% significant 
level (Model 6). 
At the same time, firms involved in high-tech manufacturing sectors are also less 
likely to change their technological focus. The probability is 31.82% lower than those in 
low-tech manufacturing sectors. 
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Table 6.3 Cox Regression Model (Event: Firms’ Technological Focus Change) 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Know_stock -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Hi_edu_emp -0.085 -0.099 -0.098 -0.088 -0.104 
 (0.052) (0.066) (0.061) (0.056) (0.069) 
Tech_Coll 0.021 0.015 0.014 0.020 0.012 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Pre_subsidy -1.559*** -1.472*** -1.570*** -1.504*** -1.500*** 
 (0.354) (0.358) (0.351) (0.357) (0.355) 
Firm_Age -0.008 -0.010 -0.014 -0.007 -0.013 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.086) (0.088) (0.086) 
Firm_Size -0.091 -0.068 -0.126** -0.063 -0.095 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.062) (0.062) 
Hi_Tech_ind -0.383** -0.378** -0.404** -0.370** -0.392** 
 (0.184) (0.184) (0.187) (0.184) (0.187) 
Export 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Cap_int -0.037 -0.034 -0.055 -0.028 -0.046 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) 
RD_dpart 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.083 0.085 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.151) (0.150) (0.151) 
Public_project  0.265***    
  (0.101)    
Province_only   0.365**  0.414*** 
   (0.154)  (0.159) 
Nation_only    0.155 0.202* 
    (0.109) (0.113) 
N 1521 1521 1521 1521 1521 
Firms 776 776 776 776 776 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-2626.8988 -2623.3996 -2624.2759 -2625.9329 -2622.7069 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: 1) Robust Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level; 2) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; 3) Efron method for ties; 4) All models include 
a set of  industrial, regional and year dummies (not reported).  
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6.4.3 Robustness Check and alternative explanation 
Robustness Check 
In the robustness check, this study employs a cross-sectional probit regression with 
controlling industries and regions in 2011, as time lags exist in the effectiveness of R&D 
subsidies. At the same time, to control the potential endogeneity issue of R&D subsidy, 
we also set an instrumental variable for the independent variables and re-run the probit 
regression. Following the suggestions of Guo et al. (2016), the ratio of total investment 
in fixed assets made by local governments over the total GDP at the city level is employed 
as the instrumental variable. 
The results from the probit regression (see Table 6.4) are qualitatively similar to the 
results obtained from the Cox regression. Participating in public subsidy programs has 
no significant impact on firms’ novel knowledge exploration (Model 11, 12, 13). While 
receiving public R&D subsidy, local R&D subsidy especially has a significant positive 
impact on firms’ technological focus changing (Models 14, 16), but no facilitation effects 
can be observed by receiving central funds (Model 18). After adding the instrumental 
variable, the significant positive effects of general and local R&D subsidy programs on 
firm-level exploratory learning are supported as well (Model 15, 17). The positive effect 
of national subsidy programs is also rejected by the probit regression with instrumental 
variables (Model 19). These results provide additional support for our empirical results. 
Alternative explanations 
One potential alternative explanation is that firms may enjoy much cheaper 
resources provided by the government on R&D activities. By helping firms to overcome 
resource constraints and reduce the risk, resource enhancement plays a more critical role 
in novel knowledge exploration and technological focus change, rather than on 
organizational learning. If this is the case, regardless of the external learning environment 
of firms, participating in the R&D subsidy programs will promote firms’ novel knowledge 
exploration and technological focus change. In Jiangsu Province, the regional innovation 
system is more developed in Su’nan (the south region of Jiangsu) area with many more 
universities and firms. This provides more learning opportunities and a better learning 
environment for firms in this region, rather than those in Su’bei (the north region of 
Jiangsu) and Su’zhong (the central region of Jiangsu) areas. Thus, sub-group Cox 
regression based on regions has been carried out. The results are shown in Table 6.5. 
Participating in the local R&D subsidy programs has a significant effect on firms’ 
technological focus change, enhancing the probability with 59.36% (Model 22). However, 
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no similar effect can be found on firms located in Su’bei and Su’zhong areas. Therefore, 
the hypotheses from the learning perspective are supported. 
Another potential alternative explanation is that firms may seek to satisfy the 
requirements of the government to explore the novel knowledge and change 
technological focus for acquiring R&D subsidy. Several Chinese public R&D subsidy 
programs will require target firms to adopt novel knowledge in order to promote 
industrial upgrading. If this is the case, the firm may return to the familiar technological 
track after the technological focus change. To illustrate this hypothesis, we define the 
event variable of Cox regression as whether the firm returns to the familiar technological 
track after changing the technological focus. The results are shown in Table 6.6. 
Participating in local R&D subsidy programs will not increase the probability of the firm 
returning to the familiar technological track. Therefore, the change of R&D behaviors 
after receiving the local R&D subsidy can be better explained by the learning perspective, 
rather than the agency risk perspective. 
However, it is also found that firms participating in central R&D subsidy programs 
were nearly twice as likely to return to the familiar technological tracks as other firms, at 
the 1% significance level (Model 25). In addition, firms with prior experience in receiving 
R&D subsidy have nearly three times higher probability of returning to the original 
technological tracks after changing their technical focus. The results imply that firms 
participating in central R&D subsidy programs may have higher agency risk. 
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Table 6.4 Probit estimates for the effect of  R&D subsidy in 2011 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 
Know_stock 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Hi_edu_emp -0.089** -0.093** -0.089** -0.114 -0.060 -0.149 -0.187 -0.101 -0.079 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.133) (0.121) (0.174) (0.190) (0.104) (0.061) 
Tech_Coll -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.069*** -0.010 -0.059** 0.003 0.029* 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) (0.016) 
Pre_subsidy -1.301*** -1.302*** -1.308*** -0.169 0.332 -0.206 -0.079 -0.205 -0.464* 
 (0.335) (0.335) (0.336) (0.333) (0.303) (0.348) (0.311) (0.338) (0.250) 
Firm_Age 0.113 0.112 0.113 -0.091 -0.079 -0.095 -0.115 -0.081 -0.009 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.117) (0.098) (0.117) (0.105) (0.117) (0.093) 
Firm_Size -0.012 -0.022 -0.014 -0.080 0.060 -0.160** -0.347*** -0.083 -0.366*** 
 (0.073) (0.075) (0.075) (0.077) (0.079) (0.078) (0.086) (0.078) (0.061) 
Hi_Tech_ind -0.144 -0.154 -0.141 -0.075 -0.203 -0.143 -0.509* -0.047 -0.204 
 (0.295) (0.296) (0.294) (0.305) (0.253) (0.318) (0.307) (0.303) (0.234) 
Export -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 0.007 0.009 0.004 -0.006 0.007 -0.015 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) 
Cap_int -0.006 -0.011 -0.008 -0.014 0.059 -0.049 -0.143** -0.020 -0.193*** 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.066) (0.053) (0.065) (0.063) (0.066) (0.047) 
RD_dpart -0.250 -0.250 -0.252 0.193 0.180 0.191 0.200 0.173 -0.034 
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.173) (0.149) (0.175) (0.158) (0.174) (0.144) 
Public_project 0.030   0.279** 1.997***     
 (0.121)   (0.132) (0.289)     
Province_only  0.079    0.562*** 2.707***   
  (0.187)    (0.200) (0.804)   
Nation_only   -0.003     0.054 -2.342*** 
   (0.138)     (0.147) (0.132) 
_cons 0.043 0.114 0.069 -0.350 -1.531*** 0.390 2.366** -0.261 3.822*** 
 (0.732) (0.733) (0.751) (0.697) (0.564) (0.714) (0.974) (0.732) (0.568) 
N 497 497 497 468 468 468 468 468 468 
Note: 1) Standard errors are in parentheses; 2) * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; 3) All models include a set of  industrial and regional 
dummies (not reported). 
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Table 6.5 Sub-group Cox regression based on regions 
 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 
 Su’nan Su’zhong 
&Su’bei 
Su’nan Su’zhong 
&Su’bei 
Know_stock -0.000 -0.000 -0.003* -0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Hi_edu_emp -0.147 -0.151*** -0.037 -0.519 
 (0.091) (0.049) (0.104) (0.684) 
Tech_Coll 0.019 0.037 0.018 0.046 
 (0.016) (0.027) (0.020) (0.030) 
Pre_subsidy -0.784*** -2.116*** -1.353*** -2.213*** 
 (0.198) (0.440) (0.402) (0.783) 
Firm_Age 0.266*** 0.036 0.064 -0.287* 
 (0.093) (0.136) (0.104) (0.162) 
Firm_Size -0.148** -0.259*** -0.046 -0.206* 
 (0.058) (0.101) (0.076) (0.115) 
Hi_Tech_ind -0.349* -0.468 -0.449** -0.195 
 (0.184) (0.358) (0.208) (0.474) 
Export 0.007 0.012 0.009 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.022) (0.016) (0.024) 
Cap_int -0.031 -0.000 -0.046 -0.144 
 (0.041) (0.095) (0.053) (0.122) 
RD_dpart -0.167 0.142 0.052 -0.077 
 (0.126) (0.357) (0.169) (0.374) 
Province_only -0.041 -0.205 0.466** 0.430 
 (0.156) (0.231) (0.190) (0.326) 
Nation_only -0.062 -0.126 0.191 0.284 
 (0.107) (0.177) (0.137) (0.199) 
N 880 359 1095 426 
Firms  544 221 554 222 
Log pseudolikelihood -2501.814 -820.9780 -1742.9326 -595.9633 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: 1) Robust Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level; 2) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; 3) Efron method for ties; 4) All models include 
a set of  industrial, regional and year dummies (not reported).  
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Table 6.6 Return to the familiar technological track 
 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 
Know_stock -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Hi_edu_emp -0.556 -0.719 -0.736 
 (0.419) (0.473) (0.479) 
Tech_Coll 0.013 0.008 0.007 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
Pre_subsidy 0.829*** 1.058*** 1.059*** 
 (0.214) (0.231) (0.231) 
Firm_Age -0.045 -0.064 -0.064 
 (0.118) (0.120) (0.119) 
Firm_Size 0.073 0.181** 0.176** 
 (0.079) (0.081) (0.082) 
Hi_Tech_ind -0.207 -0.173 -0.178 
 (0.242) (0.240) (0.242) 
Export -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Cap_int -0.103* -0.068 -0.070 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) 
RD_dpart -0.095 -0.101 -0.104 
 (0.191) (0.186) (0.186) 
Province_only -0.114  0.074 
 (0.210)  (0.219) 
Nation_only  0.732*** 0.742*** 
  (0.149) (0.154) 
N 2080 2080 2080 
Firms 785 785 785 
Log pseudolikelihood -1605.3688 -1593.1108 -1593.0541 
Prob > chi2 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: 1) Robust Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the firm level; 2) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; 3) Efron method for ties; 4) All models include 
a set of  industrial, regional and year dummies (not reported). 
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Table 6.7 The conclusion of the empirical results of Chapter 6 
Hypotheses  Empirical 
results  
Hypothesis 1 a: Participation in public R&D subsidy programs 
will facilitate firms' novel knowledge exploration behaviors 
Not supported  
(insignificant) 
Hypothesis 1 b: Participation in public R&D subsidy programs 
will encourage firms to change core technological focus. 
Supported 
Hypothesis 2 a: Participation in the central R&D subsidy 
programs can promote firms’ novel knowledge exploration 
behaviors. 
Not supported  
(insignificant) 
Hypothesis 2 b: Participation in the local R&D subsidy 
programs can promote firms’ novel knowledge exploration 
behaviors. 
Not supported  
(insignificant) 
Hypothesis 3 a: Participation in the central R&D subsidy 
programs may inhibit the change of  firms’ technological focus. 
Not supported  
(insignificant) 
Hypothesis 3 b: Participation in the local R&D subsidy 
programs can promote the change of  firms’ technological focus. 
Supported  
6.5 Discussion 
By using Cox regression based on propensity score matching (PSM), it is found that 
firms participating in public R&D subsidy programs have a higher probability of  
changing their core technological focus with novel knowledge than other firms. 
Furthermore, R&D subsidies from local governments have significant effects on firms’ 
core technological focus change, while those from the central government have no such 
effects. The results of  this study can contribute to current public R&D subsidy literature 
by testing the effect of  public support on firms’ exploratory learning behaviors. This 
study also expands the application of  learning theory in R&D subsidy research by 
exploring the extent to which firms use novel knowledge. In addition, this study deepens 
the understanding of  R&D subsidies by differentiating the effects of  sponsored 
programs from central and local governments. These findings can provide practical 
enlightenment for both the governments and firms, especially for those seeking 
technological upgrading. 
In this chapter, we explored the influence of  participating in public R&D subsidy 
programs on firms’ exploratory learning behaviors. The empirical results show that 
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public R&D subsidies have no significant effect on firms’ general behaviors of  novel 
knowledge exploration, but have a positive facilitation effect on firms’ changing their 
technological focus by adopting novel knowledge. We further distinguish the different 
effects of  R&D subsidy programs of  local and central governments. Our results show 
that participating in local R&D subsidy programs can significantly increase the 
probability of  firms changing their technological focus, but such a facilitation effect 
cannot be found with participation in the national programs. 
Our empirical results contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we 
extend the understanding of  public R&D subsidy from the learning perspective, which 
strengthens the theoretical depth in the related research field. The empirical results show 
that the firms’ existing knowledge stock, such as extant highly educated human resources, 
has a significant negative effect on their novel knowledge exploration and the change of 
firm-level technological focus, even though the firms are sponsored by governments. 
Especially in changing technological focus, firms with higher knowledge stocks have 
stronger rigidity in their existing technologies, which leads firms to rely more on the 
existing technological trajectories (March, 1991). Therefore, firms with higher knowledge 
stocks find it more difficult to change their technological focus. Our results also indicate 
that prior experience of  participating in public subsidy programs has a significant 
negative impact on firms’ novel knowledge exploration and the change of technological 
focus. With previous experience of  working with government, firms may become 
increasingly dependent on governments and regard the certifications from governments 
as the most crucial task. Thereby, the motivation for undertaking R&D with novel 
knowledge and further changing technological focus is reduced (Kotabe et al., 2011). This 
echoes and reinforces the arguments of  Clarysse et al. (2009). 
Second, our study differentiates the effects of  R&D subsidy from the central and 
local governments on firms’ learning behaviors. From the perspectives of  the types of  
providing resources and the proximity to local firms, it is argued that central government 
is more likely to subsidize firms with “can be observed” advantages to undertake R&D 
programs with explicit and concrete targets in order to satisfy national S&T strategy 
demands (Wang et al., 2017). In other words, participation in programs of  central 
government may restrict the directions of  firms’ technological development (Grodal, 
Gotsopoulos, & Suarez, 2015), even though firms sponsored by more generic resources 
can be better at innovation in frontier technological fields as well as sales of  new products 
(Li et al., 2018; Zhou et al., 2018). Thus, the flexibility is less in reshaping the R&D 
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process and reconfiguring related resources with participation in programs of  central 
governments (Li et al., 2018). Firms are more likely to innovate on the existing 
technological directions, than change the technological focus. In contrast, with lower 
information asymmetry and higher interest alignments with local firms, local 
governments can create a more stable environment for firms’ exploratory learning, 
technological focus changing and technological upgrading. This supports the argument 
of  Zhang et al. (2015). These arguments provide a new perspective for R&D subsidy 
studies and expand the strategic research related to the government-industry relationship. 
Third, this study further unpacks the “black-box” of  R&D subsidy and 
complements existing relevant studies in the context of  China. This study tests the effect 
of  participation in R&D subsidy programs on Chinese firms’ learning behaviors. 
Conventional studies argue that Chinese firms may simply seek economic returns or 
quick exploitation on familiar knowledge, especially with public funds (Guan & Yam, 
2015). However, our results indicate that Chinese firms increasingly emphasize the 
exploration and adoption of novel knowledge by raising awareness of the importance of 
innovation-driven development. As a result, Chinese firms have strong motivations in 
novel knowledge exploration to ensure the success of R&D activities, regardless of 
whether receiving public subsidies or not. At the same time, the R&D subsidy still 
facilitates change in firms’ technological focus for industrial upgrading, which has higher 
uncertainty and risk. 
6.6 Appendix 
6.6.1 PSM sampling 
On the basis of  this sample, the study takes the firms’ first year of  receiving R&D 
subsidy as the baseline period and adopts the propensity score matching (PSM) to 
constructed PSM sampling to eliminate selective bias. The treatment variable of  PSM in 
this study is a dummy variable that is assigned score 1 if  a firm has participated in local 
or central R&D subsidy programs during the base period, otherwise 0. A set of  covariates 
is selected according to more technology-related screening criteria of  R&D subsidy 
programs. 
We adopt a dummy variable ‘RD_Dpart’ to denote that firms have their own R&D 
institutions, such as a testing base, R&D center and laboratories to control for R&D 
capabilities. We also control for the value of  exports (Export) as export-oriented firms 
are assumed to be more innovative so as to cope better with international competition. 
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Capital intensity (Cap_int) is used to measure the financial status of  firms. Basic firm-
level information including firm size (Firm_Size) and firm age (Firm_Age) are also 
controlled for. Moreover, we restrict the time effect by adding in time dummy variables, 
ensuring that firms in two comparing groups have the same base period. Several industrial 
dummy variables according to the industrial distributions are also set. In addition, the 
high-tech manufacture sectors (Hi_Tech_ind) defined by the National Bureau of  Statistics 
are also controlled.  
Table 6A.1 presents the results of  the probit estimation using the full sample in the 
base period to estimate propensity scores (Model A1). 1-1 nearest neighborhood 
matching (1-1 NNM) without replacement is performed to identify the control group of  
firms. Meanwhile, we use a caliper with a pre-specified tolerance as 0.02 to avoid “bad” 
matches. Based on the PSM sample, we re-estimate the propensity scores, the result of  
which is presented in Table 6A.1 (Model A2). As shown in Table 6A.1, no single covariate 
remains significant and the pseudo-R2 drops sharply from 0.081 to 0.006 after matching 
on the base period. This means that the systematic differences in the distribution of  
covariates between the treatment and the control groups have been removed from our 
PSM sample. 
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Table 6A.1 The first-step Probit regression for PSM 
 Model A1 Model A2 
 Pre-matching Post-matching 
Hi_Tech_ind -0.119 -0.078 
 (0.120) (0.180) 
RD_dpart 0.160* 0.066 
 (0.087) (0.127) 
Firm_Size -0.131*** -0.002 
 (0.030) (0.052) 
Firm_Age 0.070 -0.006 
 (0.053) (0.086) 
Cap_int 0.078*** -0.045 
 (0.026) (0.043) 
Export -0.014* -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.012) 
_cons 0.150 0.174 
 (0.433) (0.733) 
N 1424 790 
Firms 1424 790 
Log pseudolikelihood -1287.3858 -761.4030 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.9998 
Pseudo R2 0.081 0.006 
Notes: (1) Standard errors in parentheses; (2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; (3) 
All models include a set of  industrial and year dummies (not reported) 
We also provide a balance test for the means of  covariates between the treatment 
and control groups (see Table 6A.2). According to the t-test statistic and the 
corresponding p-value on mean differences for covariates, the means of  covariates are 
balanced between the treatment and control groups. In addition, the mean standardized 
bias (MSB) drops sharply after matching, which suggests that the matching is successful. 
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Table 6A.2 Balance test for PSM 
  Means t-test MSB (%) 
Covariates  Treatment  Control  t-Stat p>t Before Match After Match 
Hi_Tech_ind 0.234  0.244  -0.41 0.683 9.8 -2.4 
RD_dpart 0.860  0.875  -0.77 0.441 5.1 -4.3 
Firm_Size 5.257  5.288  -0.46 0.642 -35.4 -2.7 
Firm_Age 2.366  2.364  0.06 0.955 1.5 0.3 
Cap_int 4.927  4.955  -0.41 0.685 -9.3 -2.3 
Export 4.256  4.302  -0.19 0.853 -17.8 -1.1 
 
6.6.2 Industrial and regional distributions 
Table 6A.3 Industrial Distribution based on 2-digit industrial codes 
2-digit 
industrial 
code  
Industrial name  
Firm 
number 
17 Manufacture of Textile 10 
26 
Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical 
Products 64 
27 Manufacture of  medicines  52 
28 Manufacture of  chemical fibers  6 
29 Manufacture of  rubber and plastics  14 
30 Manufacture of Non - metallic Mineral Products 30 
31 Smelting and processing of  ferrous metals 6 
32 Smelting and processing of  non-ferrous metals  4 
33 Manufacture of  metal products  20 
34 Manufacture of General-Purpose Machinery 88 
35 Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 206 
37 Manufacture of Transport Equipment 26 
38 Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Equipment 82 
39 
Manufacture of communications and other electronic 
equipment 112 
40 
Manufacture of Measuring Instruments and Machinery 
for Cultural Activity and Office Work" 62 
41 Other manufacturing  8 
Total  790 
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Table 6A.4 Area distributions in Jiangsu 
Regions  Cities Firm 
number 
The north region of  Jiangsu 
(Su’ Bei) 
Xuzhou, Lianyungang, Huai’an, 
Yancheng, Suqian 
60 
The central region of  Jiangsu 
(Su’ Zhong) 
Yangzhou, Taizhou, Nantong 166 
The south region of  Jiangsu 
(Su’Nan) 
Nanjing, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, 
Zhenjiang 
564 
Total   790 
 
PhD Dissertation, Yuchen GAO 
145 
7. Discussion 
In this dissertation, three empirical studies are arranged to answer one core research 
question about how public R&D subsidy influences the firm-level learning behaviors, 
which extends understanding of  extant R&D subsidy related studies following the logic 
of  neoclassical economics. The theoretical perspective of  this dissertation echoes and 
follows the logic of  Schumpeterian growth theory, which is an interdisciplinary 
theoretical system integrated by evolutionary economics, organizational learning 
perspective, and systematic theory. 
The Schumpeterian growth theory compensates for the insufficiency of  neoclassical 
economics to a certain extent, regarding innovation as the endogenous determinant of  
economic growth (Aghion et al., 1998; Romer, 1986). On the one hand, Schumpeterian 
growth theory regards knowledge recombination as the key source of  innovation, arguing 
that knowledge growth and technological advancement have a fundamental impact on 
economic development (Romer, 1986). At the micro-level, the accumulation of  
specialized and unique knowledge plays a key role in the enhancement of  firms’ 
competitive advantages, which is the fundamental reason for the differences in 
productivity among firms. The core competencies of  a firm can be achieved through 
organizational learning (Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1991). Therefore, in 
Schumpeterian growth theory, knowledge is an important resource, learning is an 
important economic activity, and the firms can achieve sustainable growth through 
knowledge accumulation and learning (Lundvall, 1992; Romer, 1986).  
On the other hand, the Schumpeterian growth theory breaks with the conclusion 
that growth is balanced and continuous development. Alternatively, the notion of  
“creative destruction” is the key to growth (Aghion & Howitt, 1992). During the process 
of  destruction, innovations are constantly emerging, and the window of  opportunity has 
been created, making it possible for catching up or even leapfrogging (Lee & Malerba, 
2017). In the discontinuity generated by "creative destruction", appropriate public 
intervention is necessary to promote knowledge creation, break the existing pattern, and 
thus reshape social cognition on innovation and facilitate the formation of  the legitimacy 
of  innovation (Freeman, 1989; Nelson, 1993). 
The design of  innovation policies increasingly emphasizes the creation, 
accumulation, diffusion, and application of  new knowledge through firms’ learning 
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behaviors under the logic of  Schumpeterian growth theory. Accordingly, this dissertation 
complements and expands the innovation policy literature, especially the R&D subsidy 
studies by providing a new theoretical perspective for the government to formulate 
innovation policies and effectively improve firm-level R&D capabilities. At the same time, 
it also provides a new theoretical perspective for firms to allocate governmental resources 
for organizational learning, research and development activities, and thereby obtaining 
sustainable competitive advantages. 
First, this dissertation extends the understanding of  public R&D subsidy from the 
learning perspective, which strengthens the theoretical depth in the related research field 
(Clarysse et al., 2009; Gök & Edler, 2012; Zhou et al., 2019). More specifically, this 
dissertation analyzes and explores the changes in firm-level R&D behaviors under the 
sponsorship of  R&D subsidy. This surpasses the R&D-subsidy-related extant studies 
which mainly focus on the logic of  neoclassical economics. This research verifies the 
impact of  public R&D subsidies on two kinds of  learning behavior of  firms, namely 
novel knowledge exploration and familiar knowledge exploitation. Especially, 
investigations into the impact of  novel knowledge on R&D deepen the understanding 
of  the changing learning behaviors of  firms supported by the government. This may 
help us to better understand how R&D subsidy can underpin firms to overcome system 
failure. 
Second, from a more comprehensive perspective, this dissertation further explores 
and portrays the heterogeneous factors of  moderating the effects of  R&D subsidies on 
firms’ learning behaviors. This contributes to extant studies on organizational learning 
theory (Clarysse et al., 2009; Huber, 1991). Specifically, the dissertation integrates studies 
on firms’ development stages and innovation novelty, explores the differences in the use 
of  novel knowledge in firms at different stages of  development and their underlying 
reasons, and supplements the research of  Barbosa et al. (2014). From the perspectives of  
external tacit knowledge learning, and the learning curve with decreasing returns to 
experience, this dissertation tests and discusses the role of  firms’ congenital learning, 
inter-organizational learning and experiential learning in the interactions between R&D 
subsidy, firms’ learning behaviors and R&D outputs. The conclusions of  this dissertation 
demonstrate that firms’ knowledge stock, which is developed from congenital learning, 
plays a key role in absorbing and adopting novel knowledge through inter-organizational 
learning by public support, but may potentially inhibit firms from changing their 
technological focus. This dual effect of  congenital learning supplements extent studies. 
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At the same time, the experience of  undertaking governmental R&D programs has 
eroded the effect of  public funding on firms’ learning behavior changes. This echoes and 
underpins related research in organizational learning theory (Clarysse et al., 2009; Jiang 
et al., 2018). 
Third, for the first time, this dissertation distinguishes the different influences of  
central and local governments in the study of  the effects of  R&D subsidy on firms’ 
learning behaviors. Based on the theoretical framework of  proximity by integrating 
administrative, economic and geographic proximity, this dissertation explains the 
differences between the central and local subsidy programs from three perspectives, 
including the provision of  generic and specialized resources, interest alignments and 
information asymmetry. The results of  this dissertation supplement the research of  Li et 
al. (2018) and Zhou et al. (2018) that local governments can create a more stable 
institutional environment for firms to change technological focus changing and upgrade 
technologically. This supports the argument of  Zhang et al. (2015). These findings 
provide a new perspective for R&D subsidy studies and expand the strategic research 
related to the government-industry relationship. 
Fourth, this dissertation extends innovation policy studies in the context of  China. 
By exploring and verifying the impact of  Chinese government R&D subsidies on firms’ 
learning behaviors, this dissertation provides both theoretical analysis and empirical 
evidence for Chinese governments to design R&D subsidy programs against the 
background of  the innovation-driven development strategy. Based on the findings of  this 
dissertation, the Chinese government is expected to provide effective R&D subsidy 
policies to enhance the firm-level R&D capabilities substantially, encourage firms’ 
learning behaviors, and promote technological focus change as well as industrial 
upgrading. In addition, this dissertation has a deepened understanding of  the role of  the 
science parks in the R&D subsidy research within the Chinese context, which contributes 
to the studies on innovation systems.  
Based on the discussion of  the research findings, this Ph.D. dissertation further 
corresponds to Mazzucato's (2016) study and attempts to answer several of  the key 
questions about the development of  new innovation policy. First, this study supports 
Mazzucato's (2016) view that current innovation policies need to break out of  the market 
failures framework but focus more on system failures. This study endorses and stresses 
the importance of  innovation policy’s enabling “the directions picked to be broad enough to allow 
bottom-up exploration, discovery, and learning” (Mazzucato, 2016; p. 150). In order to make this 
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top-down learning efficient, this study argues that the role of  governments is not only to 
provide R&D subsidies to promote firm-level R&D investment but also to create an 
external environment conducive to firms’ learning and R&D collaborations. By this 
environment creation, firms are encouraged to learn and absorb external knowledge for 
exploration and innovation. 
Second, the evaluation criteria for innovation policy are required to change from 
result-based to more process-orientation. The current evaluation indicators and methods 
on governmental R&D investment developed by market failure framework are usually 
estimated by cost-benefit analysis. In other words, current evaluation criteria on 
innovation policy are usually concerned about whether the benefits of  public 
intervention can compensate for the costs associated with market failures and market 
interventions, as well as the implementation of  policies. Mazzucato (2016) argues that 
these traditional and static evaluation criteria on innovation policy do not match the 
inherent dynamics of  economic development under innovation. It also does not take into 
account that firms are often risk-averse and have a lower willingness to change existing 
technological patterns so as to create a new one. The studies of  this dissertation support 
this argument of  Mazzucato (2016). My research on the effects of  R&D subsidies on 
firms’ novel learning indicates that the government can promote firms’ transformation 
and create new technological combinations that are entirely new to firms. Without 
indicators for such dynamic views, the static criteria will influence the government's 
ability to determine the novelty of  innovation and the essential growth of  firms’ 
innovation capabilities. Therefore, this dissertation argues that it is essential to develop a 
new set of  criteria to measure and evaluate the extent to which innovation policy has 
changed the firms’ learning behaviors and technological fields. In my studies, the novelty 
of  IPC code combinations is mainly adopted to evaluate the change of  firms’ innovation 
behaviors after receiving public R&D subsidies, which provides important enlightenment 
for the development of  new evaluation criteria. 
Third, Mazzucato's (2016) study suggests that governments should continue to 
learn and adapt to transformative processes of  technologies and socio-economy in the 
designs of  new innovation policies. On the one hand, governments need to be more 
patient with firms’ innovation activities, so as to accept the failure and experimentation 
of  firms under the R&D directionality shown by governments. On the other hand, 
governments require the potential to experiment and explore the environment. Thus, 
governments should learn, build relevant resources, capabilities, and structures in the 
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process of  investment, discovery, and experimentation to establish a symbiotic 
partnership with the private sector (Mazzucato, 2016). My studies further indicate that, 
based on more administrative, economic and geographic proximity to local firms, local 
governments have greater efficiency in learning through the interaction with local firms 
in the process of  such policies’ development. Thus, the central government needs to 
decentralize the authority of  R&D subsidy investment to local governments. This echoes 
the arguments of  Mazzucato (2016) that innovation “is best achieved not through heavy top-
down policies, but through a decentralized structure in which the organization(s) involved remain flexible, 
innovative, and dynamic from within” (Mazzucato, 2016; pp 151). 
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8. Conclusion, Implications and Further Studies 
Combining the knowledge-based view with an organizational learning perspective, 
this dissertation explores and analyzes empirically the interactions between R&D subsidy, 
organizational learning behaviors and firm-level R&D output in the context of  China 
from a more evolutionary and systematic perspective. A set of  exclusive panel data is 
applied as the basis for the empirical analysis, covering 7,928 manufacturing firms in 
Jiangsu Province observed from 2010 to 2014. Another primary data source is the official 
patent database of  2024 Jiangsu firms in the manufacturing sector from the State 
Intellectual Property Office of  the People's Republic of  China. The main econometric 
methods are comprised of  propensity score matching, instrumental variables, Tobit 
regression model, Logit regression model, and Cox regression model. 
Three core research questions are answered in this dissertation: 1) How does R&D 
subsidy influence high-tech SMEs’ collaborations with universities? What are the 
moderating roles of  science parks and human resources? 2) How does public R&D 
subsidy influence firms’ exploratory learning? Are the effects of  public R&D subsidy 
diverse at different firm development stages? 3) By participating in public R&D subsidy 
programs can this enable firms to adopt novel knowledge to change their core 
technological focus? Do R&D subsidies from central and local governments have 
different effects on firms’ novel knowledge exploration and the change of  their core 
technological focus? 
The main findings are as follows: 
First, the R&D subsidy promotes the high-tech SMEs’ investment in R&D 
collaborations with universities, and it also promotes SMEs’ citations of  knowledge from 
universities in the invention patent applications. At the same time, SMEs’ highly-educated 
R&D human resources are found to positively moderate R&D subsidy to promote the 
firms’ citations of  knowledge from universities in invention patents. Surprisingly, the 
empirical results imply that antagonistic effects exist between the science parks and R&D 
subsidy, which may be due to the overlapping of  public resources. Therefore, R&D 
subsidies can help the high-tech SMEs outside the science park to collaborate with 
universities but failed to be “the icing on the cake” for SMEs in the science park. 
Second, R&D subsidy cannot stimulate firms’ novel knowledge exploration 
behaviors. Furthermore, the effects of  R&D subsidy on firms’ exploratory learning 
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behaviors vary at different development stages. R&D subsidy significantly reduces the 
probability of  firms in the declining stage to explore, absorb and adopt novel knowledge 
in innovation. For firms at growth and mature stage, R&D subsidy has no impact on 
firms’ exploratory learning behaviors. 
Third, public R&D subsidy has no significant effect on firms’ general behaviors of  
novel knowledge exploration, which reinforces the results of  Chapter 5. While firms 
participating in public R&D subsidy programs have a higher probability of  changing their 
core technological focus with novel knowledge than other firms, we further distinguish 
the different effects of  R&D subsidy programs of  local and central governments. R&D 
subsidies from local governments have significant effects on firms’ core technological 
focus change, while those from the central government have no such effects. Moreover, 
the empirical results show that the firms’ existing knowledge stock has a significant 
negative effect on their novel knowledge exploration and the change of  firm-level 
technological focus, even though the firms are sponsored by governments. In addition, 
prior experience of  participating in public subsidy programs has a significant negative 
impact on firms’ novel knowledge exploration and the change of  technological focus. 
8.1 Implications 
This dissertation attempts to produce practical enlightenment for both the 
government and firms. 
For the government, this dissertation at first provides new essential insights for the 
design of R&D subsidy policy. Initially, according to the discussion on R&D subsidy’s 
effects on firms’ learning behaviors of this dissertation, the focus of its R&D subsidy 
policy had to change from being result-based to process-orientation. The government 
needs to pay attention to the change in firms’ innovation behaviors after receiving R&D 
subsidies. Second, based on the results of  Chapter 5, the timing of  R&D subsidy 
allocation is also important. The government can consider giving R&D subsidies to firms 
in the growth stage. However, for firms in the maturity stage, and especially in the decline 
stage, the government should withdraw intervention and no longer grant R&D subsidies. 
Especially for firms in the decline stage, R&D subsidies will damage their innovation 
novelty, and even cause them to miss the opportunity to enter a new life cycle by using 
novel knowledge. Third, the study of  Chapter 6 indicates that firms’ motivation to 
undertake R&D with novel knowledge and further change technological focus is reduced 
with previous experience of  working with the government. Thus, the government should 
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set an appropriate interval between obtaining R&D subsidy by the same firms, in order 
to avoid the weakening of  the positive effects of  R&D subsidy caused by the declining 
in the learning experience and repeated investment. Fourth, based on the discussion on 
designing the new innovation policy, the government's R&D subsidy should take into 
account the novelty of  patents in setting the criteria for final acceptance, rather than only 
using the number of  patents as the single threshold. Additionally, since direct subsidies 
are deemed less effective in promoting novel knowledge invention, subsidy with more 
incentive mechanisms, such as subsidized loans, might be a better option. 
In order to promote the learning behaviors of  firms, the government should also 
help shape the external learning environment of  firms. Governments should make 
efforts to build regional innovation systems to support the local firms and the spillover 
of  novel knowledge, as the complicated novel tacit knowledge tends to be localized and 
disseminated within the region (Fritsch, 2002). Within perfect regional innovation 
systems, the government can help to link firms with universities and encourage 
knowledge sharing among firms via R&D subsidy. At the same time, the transfer and use 
of external new knowledge to generate technological output comes down to the 
improvement of internal absorptive capacities. In this way, governments, besides giving 
direct R&D subsidies, need to encourage firms to enhance internal congenital learning 
capabilities through specific behaviors and activities, for example, recruiting highly 
educated R&D employees. In addition, according to the findings of  this dissertation, the 
R&D subsidy should be more allocated to the firms outside science parks. 
Another important implication for policymakers is that the central government 
needs to decentralize the authority of  R&D subsidy investment to local governments for 
the technological upgrading of  local firms. Local governments should strengthen their 
interaction with local industries and leveraging systemic flexibility in order to promote 
the local firms’ acquisition and adoption of  regional specialized resources for exploratory 
learning and technological upgrading. 
For firms, the results of  this dissertation provide implications for strategic decisions 
on when and how to participate proactively in governmental projects in relation to the 
exploration of  novel knowledge for the enhancement of  their own innovative capabilities 
and technological upgrading. This dissertation also suggests that firms should emphasize 
the improvement of  R&D capabilities and related absorptive capacities for novel 
knowledge through upgrading human capital and knowledge base renewal. At the same 
time, firms should design flexible organizational forms to efficiently absorb and adopt 
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relevant specialized resources and knowledge when utilizing R&D subsidy. In addition, 
firms need to maintain close interaction with local governments to reduce information 
asymmetry when undertaking R&D subsidy programs. 
8.2 Limitations and Further Studies 
This dissertation also raises several questions for further research directions. First, 
the data employed in this dissertation has a comparatively short observation period, and 
cannot capture the impact of  R&D subsidies on long-term learning behaviors and 
performance. As extant research stressed, firms’ high level of  learning behavioral 
additionality generated by R&D subsidies does not necessarily guarantee the success of  
the policy (Georghiou & Clarysse, 2006). This policy may lead firms to surpass their own 
capabilities, moving in wrong directions of  technological development. This may lead to 
higher failure risks in firms’ R&D activities, which is not conducive to sustainable 
competitive advantage. More specifically in the context of  China, the evaluations of R&D 
subsidy projects are usually undertaken within three or four years after providing support. 
Therefore, in further research, the observation period of  the sample can be extended 
with more than five years’ observation to capture not only the legacy effect but the 
persistent effect of R&D subsidy on firms’ learning behaviors as well. 
Second, the sample employed in this dissertation comes from Jiangsu Province, 
which is a leading province of  innovation in China. The R&D capabilities of Jiangsu 
firms are in the leading position. For other provinces, especially those with relatively 
backward innovation capabilities, whether R&D subsidies have the same impact is 
unverifiable in this dissertation. Thus, further research can compare the impact of  R&D 
subsidies on firms’ learning behaviors in different regions with different technological 
development stages in China. The effects of  knowledge flow formed by cross-regional 
linkages on firms’ R&D behaviors can be also explored (Qiu, Liu, & Gao, 2017). 
Third, because there are differences in the relationship between firms’ development 
stages and innovation novelty in different industries and technologies (Barbosa et al., 
2014; Sorensen & Stuart, 2000), R&D subsidies designed for firms in other industries 
can be one of  our future explorations. In addition, the effects of  different types of  R&D 
subsidy, such as subsidized loans and tax incentives on firms’ learning behaviors, can be 
further investigated. 
Fourth, this study cannot capture the effect of R&D subsidy on firms’ 
collaborations with other industrial partners, even though Li et al. (2018) argue that 
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interactions with suppliers, users, and even competitors have a profound effect on a 
firm's innovation performance. Thus, another future research direction can measure 
firms’ organizational learning behaviors with industrial partners, and further study the 
effect of R&D subsidy on learning behaviors in such collaborations. 
Fifth, exploring effects from types of R&D subsidy should be one of the critical 
directions for further study. Currently, in China, various types of R&D subsidies have 
been designed, including direct grants, subsidized loans, tax incentives, and even public 
guidance funds. As argued by Mazzucato (2016), governments can learn from the 
experience of private venture capitalists to design portfolios of different types of R&D 
subsidy by considering opportunity costs and risk tolerances. For example, the research 
question could be valuable about how direct grants can be used by combining subsidies 
with more market-orientation mechanisms, such as subsidized loans, to achieve higher 
efficiency. Thus, research related to finding the optimal solution for the different 
proportions of various R&D subsidy types could be another promising research direction. 
In terms of  research methodology, to further confirm the causal relationship 
between R&D subsidy programs and the change of  firms’ learning behaviors, a 
qualitative research technique can be designed to identify the changing directions of  the 
technological focus of  sponsored firms, thereby verifying the extent to which R&D 
subsidies affect firms’ learning behaviors. The data envelopment analysis (DEA) method 
can be adopted as well to find the optimal proportion of R&D subsidies on firms’ R&D 
investment in different regions. At the same time, the DEA method can also help to 
explore the optimal solution for the different proportions of various R&D subsidy types, 
and thereby provide guidance for the government to formulate more effective R&D 
subsidy policies. 
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